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
WITH

AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

BY

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THE EUTHYDEMUS

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
IN THE EUTHYDEMUS

GEORGE HENRY WELLS

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
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ISAACO GULIELMO SEWELL.

In Memoriam.



INTRODUCTION.

IT may be said of Euthydemus, as it has been said of John Wilson Croker, that he belongs to that class of persons who have contrived to secure immortality by incurring the hostility of some more potent spirit than their own. Euthydemus is the representative of a class of men who incurred the censure of Socrates and the hostility of Plato: and Plato, the pupil and biographer, whilst depicting his master's satire, has employed the fullest powers of his graphic pen in placing before us a complete portrait of the lowest type of Sophist. And the object of this dialogue is to show how Socrates warned those who were interested in education against men of this type; and not to make any positive additions to the Platonic philosophy.

Plato's dialogues have been divided into two kinds—viz., those that are destructive and negative, and those that are constructive and positive; in other words, those occupied in removing fallacies and convicting men of ignorance, and those devoted to the establishment of positive results. The dialogue before us belongs to the former class. There are but few points of positive or constructive import, the far greater part of the dialogue being taken up with a delineation of debased dialectic and its teachers. When, therefore, these few points have been touched upon, we shall proceed to the more important aspect of the dialogue, and try to gain a clear notion of the term "Sophist."

§ 1. The points in which an attempt is made to gain additions to positive knowledge, are as follows. That all men desire happiness. That the proper and rational scheme of life is, to employ ourselves towards the attainment of that end for which we are fitted. That there is some science, acquaintance with which should teach us the rules of virtuous

action. And that, therefore, it is possible to teach men how to be virtuous. (See chaps. viii.-x.)

These theses imply a doctrine very far removed from the cardinal theory of life and virtue in Plato's philosophy, and rather recall to us Aristotle's dogma, that man's right function is *ψυχῆς ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετήν*, a virtuous use of the intellectual faculty.

The principle of an *ἔργον*, or function, insisted upon by Aristotle, is generally subordinated by Plato in importance to the *τέλος* or result of that *ἔργον*. His school made an ideal good their object, the Aristotelian school a material good—viz., happiness. Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics gives, as a reason for treating the doctrine of the Universal at length, the fact that the Platonists have introduced their *εἶδη* or Ideas into the question—*τὸ δὲ καθόλον βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι . . . διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη*. And Plato's highest conception of a man's being was a life gradually educated up to the contemplation of the Ideal good (see Rep. VII. ad fin.): *ἀποβλέψαι . . . καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ*. . .

Probably we have in these theses Plato's earlier system of ethic, which afterwards underwent a great change, and was completely idealized. Also we must recollect that in this dialogue Socrates is addressing a mixed audience, and, in particular, he is endeavouring to elicit answers from a boy, in order to encourage him against the dialectical attacks of two Sophists. And therefore we must lay no stress upon the form these inquiries take, a form necessarily simple and popular; but imagine that Socrates is taking his pupil over well-known ground, where it would be impossible, in the course of a few moments, to arrive even at the beginning of an elaborate philosophical system, such as we have in Plato's Republic. And as to the possibility of wisdom being taught, we learn from the Protagoras that Socrates held this tenet in common with the great Sophist, although differing from him on other points. The inquiry after that science which is to supply rules for a virtuous life, is left without a conclusion, and is introduced partly to carry

on the interest of the discussion, partly to draw out the Sophist, and partly to encourage Clinias once more to form his own opinions (*see* chap. xvii., notes).

Therefore Plato's object in writing this dialogue was not to advance philosophy. He desired, rather, to exhibit in its true light that perversion of dialectic, called eristic, and practised by inferior Sophists, of whom he has given us such a scathing account, that we feel obliged to try and discover, from contemporaneous sources, if his account is not coloured by class or party feeling.

§ 2. The chief characters of the dialogue before us, apart from Socrates, are two strangers from Thurii. "Who are they?" asks Crito, and Socrates replies: *Καινοί τινες αὐ οὔτοι, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφισταί.* And without a careful investigation of the significance of this term Sophist, we shall be unable either to grasp the full bearing of the dialogue, or weigh justly the characters of the interlocutors.

Passing over the early acceptations of the term—viz., "A man clever in any trade or profession," or "a wise man," we shall confine ourselves to its meaning in Athens and in the time of Socrates.

In Thuc. 3, 38, Cleon, when advocating the entire destruction of Mitylene, city and inhabitants, compares those Athenians who were not sufficiently alive to the importance of the political situation, to men sitting down and listening to Sophists (*σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένους*). From this we may gather two or three facts. Firstly, that the Sophists gave lectures to public audiences or to private classes; secondly, that these lectures were regarded by some in the light of a quasi-theatrical performance, and not necessarily as a practical means of instruction, a point confirmed by a reference to the present dialogue, ch. vi. init. (*ὁ Εὐθύδημος . . . ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν αὐτόν.*) Thirdly, that the term had been specialized by the year 423 B.C., at which time Thucydides was banished, and may be considered to have begun his history. But we are not justified in recognizing any expression of opinion with

regard to the Sophists' professions or practice in this passage by itself. But in a contemporary writer we find the term coupled with an extraordinary number of abusive epithets,—extraordinary, even for a comic writer. ἴσθ' ὅτι πλείστους αὐται βόσκουσι σοφιστάς, θουριομάντις, ἰατροτέχνας, σφραγιδονυχαργοκομήτας,¹ &c. From the epithets employed it is evident that either the term is used in its older significance, meaning one who has knowledge of any trade or profession, or that there is an intentional confusion of different kinds of quacks with the Sophist, σοφιστής, in the later acceptation of the word. And we are inclined to accept the latter alternative, because later on in the same play (l. 1111) we find the term used absolutely of Strepsiades' son, who is to be educated by Socrates, and to be turned out a σοφιστής. But if we accept this as the gist of the passage we are obliged to draw the inference that Aristophanes must be held in a greater or less degree responsible for any obloquy that might afterwards have fallen upon the σοφισταὶ as a class.² We must not undervalue the influence and authority of this Dionysiac comedy.³ It was attended, roughly speaking, by the whole population of Athens, besides many strangers. It performed the critical function of the modern newspaper and review, and it formed and directed public opinion among the mass of the population. Its choruses are the prototypes of the modern political or topical song, whose wide influence the events of late years have on more than one occasion fully shown. Many an auditor, therefore, who had perhaps

¹ Aristoph. Clouds, 331, 2.

² Grote lays all the blame of attaching odium to the name "Sophist" upon Plato. See "History of Greece," chap. lxvii. p. 484, 3rd ed. But considering Aristophanes' use of the term, Plato must be exonerated from this charge. The view taken in this account of the Sophist is substantially the same as Professor Grote's; but to speak of the

heterogeneous mass of persons such as the Sophists composed under the name of a "profession" is misleading. He himself allows that "it is impossible to predicate anything concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and peculiar to all the Sophists."

³ The first production of the Clouds took place at the Διονύσια ἐν ᾧστει, B.C. 423, many years before Plato wrote.

hardly heard of the Sophists as a class in B.C. 423, no doubt went away from the performance of the *Clouds* fully persuaded that the Sophists were a kind of noxious animal, whose houses should be burnt over their heads, who should be objects of aversion and persecution to every good citizen, to whom no encouragement should be shown, nor quarter given if they came within the reach of the law.

Meantime the better educated part of the Athenian world had opportunities of forming their own opinion. The writer of the *Clouds* was a thorough Conservative, and in his play of the *Clouds* we get the conservative side of the question. Let us now discover what were the opinions held by other and more progressive minds.

The most celebrated man who bore the name Sophist was undoubtedly Protagoras of Abdera. If we hear what Socrates said and thought of this Sophist we shall have a certain datum whereon to found our conclusions as to his opinion of the whole class. In the dialogue of Plato named after Protagoras we find all Athens astir with the news of his arrival, for the second time. A citizen, Hippocrates, has been up all night, and comes hurriedly into Socrates' house to wake him, and begs that he will accompany him to Protagoras. These events make it clear that Protagoras was a person of celebrity and public reputation. Upon Socrates inquiring why Hippocrates is so excited, he is told that Protagoras alone has wisdom, and has not yet imparted it to Hippocrates. To which Socrates replies that money and persuasion will be sufficient to effect Hippocrates' object. We may pause again and gather up these facts—viz., that Protagoras was "a professor of wisdom," that he received money for his lectures, and that he was in a position to require "persuasion" to lecture. After this Socrates proceeds to make Hippocrates state his reasons for going to Protagoras and paying him money, employing his analogical argument, as usual. "If you went to a physician, and paid him money to teach you, you would be intending to become a physician?" and so on through a number of instances. When the analogy is complete, the

question is put, "What is Protagoras considered to be?" and the answer is, "They call him at any rate a Sophist" (Σοφίστην δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε αὐτόν), where the particle γε implies that the name is not perfectly clear and unequivocal. And Hippocrates is obliged to confess that it seems that he must be intending to become a Sophist, if he goes to Protagoras and pays for his teaching; at which confession he blushes. And Socrates asks, "Would you not be ashamed of coming forward as a Sophist in Greece?" to which Hippocrates assents.

And now we begin to see that the Sophist's celebrity is not unattended with drawbacks; that there is a dark side to his position; and that whilst every one is anxious to go, to listen, even to receive instruction, they shrink from the thought of becoming what the Sophist is. What has been said above of the quasi-theatrical character of the sophistic lectures may help us here to grasp the full significance of these blushes, and this repugnance to the profession of Sophist. It was probably the same spirit that made acting on a stage the extremity of dishonour to which a free-born Roman could descend; that *hauteur* which forbade a citizen to run in the public streets, which prescribed a decorous carriage, and a graceful neglect of all except political occupations, and was induced in great part by the institution of slavery. On no other grounds¹ can we explain the apparent anomaly of men being ashamed to teach the most intellectual subjects, which they were only too glad to learn.

Socrates finds a way for Hippocrates out of his difficulty by suggesting that he would go to learn with a Sophist as a means of general education, and not in order to become a Sophist himself; with which explanation Hippocrates is naturally satisfied. And then comes the crucial question, "What is a Sophist?" but Hippocrates fails to give a satisfactory definition. "How, then," asks Socrates, "can you bear to hand over the direction of your mind to a man of

¹ It must, however, be recollected that, in addition to this, the payment of money for in-

struction received was a repulsive thought to a well-born Athenian.

whom you cannot give an account?" This last question may be put simply in Socrates' perplexing manner, to bring Hippocrates to a proper state of submission; but it may also intimate that there were Sophists against whom Socrates considered it necessary to caution Athenians, a possibility which a perusal of the Euthydemus will render a certainty.

Hippocrates and Socrates set off for the lodging of Protagoras, where it is said that Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, two other leading Sophists, are staying. They have some difficulty in gaining admittance, the reason of which, Socrates suggests, may be the great crowding of Sophists (*πλῆθος σοφιστῶν*) to the house. From which we gather that Sophists abounded in Athens at this time. Even Socrates and his friend are suspected of belonging to this class, and are kept waiting till their importunity succeeds in gaining them admittance. We now have an opportunity of hearing the great Sophist expound his own views of his profession. He remarks, to begin with, that the sophistic profession is an old one, and includes many famous names—as Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus,—who veiled their real pursuit under the name of poetry, or of other arts, because of the odium attached to it (*διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθές*). Of himself he says, *ὁμολογῶ σοφιστῆς εἶναι, καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους*, where the word *ὁμολογῶ* is evidently apologetic, and confirms our deductions from the blush of Hippocrates (*v. supra*). He professes himself perfectly willing to discourse before an audience, and Socrates encourages the intention, because, as he says, "I thought he wanted to show off and cut a fine figure before Prodicus and Hippias." This, again, supports what has been said about the histrionic aspect of sophistic.

Later on in the dialogue Socrates finds that if he is really to get any solid good from Protagoras he must be allowed to put his questions and receive answers in the dialectical manner which he always adopted. But Protagoras will not agree to this, except under compulsion of the majority, who can only persuade Socrates to remain and continue the discussion on those terms. Protagoras,

on the other hand, wishes to give his opinions at length, not to subject himself to criticism and cross-examination. "If I had adopted the latter method," he adds, "I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere"¹ (*οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησίν*). With this example of a sophistic monologue we may compare the oration of Thrasymachus, in Republic I., who makes a long speech and then wishes to run away; as Socrates puts it, "when he had deluged our ears with this torrent of rhetoric like a bathman, he had it in his mind to go away." So that we begin to recognize two types of Sophists—viz., those who lectured, and those who employed the dialectical method. And it is evident that what abuse there might have been amongst them probably arose in the latter class, inasmuch as their proceedings must necessarily have been of a less public character than those of the lecturing division. This conclusion will help to explain the bad name which Socrates incurred; for he was a σοφιστής, or teacher of wisdom and ethic, although he may have disclaimed the name, and fell naturally within the division of interrogating Sophists. Not much more is to be gathered from the Protagoras with reference to the Sophists; but our opinion of the great Sophist is raised when we meet with a frank acknowledgment of Socrates' abilities, as a logician and future philosopher, towards the end of the dialogue. And we are warranted in concluding, from Plato's known hostility to the Sophists, that the account of Protagoras here given does not err upon the side of indulgence.

We now turn to the Meno. In ch. xxvii. of that dialogue the question is put by Socrates, "To whom should a man be sent who desires guidance and information about private and political economy, and the duties of a man towards his parents and his friends?" and the answer is, "To those who profess to teach any one who will learn the practice of virtue for a pecuniary consideration." Anytus, who is

¹ Jowett.

Socrates' interlocutor, asks, "And who are they?" Socrates replies, "The Sophists, as men call them." Whereupon Anytus breaks out with this exclamation: "Heracles! hush, Socrates! I hope none of our relations or friends would be mad enough to go to them and be corrupted. Why, it is notorious that they injure and corrupt all who have to do with them!" We see that Anytus would have been entirely at one with Aristophanes, that he took the violent, sweeping, and anti-progressionist view of sophistic, and entirely ignored the reputation of such men as Protagoras. The answer of Socrates to this outburst points out the absurdity of this sweeping condemnation of sophistic. "How is it," he says, "that men are willing to pay large sums of money in return for this ill-treatment and corruption, as they do? Protagoras, for instance, made more money even than Phidias, to my knowledge." And he goes on to say that through a course of teaching which lasted over forty years Protagoras' reputation remained famous and untarnished (*εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὴν εὐδοκίμων οὐδὲν πέπνυται*) and that his was by no means a solitary case. These facts speak for themselves, and require no comment. But the same dialogue will supply us with material for showing that Socrates was alive to the Sophists' bad side: where he utters in plain language the condemnation which in the Euthydemus is delivered in the language of satire and innuendo. When Meno is endeavouring to prove, like a "sophisticated youth"¹ as he is, that it is useless to seek after that of which we are ignorant—in other words, that Inquiry is fruitless, Socrates remarks, *ὁρᾷς τούτον ὡς ἐριστικόν λόγον κατάγεις*; showing his contempt for this quibble, which Meno had doubtless picked up from some Sophist of the Euthydemus kind. And, as a final condemnation of the Sophists, we find in the Phædrus that they are relegated to the last place but one in the abode of souls after death, the last place being held by the tyrant, whom we know, from Republic, Book IX., to

¹ Jowett.

have been considered by Socrates as the worst type of man that could possibly exist.

We have, then, a part of the internal evidence of Greek writing, upon which to found our estimate of the Sophists. We have seen that the history of the name is as follows. Originally meaning nothing more than a proficient or professor of any accomplishment whatsoever, it had become, towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the distinctive title of persons professing to teach letters and philosophy, ethical and political; that about the same time a violent prejudice arose against these professors on the part of the Conservatives in Athens; whilst the greatest leaders of the class proved their integrity by the fact that their lectures were crowded, and that learners were ready to pay large sums for instruction. The question has been asked, Did the Sophists form a distinct order in Greece? If by this is meant, Were they of a recognized social standing? we must answer, No. But in the absence of a board or faculty of Education the Sophists seem to have occupied that position amongst their fellow-citizens which Thucydides considers Athens to have held amongst the States, when he describes her as the educator of Greece.¹ We have mentioned below that the education supplied by the Sophists was in the direction of a university course, and that its special subject was ethic. Political information, in a Greek or Roman city, could be acquired from any public man of eminence; but ethical study was from its nature the pursuit of few and private individuals. As society grew more complex, the want of an ethical system was felt, to supply which the Sophists arose. It seems probable that they must have incurred the enmity of the priestly class, whenever their investigations assumed a rationalistic phase. Socrates, we know, incurred the charge of what we may call Naturalism through his noble rejection of that mass of legend and anthropomorphism which had gathered round the originally simple cult of

¹ πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύουσιν εἶναι.—Book II., ch. xli. init.

Hellas; and this charge formed one of the special counts of his indictment before the Court. But that he was a recognized authority on educational matters is clear from the attitude of men like Crito, Alcibiades, Hippocrates, and Clinias, towards him. Another question has been asked, Was Socrates a Sophist? To this we may answer both yes and no. The points of coincidence are these. Socrates and the Sophists both gave instruction, both used the dialectic method (although not all the Sophists did so), both were ready at another person's call to discuss questions, and both lay under the same stigma of being rationalistic and subversive talkers. Therefore Socrates was described as a Sophist by his contemporaries. But the important difference between them—most important in the eyes of a Greek citizen, as we have stated above—consisted in the fact that Socrates received no remuneration for his dialectic services, but made the general welfare of mankind his object in this pursuit of discussion, and not the support of his own life. A more material difference, but one which it required time to vindicate, lay in the deeper import of Socrates' inquiries. In the Euthydemus the import of the two Sophists' inquiries must be represented by zero, as will be noticed in the account of their character. And it is probable that every shade of difference in this respect was represented in the investigations of different Sophists. But of this we may be sure, that none surpassed Socrates in the earnestness and the catholicity of his philosophy.

The uncertainty and the disputes about the Sophists as a class arise from the intrinsic difficulty of including, in a class, a number of different minds developed by the same awakening in different channels. The name was a popular name, and, like all popular names, it was incorrect. Under it were included all those professors of argument—we cannot call them professors of logic—of whom Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are types, whom Socrates himself distinguished from σοφιστικοὶ under the title of ἐριστικοὶ, or debased dialecticians. The name, in fact, was applied in a general way to any person who professed to impart moral

or intellectual culture; its debasement may be partially illustrated by that of the word "æsthetic," which at the present day is in danger of losing its first and right meaning of "appreciative," and of being restricted to the designation of a mingled affectation and absurdity.

§ 3. The *dramatis personæ* of the Euthydemus between whom the principal conversation takes place, are Socrates and Crito; but, as in the case of the Republic and Protagoras, the greater part of this composition is taken up, not with a conversation between the characters first introduced, but with a description of a conversation that has taken place before, narrated for the amusement or the benefit of a friend by Socrates himself. The actors in this secondary, though really more important part of the dialogue, are Socrates; two Chians, brothers, named Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, emigrants to Thurii; a grandson of Alcibiades, named, after his great-grandfather, Clinias; a friend of Clinias, Ctesippus, and a crowd composed of the friends both of the Sophists and of Clinias.

Of Crito, to begin with the original interlocutors, there is not much to be said, beyond what we can gather from the few words he has with Socrates. He is taken by Plato as the type of the average Athenian of the day; average, because he is no enthusiast upon the subject of sophistic teaching, nor, at the same time, is he a violent anti-sophistic. He is quite ready to profit by the new and enlarged scope of cultivation, but he is wary, and not likely to commit himself by too hasty a choice of a professor to induct him into the mysteries of a liberal and advanced education. He is a farmer, like most other Athenian citizens (*ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία*, ch. xix. med.), and he is in want of a suitable person to educate his sons, about one of whom at least, Critobulus, he is very anxious (*καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν υἱῶν . . ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ*); and he makes Socrates his daily confidant on the subject. It may be remarked, by the way, that the education of which he is in search corresponds to the general culture which our

universities afford, and in particular to the study of ethical and political philosophy; literature, and science (*i.e.*, natural philosophy), not being objects of study in Athens, where to be familiar with Homer and contemporary writers, as all citizens were, was to be thoroughly versed in literature, whilst to pursue natural science was to court the abuse of Dionysian comedy, or the fate of Anaxagoras. To return to Crito. He is a man who appreciates and discriminates character: thus when Socrates is going on perhaps too far in the account of the discussion he enjoyed with Clinias, Crito interposes with the question, "Did young Clinias say all this?" and again, upon Socrates suggesting that perhaps it was Ctesippus, Crito contemptuously asks, *ποῖος Κτήσιππος*; He seems to have had a profound respect for Socrates, from the fact mentioned above, that he frequently (*ἀεὶ*) consulted him about his sons' future, and from the reluctance with which he informs Socrates of the censures passed by a friend upon his readiness to meet all comers in the dialectical arena. And this we learn even better from the dialogue which bears Crito's name than from the Euthydemus, where, when urging Socrates to attempt escape, we find him saying that if Socrates dies he will be deprived of a friend (*οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μήποτε εὐρήσω*.)¹ And again, in the Phædo, we find him with Socrates to the very end; and to him Socrates turns when he is desirous that Xantippe should be led home from the prison.² Nor are tokens of their attachment wanting in the Apology, in which composition Crito is mentioned along with Critobulus his son, and Plato, as ready to offer bail for Socrates' enlargement.³ He was a man of Socrates' age and Socrates' deme,—*Κρίτων οὗτος, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης*,—and therefore probably Socrates' oldest friend. That he was of a money-making turn of mind is evident from Socrates' remark that the acquisition of wisdom under the guidance of the Sophists does not stand in the way of any pursuit, even of

¹ Crit. 44 B.² Phæd. 60 A.³ Apol. 38 B.

money-making, when he adds, *ὁ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι*. He is also of an inquiring nature: *φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε*, he says of himself; he was attempting to hear the conversation which forms the bulk of this dialogue, afterwards narrated to him by Socrates; and he manifests great interest in Socrates' account of the Sophists. He has not gone deeply into philosophy, or he would not have been at a loss where to put his sons, nor have been in that doubt with respect to the real worth of it, which makes him characterize it merely as *χαρίεν*, and endure his friend's condemnation of it as *οὐδένοϛ ἀξίον*, without a reply. On the whole it is a pleasant character,—a man of business habits, yet anxious to educate his children liberally; with discrimination; with affection, and appreciation of real worth; with an interest, although undeveloped, in letters and philosophy: one of those citizens who might have prevented the downfall of Athenian empire, if they had not unfortunately been left by this time in the minority.

Socrates appears in this dialogue in two characters: as narrator of the experience with the Sophists to his friend Crito, with whom he now and then discusses a point, and as one of the actors in the dramatic dialogue itself. But such was his power of lending himself to either side of a question, such was his satiric humour, and his appreciation of dramatic effect, that Socrates, the narrator of the discussion to Crito his friend, frequently loses himself in Socrates the *εἴρων*, the hero of the actual discussion. To Crito he is as full of admiration for the Sophists' wisdom as he is in the presence of the Sophists themselves, when he is calling Clinias' attention to their wonderful gifts of logic and philosophy and dialectic. Their wisdom is *θαυμασία*, they themselves are *πάνσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς*. Nay, he is anxious to attend their classes himself, and would have Crito come with him, so desirous is he to catch all the words of wisdom which they may utter. Again, he is so wrapt in the discussion which he relates that he even draws Crito into it, and, by question and suggestion,

causes him to work out the very conclusions over again to which the interlocutors came themselves (ch. xix.). This indeed is a trait not peculiar to the Socrates of the Euthydemus, but is characteristic of the universal Socrates of Plato's dialogues. At the end of the narrated discussion Socrates finishes by repeating his request that Crito will go and hear for himself; and the absurdity of the suggestion—absurd, because Crito is advised to go and learn virtue and wisdom from quibblers and triflers—makes the whole intention of the dialogue no longer doubtful, if it had not been evident from the beginning in what a satirical vein Socrates' admiration for the Sophists is conceived. Socrates relates the dialogue to hold up the Sophists to that contempt which they deserve, to deter men from trusting them with their children, and to excite an interest in their teaching which if followed up will lay bare its unsatisfactory character. Hence, although apparently sarcastic, this request for Crito to go and judge for himself is really the strongest deterrent that could be administered to prevent him, when he had once heard them, either from studying with the Sophists himself, or entrusting his children to their direction. Only at the very end of the composition does Socrates doff the garb of satire which he has worn throughout, even with Crito, and enter upon a serious criticism of the pretensions possessed by men of general culture to a reputation for philosophy and politics. He adds, also in a serious vein, a word on philosophy, with a very earnest exhortation to which the dialogue ends.

Reserving the Socrates of the discussion until the other characters have passed before us, we will first take Clinias, the youthful and beautiful Athenian, whom Socrates introduces to the Sophists, in the hope that they may give him the best instruction possible towards leading a virtuous life. He is very dear to Socrates and to a number of other friends, some of whom are present with him in the Gymnasium at the time of this discussion: φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, ὅσον εἰκὸς περὶ νεώ. He is Alcibiades' grandson, and bears the name of his great-grandsire, his father being

Axiochus. He is evidently of a modest disposition, shame-faced and confused when Euthydemus begins to cross-examine him. His attachment to Socrates is intimated by his looking towards him for an answer when nonplussed (*ἀπορήσας ἔβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ*), and by his freedom of answer when under catechism by Socrates (chap. viii. *seqq.*). In fact, as the catechism, in its second part (ch. xvii.), merges into a discussion between Clinias and Socrates, the former loses all his shamefacedness, begins to indulge in side-thrusts at the Sophists (ch. xvii. D), and exhibits such a fearlessness of criticism, that we feel compelled to interpose with Crito, and exclaim, *τί λέγεις σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μαιράκιον τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγγετο*. This is the only blemish that can be found in an otherwise picturesque character, if it is to be called a blemish. Probably the whole episode to which we refer is a case of that fidelity to nature and real character which makes the Platonic dialogues so fascinating. Probably Plato intends to represent Socrates carried on a little too far by the ardour with which he recounts his conversation with Clinias, and induced to overrate the success of his maieutic method in eliciting answers from the boy. In that case—and, upon the whole, it seems the best view that can be taken—we may rest content with merging a certain part of the personality of Clinias in the completer personality of Socrates, and add one more trait to an already familiar character.

Socrates was sitting in one of the rooms of the Gymnasium, when a crowd of persons entered, centering on two figures, men somewhat advanced in years, whom they followed with marks of obsequiousness and attention. The two elder men were Chians, and in one of the revolutions of which that island was the scene, they had found themselves obliged to flee their state and take refuge in Thurii, in Magna Græcia (*v. note, ch. i. Χίον*). From Thurii they had visited Athens, and having once exercised the profession of pancratiasts, *i.e.*, professors of arms and gymnastic, they now appear in the character of Sophists, *i.e.*, professors of ethic. From the change of profession we may gather

that they were more or less adventurers, as Ctesippus hints (ch. xvi. med.) when he mentions their frequent change of residence, *ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ἐνομαζόμενοι*. And this supposition is confirmed from the tone of their language as we go further into the dialogue. A distinction asserts itself between the two brothers, as disputants, before their performance has gone far; and Dionysodorus is soon recognized to be inferior to Euthydemus. And first in regard of keeping his temper, Euthydemus is seen to be the more finished dialectician. In ch. xii. med., where we find Ctesippus enraged at the silly quibble that Clinias' friends wish him to be annihilated, and distributing verbal cuts to each of his opponents, Euthydemus receives his insults calmly and pursues the thread of his argument; whilst Dionysodorus, when he hears his brother informed that insipid people talk insipidly, so far forgets his science and his self-control as to break out with the exclamation "You are abusive, Ctesippus!" which of course puts an end to all discussion, until the peacemaker, Socrates, has interposed and put them on good terms again. Again, in ch. xvi. init., when Socrates has crushed the argument upon the impossibility of error, by exhibiting its self-stultifying effect upon the originator, Euthydemus again is silent, probably planning a mode of escape from Socrates' confutation, but Dionysodorus breaks out angrily again, *οὕτως εἰ κρόνος*, &c. (just as Thrasymachus does in Republic, I., v., note p. 37), forgetful of everything except his present discomfiture, and anxious rather to abuse the confuter than to try and find a flaw in the confutation. But we must not deny him a certain versatility and readiness, shown in the quibble which he commences immediately upon the failure above mentioned, catching hold of a single unguarded expression of Socrates (*ἐννοεῖ τὸ ῥῆμα*), and drawing from it a fresh confutation of his opponent, in order to divert attention from his own failure, and re-establish his own position. Here, however, he is again met by Socrates with a disproof drawn from his own conclusions, and subsides into silence. In ch. xxiii., again, we find Dionysodorus

dorus failing in that amount of prevision necessary to a finished arguer; where the position held by the two brothers is that a man who knows one thing knows everything; and to test their position thoroughly, the question is put, "Does such a man know that the good are wicked?" Now Dionysodorus, though prepared to go the length of the first statement, loses heart at this ingenious question, and, like a coward, will not bear out his original statement. This of course is equivalent to belying the original statement, and draws down upon Dionysodorus a rebuke from his brother, which has the further disadvantage of laying bare to the audience the machinery of the Sophists' performance. And not only does Dionysodorus forget himself thus; but he is actually so lost to a proper sense of eristic self-possession, that he blushes! But as Socrates remarks of Thrasymachus in the Republic, we may imagine that it is for the first time (*v. note, ad loc.*). His greatest gift as a Sophist is perhaps his tenacity, and unwillingness to allow any one to have the last word but himself; and so it is with a most outrageous pun on his part that Ctesippus, the staunchest of opponents, is finally compelled to relinquish the combat in disgust.

There is at least one trait belonging to both Sophists, but more especially to Euthydemus, which cannot but move our admiration, and that is, the consistency with which they confine themselves to word-quibbling, to the utter ignoring of that matter of which words are a sign. Throughout the dialogue there is hardly an argument on their part which gives any signs of bearing fruit, much less actually produces it. Perhaps the only one wherein we can discover a grain of truth is the contention in ch. xxv., that if a thing is good we are happier in direct proportion to our greater possession of it. Although this position is taken up with the same intention as all the rest,—viz., to involve the opponent in an absurdity or a self-contradiction, yet Euthydemus intends to prove the converse, and appears, as he works out the fallacy, to feel the force of the right view,—viz., that only a certain proportion of a good

thing is really beneficial. And that he really for the time is enforcing this as a true precept is evident from the sarcastic words in which he condemns the false one,—*καλῶς . . ἔξει, εἰάν τις . . ἐγκεράσῃ ἑλλεβόρου ἀμάξαν*. But it is only by accident, so to speak, that Euthydemus stumbles upon an argument, which results in the establishment of an important truth; and we can feel no doubt but that the establishment of the converse would have given him quite as much pleasure, or possibly more, in so far as an apparent paradox commands more present admiration than a truth.

We have shown by contrasting Dionysodorus with Euthydemus as a dialectician, the superiority of the latter; and, as we might expect from this, he takes the lead in their introductory conversation with Socrates. Virtue, according to his statement, is their profession; but if we are to take their words in this dialogue as in any way illustrating that profession, we can only be sorry for their incapacity to conceive rightly what virtue is. The best that can be said for these Sophists and their professions is, that with them the art of getting the better of other men by a command of words appeared in the light of the real and the only desirable good; and if we grant this we must allow that they follow out their text with skill and consistency. And in order that we may not appear to be raising the Sophists to a higher level than they deserve, when we mention the words good and consistent in connection with their names, it must be allowed that Euthydemus, at least, held consistently the apparently ridiculous opinion that a man is always and in every respect that which he is at any moment and at all. He held it so consistently, that it is attached to his name; just as the opinion that, "whatever appeared to be to a man, is truly so to that man," was attached to the name of Protagoras (*v. Crat.* 386 D). And this thesis, which we find Euthydemus proving at great length and with great pains (*chh.* xx.-xxiii.), may be concluded from the passage in Cratylus to have been his distinguishing tenet. He had already established a reputation when we meet with him in Athens, appearing

as he does amidst a number of ἑταῖροι^{*} and ἀκροαταὶ, who laugh and clap and make a noise as he makes his points (ch. v. fin. &c.). The word refinement does not apply to him, nor indeed to Dionysodorus either, who, as we have seen above, falls to boorish abuse when worsted in argument. And when Socrates has given the two a complimentary introduction to Clinias, they look at each other and burst into a fit of laughter; from which circumstance we see that their ἑταῖροι are but following the lead of those greater than themselves, when they commit the same offence against good breeding.

The proper title for Euthydemus to assume would have been professor of Proof and Disproof; for if we examine the parts of the dialogue we shall find that all his efforts are directed merely towards the proof of some statement which he has brought forward, or the disproof of another's statement, and nothing more. For, be it observed, although all productive and sound reasoning must be conducted by the same means, proof and disproof of statements are nothing but means in themselves, and when employed as ends become trifling and unproductive. That the proof was everything and the substance or statement nothing, is shown by Dionysodorus' remark in ch. v. : "But I tell you, Socrates, whichever way Clinias answers, he will be proved wrong." The object was not to establish any truth by a method of ratiocination; simply to prove an adversary to be incorrect, whatever assertion he made. Therefore Euthydemus is guilty of downright falsehood, when in ch. ii. fin. he professes to teach the best method of becoming virtuous. It would have been a different thing to have professed the inferior art and have striven to teach the greater. Such a practice would have been a form of Socratic εἰρωνεία, about which was nothing dishonest. But to profess the greater and to be found wanting in it can be nothing else than ignoble as well as deceitful.

One further count has to be added to these charges against the Sophists—viz., that they were not above taking money for their teaching. "A man must live," was their

thought; and their commodity found as ready a market as any other, especially when the pupils learnt that to be virtuous was to possess the ability to disprove any assertion of any man at any given time. "If any one will give them money they will teach him;" such was Socrates' concluding remark concerning the brothers, reminding us of one with whom we have before had occasion to compare them, Thrasymachus, of the Republic, who reviles Socrates for not even being grateful—*i.e.*, much less paying a fee, in return for information which he acquires from others (Republic, I. 388 B).

On the whole we are compelled to look upon Euthydemus and his brother as unprincipled, besides little-minded, men. We can view with astonishment their marvellous command of quips, and fallacies, and puns; we can admire their pertinacity, and (in Euthydemus' case) self-control; we may regret that their cleverness at cross-examination was not employed in a law-court and in the service of justice; but we see in them also a sordid temperament, which only takes for its object that which will pay; a vulgar complacency over a conquered antagonist; an abusive brutality when crossed; and an inability to perceive that the really good is worth pursuing for its own sake, coupled with a deceit which makes a false pretence of pursuing good. And we must heartily agree with Socrates' recommendation, that they should, if possible, keep their talk for each other's delectation; and failing that, only perform to an audience who would pay them; for in that case they would certainly fail to find any one who could think it worth while to pay for such information as these Sophists supplied. And with this advice of Socrates we turn from a pair of unprepossessing portraits to a character of a very different, of an exactly opposite type, Ctesippus.

This character cannot be better described in few words than as (in the words of Socrates, ch. ii.) "a thorough gentleman, in his real nature, but reckless, because he is young." His ardent and impulsive nature is indicated by

his devotion to Clinias, which we gather from the remark let fall by Socrates when he describes the preliminary scene in the dressing-room,—*βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ παιδικὰ*; and, as the story of the conversation is unfolded, from many other intimations of his friendship. Of these the most notable is the anger of Ctesippus, which breaks out in the form of a significant threat, when the Sophists inform the company that they are evidently anxious that Clinias should be annihilated. and finds vent in the words,—*ὦ ξένε Θούριε . . . εἶπον ἄν, Σοὶ εἰς κεφάλην*. And again, in ch. xxvi. fin., he is also thoroughly devoted to Socrates, and shows his generous and unflinching nature in the promise, *ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαντόν*, when Socrates is preparing to brave all the dangers of a Sophistic catechism, showing thereby that he will not be left behind in a dangerous enterprise, nor be outdone in generosity. He is outspoken always; thus he will explain (ch. xiii. med.) the entire difference between being angry with an opponent, which he disowns, and differing from him. He has a hearty laugh, *μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας*, and is of a thoroughly demonstrative character. Up to a certain point in the dialogue, however, we only see half of his entire nature; that side of it, viz., which is plain-spoken, straightforward, and downright. But we are surprised to find that the irascible, violent, and affectionate disposition can throw over itself the cloak of sarcasm, and employ the restrained language of satire and innuendo. Nor are the precipitate arguments of Ctesippus any the less telling for their precipitation; he finds the Sophists wanting several times, without the aid of Socrates; and finally turns the tables completely upon them, by adopting their system of argument, and surpassing them in the extravagance of his paradoxes (v. chh. xxiv., xxv., xxvi.). His power of sarcasm is marked at every fresh point of departure in the later arguments; nor is it ill-humoured sarcasm, but of that kind which sees its antagonist unworthy of serious confutation, and treats his arguments more in the light of a joke

than otherwise. See ch. xxv. init. : *τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον* ; KT. *Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς· οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί σε*. And in ch. xii. ad fin., when he has relieved his mind by the outburst against Dionysodorus, and cannot refrain from a cut at the Sophists' insipidity, he disclaims the charge of abuse brought against him, adding, *ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε*. Again, in ch. xxv. fin., the Sophists are proving that it is possible to speak and be silent at the same time ; Ctesippus happily puts in, " Yes, certainly, for you have succeeded admirably in saying nothing." But he bears no malice, and has the good taste to leave the last word to the Sophists. His quickness of verbal repartee is remarkable for an amateur, combating two skilled opponents such as Dionysodorus and Euthydemus ; and we must look upon him as a living expression of that characteristic of which the Athenians were especially proud—viz., *δεινότης*, a quality which cannot be expressed by any single word of the English language, but partakes of the meaning of "cleverness," "dash," "readiness." Besides this he ought not to fail to be considered as Socrates describes him, *μάλα καλὸς καὶ γαθός*, a thorough gentleman ; and we shall then have a fair idea of one of Plato's most amiable and characteristic creations.

The dialogue of the Euthydemus brings out in its strongest light one of the strongest traits in Socrates' nature—viz., his unvarying and keen sense of, and appetite for, the Satirical in his intercourse with men. Now it is rare to find this satirical vein existing side by side with earnest and full convictions, and with a good-humoured enjoyment of society of all degrees. The former often finds its expression not so much in satire as in sarcasm, the difference between which ought by no means to be ignored in considering Socrates' nature, whilst a vein of satire would in most cases be incompatible from its very nature with the latter. Yet these three characteristics are all found in Socrates, as Plato presents him to us, and they are the salient traits of his nature. First and foremost must be placed his deep and earnest conviction. And of what? We may answer in his own words from the

conclusion of the Euthyphro: “ὡς . . . τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην;” or from the dialogue before us: “τίς ποτ’ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥς τυχόντες ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν;” In what nobler sentiment could the scheme of a rational life be expressed? Nor is it a selfish search for salvation; he is willing to do anything and suffer anything in the cause of the search (ch. xiii. med.), and it is not even for his own sake that he is anxious to hear the cause preached, but for the Athenian youth, as expressed in the person of Clinias, and the Athenian public generally (v. ch. iv. init.: *τούτοις χάρισασθον καὶ . . . ἐπιδείξατον*; and *infr. τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες* (Κλεινίαν) *ὡς βέλτιστον γενέσθαι*). Thus again to Clinias himself he gives as a reason for plucking up courage to answer the Sophists the possibility that it may be of great advantage to him in his pursuit of virtue: *ἴσως γάρ τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μεγίστην ὠφέλειαν* (ch. v.) And we must not forget the index of this conviction, the supernatural warning of which he was as much convinced as he was of his duty to lead a better life and help others to do the same. To this warning he distinctly attributes the opportunity which occurred to him of bringing into contact the rising generation of Athens and the professors of Sophistic (ch. ii. init.: *ἀνισταμένον δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον*). We have mentioned above that not only is the whole of the narrated dialogue cast in a satirical vein, but that Socrates frequently, nay, generally, preserves the same tone in his conversation with Crito. But it is noticeable that this satire appears together with the mention of the Sophists, is carried on with great rigour during the description of them, and their arguments, and drops immediately upon their dismissal. Then, again, is Socrates serious in his language (serious in intention he has been throughout), and he discusses the question of Specialism in a matter-of-fact tone which could leave nothing to be desired, even to the most matter-of-fact auditor. And his earnest words on the subject of philosophy as a vehicle of education, we have also mentioned above.

From these considerations it seems clear that whatever Socrates' manner may be, he has always before him some object of material good and material improvement. And whilst this object, whatever it might have been from time to time, never left his thoughts, he was saved from fanaticism by his unbounded charity, philanthropy, and justice. An absorbing sense of duty, when it pervades the whole life of a man with equal intensity, in many cases produces, or rather becomes, fanaticism;¹ it turns men into Inquisitors, or Puritans. To prevent religious feeling, as we might say, from turning sour, there must be a very large proportion in man's nature of what we may term "kindliness," in default of a better expression. This was the most prominent feature in Socrates' character, after his absorbing purpose, and it was his kindliness which saved him from fanaticism, which made his teaching bear fruit, and gathered round him a band of devoted friends. And if we pause for an example of another reformer in history whose kindliness was only exceeded by his strength of purpose, the name of Luther will recall one who shares not only this but other traits with the Athenian protestant. To this second feature in Socrates' nature, his accessibility, his catholicity, which thought no man common or unclean, but all worth teaching and saving, we come next. And notice that this, as in the case of One greater than Socrates, is made a ground of accusation against him. Even Crito, his oldest friend, whose long acquaintance with Socrates should have taught him better the catholicity of his nature, even Crito seems to agree with the verdict of his friend that Socrates had no business to let these Sophists do as they liked with him in their dialogue: *τὸ μέντοι ἐθέλειν διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτοις ἐνάντιον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι*. For this piece of carping criticism Socrates bears no malice, but he criticizes the spirit of such a carper, and adds the Christian and judicious remark that

¹ Compare the refusal of Savonarola to interfere on behalf of the

condemned Bernardo del Nero, in George Eliot's *Romola*, ch. lx.

the kind of men under discussion should be pardoned if their emulation leads them to be bitter, but that they must more or less forfeit our estimation; enunciating, as a reason for the former statement, that we ought to feel respect for any and every man who pursues earnestly any object from conviction. We see this kindness brought out by the way in this dialogue, when Socrates has to act as peacemaker between the irascible Ctesippus and the two Sophists. He, no doubt, amused himself to a considerable extent with these comical encounters, and would have enjoyed their further development, had it not been to his interest—that is, to Clinias' interest,—that they should be restricted. But we recognize the habitual peacemaker in the intimation to Ctesippus that he should take what the strangers have to give him, and not obstruct their attempts to teach him. And, rather than keep the fountain of wisdom from flowing, he is ready to offer himself on any terms as a medium of discussion, or *corpus vile* for the professors' demonstrations. And again, in ch. xvi., ad fin., he mollifies Ctesippus once more; *κατεπράυνον τὸν Κτήσιππον*; with the same explanation of the Sophists' whimsicalities that he had used to Clinias. His kindly nature shows to no greater advantage than when he takes upon himself to cheer up Clinias after the dialectic falls they have given him: with what consideration he explains that, after all, it is only their fun, that these are but jests and the preliminaries to the real course of instruction! And, to encourage him further, he puts him through an easy catechism on the subject of the end and object of existence. It may be urged that it is not very considerate of Socrates to expose Clinias to the first attack of the Sophists, to constitute him the Carian, or leader of a forlorn hope; but Clinias, it must be remembered, is in sore danger of being spoilt by his admirers, and cannot fail, if he is a boy of spirit, to profit by a few tumbles in the dialectical contest.

The opening scene of the Charmides gives us a slight but a telling intimation of the terms which subsisted

between Socrates and his acquaintance; and herefrom we can draw a cogent proof of this trait which we are considering. Returning from the army at Potidæa, he repairs to his accustomed haunts, to one of the *palæstræ*, and finds a number of his acquaintance there. Friends, and those unknown to him personally, start up and welcome him as he enters: εὐθὺς πῶς ῥῶθεν ἡσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν. And Chærephon rushes up to him "like a madman," to know the particulars of his safe return. Χαιρεφῶν δὲ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὢν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων, ἔθει πρὸς με, καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης. A man welcomed in such a fashion as this by a mixed company could hardly fail to be, on the whole, a popular character, even allowing for the adventitious interest of his being fresh from the seat of war. And popular he would no doubt have continued to the end of his days, had he not been too stern an enemy to falsehood and immorality to allow of his adopting any but an uncompromising attitude towards those who encouraged these vices. That this was his unvarying attitude we need read but few pages of Plato to conjecture, and but few more to conclude; and of the means he employed to unveil vice we now come to speak.

The method and the manner of Socrates' ἔλεγχοι, or proofs, are inseparably connected, both being represented by the word εἰρωνεία. By continually representing himself as ignorant and incapable, he lulls his opponent into a false security, and leads him on to a rashness of statement which, if rigorously tested, must bring its originator into difficulties. This method predominates to such an extent in Plato's Socrates that it may be called his method *par excellence*; and in no dialogue is it more sustained than in the one before us. From his first meeting with the Sophists, down to the very end, Socrates is continually lost in admiration of their superior wisdom and general acquaintance with scientific methods; only now and then indulging in a sarcasm, more or less patent to the audience, when the Sophists lay themselves open to the Parthian arrows of his

irony. We have called attention to the predominance of satire in Socrates' character, and have distinguished it from its near neighbour, sarcasm. The latter has been termed "the language of the devil," and, although this is too harsh a definition, might be described as satire plus bitterness. Now bitter Socrates certainly is sometimes, when his indignation gets the better of his kindliness, and we respect him the more for his bitterness. But the prevailing tone of his conversations is satirical rather than sarcastic; he used to accomplish his object—viz., the destruction of falsehood and incorrectness, by means of his satirical method above described; and only now and then does he feel it worth while to be angry with any of his fellow-creatures. When he employs the power of sarcasm, he gives shrewd blows to those who incur his contempt, and yet affords no opportunity to the opponent of bringing against him the charge of rudeness, as Dionysodorus does against Ctesippus (ch. xxiii. fin. comp. with ch. xii. fin.). He prefers, if possible, to let the incorrect statement or theory confute itself, thereby bringing home to its advocate the real insufficiency of his opinion. Thus, in his well-chosen confutation of the Sophists' theory of the Impossibility of Error, he does not show that a man must err in this or that position, but he simply asks the question—"Then why do we want you to teach us how to avoid the evil and choose the good?" the most telling confutation that can be devised of such an absurd theory as held by professors of ethic (ch. xv. fin.). And in ch. xxvii. he uses a quibbling proof to establish the Identity of the Different, which might have been taken from the repertoire of Euthydemus himself. This negative method follows consistently upon his profession of ignorance, and gives the opponent no opportunity of fortifying his own statements by admissions of Socrates. It is only when in conversation with a receptive and a tractable mind, like that of Clinias, that Socrates drops his satire, and launches out into constructive dialogue. And although he arrives at certain results in his conversation with Clinias, he soon guides the argument

into an unproductive channel, that an occasion may arise for invoking once more the Sophists' assistance, and for exhibiting thereby the pettiness of their subjects. It is only when in contact with ignorance that Socrates employs this satirical method, and the more perverse and noxious the ignorance, the more satirical does Socrates become. From this fact, which may be gathered from any one of the dialogues of Plato, we conclude that the prevailing feeling in Socrates' mind was philanthropy, and not cynicism finding its expression in satire, as might be concluded from a hasty perusal of this and certain other dialogues. Socrates was essentially a man of peace, although he could fight, if he were called upon to do so, in defence of his country or his opinions; and he was never at a loss for the soft answer to turn away wrath. He was of a distinctly sanguine temperament, especially in the cause of education or general knowledge. Thus he is anxious to go and learn ethic, just as he used to learn music of Connus (ch. i.), and he promises (ἐγγυῶμαι) the Sophists that not only will he learn, but all the others who are there with Clinias; and he is the last to be deterred by any feeling of shamefacedness or dulness.

Keeping these three principal traits before us—viz., Socrates' purpose, philanthropy, satire,¹—we recognize a thoroughly healthy mind, of sound principles, nor yet gloomy, of a humorous turn, nor yet flippant; cheerful, unvarying, and yet always new; such a mind as, from its freshness, must always command a large circle of admirers, and from its solidity cannot fail to justify their devotion.

¹ This satiric humour never left Socrates, even in the hour of his trial before the Athenians. When the assessment had been made, upon his condemnation, and the penalty proposed was "death," Socrates' counter-assessment, according to the usual course of procedure, was "a seat

and sustenance in the prytany chamber," a distinction awarded to those who had done service to the State, as indeed he claimed to have done; but the grim humour of this proposal probably enraged the dicasts and lost Socrates his life (*v. Apol. Socr. ch. xxvi.*).

THE ARGUMENT OF THE EUTHYDEMUS

OF PLATO.

CRI. Who were you talking with, Socrates, in the Lyceum yesterday?

So. With Euthydemus and Dionysodorus among others, Crito; two Sophists.

CRI. And who are they, and what do they teach?

So. They come originally from Chios, and have been living in Thurii. Their wisdom is extraordinary, and they communicate it to others for a consideration. I am going to study with them myself.

CRI. Surely you are too old to learn, Socrates. But tell me in detail what they said.

So. Well, I was in the Gymnasium and was going away, when I experienced the monitory sign, so I sat down again. And directly afterwards these two Sophists came in, followed by a large crowd of admirers; and shortly after them came in Clinias, Alcibiades' grandson, with Ctesippus, and a large crowd of his friends. Clinias came and sat down by me, and meanwhile the two Sophists walked about and talked loud and looked in our direction. So I, seeing what they wanted, gave them an introduction to Clinias; but only got laughed at for my pains. Then they told me that they taught virtue, and I said that I and Clinias and Ctesippus were all anxious to learn. So they began upon Clinias. And, instead of teaching him anything about wisdom or virtue, they made him contradict himself three or four times, and, whenever he did so, their friends laughed and clapped their hands. So I thought it time to interfere, and I encouraged him by saying that they meant well and were only having a little fun with him, just as people pull chairs away when others are going

to sit down. And to reassure him, I put him through a little catechism about the end of life being happiness, and about the means towards gaining happiness. I led him to work out the argument that we ought to use all our talents and all our intellectual gifts for those objects which they suit best; and he proved, with my help, that it is better to be weak and uninfluential than strong and powerful, if you have no principle. And, since happiness is the result of directing our powers to their proper end, we ought to make the latter our earnest study. And then came the question: "Can this wise and proper use of our faculties be taught?" Then I turned to the Sophists and said: "This is what I mean by teaching a young man wisdom; but perhaps you can show us a better method." "Well," said Euthydemus, "as far as I can see, you want Clinias to become what he is not, and to leave off being what he is; in other words, to be annihilated." This made Ctesippus, who is extremely fond of Clinias, very angry; and he told Euthydemus that he lied. But Euthydemus said that it was impossible to lie; and while they were arguing about this, Ctesippus contrived to make the other Sophist, Dionysodorus, lose his temper. So I interposed and offered myself as a *corpus vile* for them to experiment upon with their arguments; but they again began to prove the impossibility of contradiction, according to Protagoras' school. Then I said, "If you maintain the impossibility of an untruth and the impossibility of a contradiction, why on earth have you come here to teach us how to frame our conduct?" And this made Dionysodorus very angry again, and he caught hold of a chance expression of mine about a word "meaning" something, and he asked how could a word "mean" this or that, as if it were alive. And I tried to hold him to my question, but he would not be held, but would make me answer. So I deferred to him as to my superior in attainments, and let him say his say. After this I resumed my conversation with Clinias about the possibility of teaching wisdom and virtue. And we worked it out as follows:—That we must

discover some science which teaches us both to find the material upon which our faculties are to be employed, and also to employ our faculties upon it in the right way. And we thought that the art of generalship might be the one required, but it would not answer, and several others failed to satisfy us, even the art of being a king.

CRI. But did young Clinias say all this?

So. Oh! Clinias, or Ctesippus, or it may have been someone else. Then the Sophists struck in again, and were for telling us what we wanted to find out, or for proving to us that we already knew and possessed it,—whichever we pleased. So they proceeded to prove that if I knew one thing I knew everything; but they had to twist my words about to do so, and to make me answer in their words and not my own. But it followed that they knew everything from this; and Ctesippus, seeing the comic side of the admission, began to ask them if they knew how to do the most disgusting things, and I also asked if Dionysodorus could dance. Afterwards I asked him if he knew that the good were bad and black was white, and he said “No;” thereby destroying his brother’s argument, as Euthydemus told him, which brought a blush to his face. But he began another quibble to prove that, once a brother always a brother, once a father always a father; so that I must believe that Euthydemus’ father was my father; but I said I had rather not. And Ctesippus saw his opportunity here, and said he supposed Euthydemus’ mother was the mother of everything; so that Euthydemus must be brother of the gudgeons and puppies and little pigs. Then Ctesippus proved that the Scythians drink out of their own skulls and many other strange things, *e.g.*, that it is possible to speak when you are silent, and to be silent when you speak, as (he said) Euthydemus had shown, by saying nothing and yet talking a great deal; and that the right thing to do with a cook was to cook him, and with a potter to make pots of him, and many other such fancies. Then Dionysodorus again took up the tale, and proved that my gods were my property, and I could buy, sell, or do

anything I pleased with them. And at last he made such a foolish play upon words that we left off in disgust. And at parting I told them that they should not be so lavish of their wisdom, since "*quod rarum, carum*;" but that their best plan was to keep their talk for each other's delectation, and, failing that, charge a good price for their lectures, or the world would get too wise.

CRI. I should like to hear them, Socrates, especially as I am anxious about my boys. But a friend of mine told me, and I must say I agreed with him, that he thought you were wrong in letting them ask you what they liked and do what they liked with you in the arguments.

So. Who was this gentleman; a rhetor?

CRI. No; a literary man of some sort.

So. Ah! one of those people who have too high an opinion of their own attainments to look with favour on Euthydemus and the other professors of omniscience. But I dare say he meant well. But do not neglect your sons' education, for it is inconsistent to pay great attention to their birth, breeding, and bodily training, and then neglect the training of their minds. Make up your mind about philosophy, and if you think it a good thing, study it both for your own sake and that of your children.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΕΥΘΥΔΗΜΟΣ.

Cap. I. Τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ 271
 διελέγου; ἡ πολλὸς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιεστήκει, ὥστ' ἔγωγε
 βουλόμενος ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἴός τ' ἦν ἀκοῦ-
 σαι σαφές. ὑπερκύψας μέντοι κατεῖδον, καί μοι ἔδοξεν
 εἶναι ξένος τις, ᾧ διελέγου. τίς ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ὅποτερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἷς,
 ἀλλὰ δύο ἦσθην.

ΚΡ. Ὅν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ Β
 καθῆστο· ἐν μέσῳ δ' ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον ἦν.
 καὶ μάλα πολύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξε,
 καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν

ἐν Λυκείῳ, the gymnasium near
 the temple of Apollo Lycæus,
 Socrates' favourite haunt: cf.
 Euthyphro init. ὦ Σώκρατες . . .
 σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν δια-
 τριβάς. These gymnasia were
 elaborate buildings, and served
 the use of the modern club, read-
 ing-room, or promenade.

βουλόμενος, transl. "although
 I wanted . . . v. infr. ch. x. note
 on ἦν δεῖ λαβόντα.

ὅπ. καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, "Yes, but which
 are you speaking of?" *Anglice*;
 the force of καὶ here, as often,
 is difficult to analyze, but has a
 marked effect on the whole clause.

Like many other particles in
 Greek it marks an ellipse, which
 might be thus supplied: "There
 is also (καὶ) another point to be
 settled, viz., which man you
 mean." For the use of ὅποτερον
 in a direct question, and not
 πότερον, Stallb. compares Lysis,
 212. C. ὅποτερος οὐν αὐτῶν πο-
 τέρου φίλος ἐστίν;

τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον. Clinias,
 grandson of Alcibiades, named
 after his great-grandfather.

ἐπιδεδωκέναι, used in the same
 way of moral improvement. Prot.
 318 A. αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπι-
 διδόναι.

Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλ' ἐκείνος μὲν σκληφρός, οὗτος δὲ προφερὴς καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄψιν.

ΣΩ. Εὐθύδημος οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Κριτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς· ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διονυσόδωρος· μετῴχε δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων.

ΚΡ. Οὐδέτερον γινώσκω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

C ΣΩ. Καινοί τινες αὖ οὔτοι, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφισταί.

ΚΡ. Ποδαποί; καὶ τίς ἡ σοφία;

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὡς ἐγώ μαι ἐντεῦθεν ποθέιν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου, ἀπώκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους· φεύγοντες δὲ ἐκείθεν πόλλ' ἤδη ἔτη περὶ τούσδε τοὺς τόπους διατρίβουσιν. ὃ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων· πάνσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς. ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ, ὅ τι εἶεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί. τούτῳ γάρ ἐστον κομιδῇ

ἀλλ' ἐκείνος, &c. "But Clinias is slight for his age, whilst Critobulus is well-grown." The scholiast explains these two words as the converse of each other, thus: σκληφρός, ὁ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ πρεσβύτερος, τῷ δὲ ὄψει νεώτερος, προφερὴς δὲ, τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ νεώτερος, τῷ δὲ ὄψει πρεσβύτερος.

παρ' ἐμὲ. We should expect ἐμοί, but the idea of previous motion is implied in the verb. So Od. 4, 51. ἐς ῥα θρόνους ἔζοντο παρ' Ἀτρεΐδην Μενέλαον, where notice that motion is implied also in the preposition ἐς.

Χίου. This island was the scene of much disturbance in the Peloponnesian war. See Thuc. 8, 6, 7, 8. Its feeling was always really phil-Athenian, or phil-Ionian. Thus, in Her. 8, 132, they revolt from their tyrant and send messengers to the Hel-

lenic camp at Ægina, and previously begged the Spartans, ἐλευθεροῦν Ἰωνίην. But in 412 the oligarchs effected a revolt of the island from Athens.

φεύγοντες, "being exiles." The present used, since the word refers to their present state. πολλὰ ἔτη belongs to διατρίβουσιν.

ὃ δὲ, the object of ἐρωτᾷς seems to be σοφίαν: it remains to account for ὃ. It is also an accusative, and approaches nearest to what is called the accusative of Respect; thus we might render—"but as regards your question about their wisdom"...

ὡς ἔγωγε, &c.: "for I did not even know, before then, what champions were." Socrates means to say that these new comers excel the ideal of championship which he had hitherto conceived of.

παμμάχῳ, οὐ κατὰ τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνε τῷ παγκρατιαστᾷ ἀδελφῷ· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἶω τε μάχεσθαι· τούτῳ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ σώματι δεινοτάτῳ ἐστόν, καὶ μάχῃ, ἣ πάντων ἔστι κρατεῖν· ἐν ὅπλοις γὰρ αὐτῷ τε σοφῷ πάννυ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῷ μισθόν, οἶω τε ποιῆσαι· ἔπειτα τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἷους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δεινὴ ἦσθην μόνον, νῦν δὲ τέλος ἐπιτεθείκατον παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ. ἡ γὰρ ἦν λοιπὴ αὐτοῖν μάχῃ ἀργός, ταύτην νῦν ἐξείργασθον, ὥστε μηδ' ἂν ἕνα αὐτοῖς οἷον τ' εἶναι μηδ' ἀντᾶραι· οὕτῳ δεινὴ γεγόνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἕαν τε ψεῦδος ἕαν τε ἀληθὲς ἦ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐν νῦν ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδροῖν παραδοῦναι ἑμμαντόν· καὶ γὰρ φατον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινόν· τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεινόν.

ΚΡ. Τί δαί, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ᾖ;

ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων· ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον ἔχω

πρῶτον μὲν . . . καὶ μάχῃ. So-
crates proceeds to support his
news. "Their first accomplish-
ment is bodily skill and the
knowledge of an engagement (ἡ
πάντων κρατεῖν), in which (or by
which) they can overcome all
adversaries." This statement is
carried on to the word ποιῆσαι,
where ἔπειτα, "in the second
place," introduces the other ac-
complishment.

λόγους οἷους εἰς . . . οἷους is
simply attracted to the case of
λόγους. So Thuc. 7, 21: πρὸς
ἀνδράς τολμηροὺς οἷους καὶ Ἀθη-

ναίους, and Plat. Euthyph. init.,
Μέλητον οἷον τετανότριχα.

μάχῃ ἀργός, "an untried battle-
field;" ἀργός is ἀεργός, unworked,
and is applied to clay, silver, corn,
&c., in the literal sense. ἀντᾶραι,
supply χεῖρας, for which Stallb.
compares Thuc. 3, 32: χεῖρας
ἀνταιρομένους.

δεινὴ γεγόνατον . . . What So-
crates says here of the Sophists,
Aristophanes says of him, Nub.
98-9: οὔτοι διδάσκουσ' ἀργύριον
ἦν τις διδῶ λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ
δίκαια κᾶδικα.

- καὶ παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γέροντες ὄντε ἡρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας
- C ἥς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσσι ἢ προπέρυσιν οὐδέπω ἦσθην σοφῶ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν ξένοιον περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν. ὀρῶντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένοιον τούτοις τις ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ὀνειδίσῃ· οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσως φοβούμενοι τάχα με οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖσε μὲν
- D ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητάς μοι φοιτᾶν πρεσβύτας, ἐνταῦθα δέ γε ἐτέρους πειράσομαι πείθειν, καὶ σύ τί που συμφοίτα. ἴσως δὲ δέλεαρ ἄξομεν αὐτοῖς τοὺς σοὺς υἱεῖς· ἐφίεμενοι γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς παιδεύσουσιν.

KP. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν γε σοὶ δοκῇ. πρῶτον δέ μοι διήγησαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τίς ἐστίν, ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅ τι καὶ μαθήσομεθα.

πρεσβύτερος, "too old"; properly "older than the proper age." μὴ αὖ, "that I may not again." In the sentence above, *Καινοί τινες αὖ οὗτοι*, this particle has no more iterative force than is sufficient to emphasize a *fresh* statement. V. *infr.* ch. xvii. note, οἱ δ' αὖ.

Socrates' remark here is a fine instance of his unvarying disregard of self; he does not mind being laughed at, τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, as he says in another place: his only fear is, that he may inconvenience the strangers. There is irony, of course, running through these remarks, as through all the dia-

logue, but the sentiment may be taken as genuine and genuinely Socratic.

μὴ οὖν καὶ. The ellipse of δαίδω, or some similar expression, is evident. So we have in *Xen. Anab.* 1, 7, 3: ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

ἐκεῖσε, *sc.* to Connus's lesson. οἶδ' ὅτι, a colloquialism, and equivalent in force to an adverb: "without doubt." So *ἐστίν ὅτε* means "sometimes," *ἐστίν οἱ*, "some men." We may recall in Latin *nescio-quis*.

ὅ τι καὶ μαθ., "which we are going on to learn." By *καὶ* Crito registers Socrates' further remark, that he is to come and learn

Cap. II. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων · ὥς οὐκ ἂν
 ἔχοιμί γε εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν, ἀλλὰ
 πάνν καὶ προσεῖχον καὶ μέμνημαι, καὶ σοι πειράσομαι ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγῆσασθαι. κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον Ε
 καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδουτηρίῳ
 μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νῶ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι · ἀνισταμένου δέ
 μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν
 ἔκαθεζόμην, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τούτῳ, ὃ τ' 273
 Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα
 πολλοί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιεπατεῖτην ἐν τῷ
 καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ οὐπω τούτῳ δὴ ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους
 περιεληλυθότε ἦσθην, καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας, ὃν σὺ φῆς
 πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι ἀληθῆ λέγων · ὅπισθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔρασταὶ
 πάνν πολλοί τε καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος νεανίσκος τις
 Παιανιεύς, μάλα καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός, τὴν φύσιν ὅσον μὲν,
 ὑβριστῆς δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλεινίας

the wisdom, about which he only asked for information.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκ., literally "You cannot be quicker in listening (than I in telling)." So Her. 7, 162, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε τὴν ταχίστην ὀπίσω ἀπαλλασσόμενοι, i.e. "You could not be too quick if you went off at your quickest."

τὸ εἰωθὸς . . . δαιμόν. Observe that this sign or monitorial and supernatural influence is not said to suggest, but restrains only. The general principle of its action is laid down in the words αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε.

ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, understand some particle like ὥστε, "and other pupils with them, till there seemed to be a great number of them:" explanatory or epexegetical infinitive.

καὶ εἰς. : "When in comes Clinias." So Her. 7, 217, ἡὼς τε δὴ διέφαινε, καὶ ἐγενοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ. and here is equivalent to ὅτε. So in Latin, "Atque ego Daphnin Aspicio," Virg. E. 7, 7; and Plaut. Bacch. 2, 3, 45. "Dum circumspecto atque ego lembum conspicio:" where it is equivalent to tunc. V. infr. ch. vi. ad fin., and note. A good example is also found in Xen. Anab. 2, 1, 7: ἤδη τε ἦν περὶ πλήθουσιν ἀγορὰν καὶ ἔρχονται παρὰ βασιλέως κήρυκες, and similarly in 1, 8, init. id.

καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος, "Ctesippus among the rest."

τὴν φύσιν ὅσον μὲν. These words are put in as an after-thought or saving clause. Socrates probably felt obliged to

- B ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου μόνον καθήμενον, ἀντικρυς ἰὼν παρε-
καθέζετο ἐκ δεξιᾶς. ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ φής. ἰδόντες δὲ αὐτὸν
ὃ τε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπι-
στάντε διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιν, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀπο-
βλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς — καὶ γὰρ πάνυ αὐτοῖν προσεῖχον
τὸν νοῦν —, ἔπειτα ἰόντε ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον ἐκα-
θέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς·
- C οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστος ἐτύγχανεν. ἡσπαζόμεν οὖν αὐτῷ
ἅτε διὰ χρόνου ἑωρακώς· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εἶπον πρὸς τὸν
Κλεινίαν, ὦ Κλεινία, τῷδε μέντοι τῷ ἄνδρε σοφῷ, Εὐθύ-
δημός τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, οὐ τὰ σμικρά, ἀλλὰ τὰ
μεγάλα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πάντα ἐπίστασθον,
ὅσα δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν στρατηγὸν ἔσεσθαι, τάς
τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ ὅσα ἐν
ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι διδακτέον. οἶω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατόν
εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν τις
- D αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ. Εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα κατεφρονήθη ὑπ' αὐτοῖν·
ἐγελασάτην γοῦν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὁ

qualify his praise of Ctesippus, when he thought of those words of his which induced Dionysodorus to cry out: λοιδορεῖ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορεῖ. See ch. xii. fin. For this accusative see above, ch. i. τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν, ἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄψιν, ποιῆσαι καὶ ἄλλον αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεῖνόν. ὅσον gives an intimation of the full construction of such accusatives.

ἀντικρυς, straight on; not ἀντικρὺν, opposite. Clinias appears at the door, and seeing Socrates there, comes straight up to him.

ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλ. ἀποβ.: "Now and again." Heindorf points out

that ἄλλη is the ordinary word. ἀποβλέπειν is to look away from other objects at one, to concentrate upon, or abstract from surroundings.

παρὰ τὸ μ. for acc. v. s. ch. i. παρ' ἐμὲ κατήμενος and note.

ὅσα δεῖ . . . ἐπίστασθαι must be supplied, to which τὸν μέλλ. will be subject.

ἐγελασ. γοῦν. Connect this closely with the preceding clause, "at any rate they laughed:" it is the physical sign of their mental contempt; and ἐγ. γοῦν, &c., justifies Socrates' supposition that they were despising him.

Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν · Οὗτοι ἔτι ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα. Καγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον · Καλὸν ἂν τι τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν εἴη, εἰ τηλικαῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν εἵπετόν μοι, τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ καλόν. Ἀρετὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἷω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.

Cap. III. Ὡ Ζεῦ, οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα. Εὐθύδημος τοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον εὐρέτην; ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν διανοοῦμένην ἔτι, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο δεινοῖν ὄντων, ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγον περὶ σφῶν · ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδημησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφῶν ἐπαγγελλομένω. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον, ἵλεω εἶητον · ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶν ὥσπερ θεῶν προσαγορεύω, συγγνώμην δεόμενος ἔχειν μοι τῶν ἐμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτον, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετον · 274 ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυ-

παρέργοις αὐτ. χρω. "We treat them as matter for leisure moments." So τοῦτῃ παραδείγματι χρώμενος, "using this for an illustration." The meaning of a πάρεργον is best seen from what Thuc. says about a navy, 1, 142: τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκείνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίνεσθαι.

ἔρμαιον. Hermes was a road-god, as will be remembered from the mutilation of his images. Thuc. 6, 27. Hence anything found on the road was considered as found under his auspices. And hence the word means any good fortune. Cf. infr. ch. xxi. fin.:

τί μείζον ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὔροιμι.

ἐγὼ δὲ, &c. Take ὡς δεινοῖν ὄντων immediately after ὑμῶν. τὸ πολὺ is an adverb, and qualifies δεινοῖν. Routh prefers to take it as adjective with τοῦτο, but, as τοῦτο is the art of fighting in arms, and the Sophists are allowed to be perfect in that art, it is hard to see why τὸ πολὺ should be used, and not τὸ πᾶν, if Routh's rendering be adopted.

ἵλεω εἶητ., "formula quam usurpabant qui delictorum veniam a diis precabantur," Stallb. Socrates asks pardon of them for his wonder at their professions; for he regards them ὥσπερ θεῶν.

- μαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφατον, τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον. Μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς. τοσόνδε δέ μοι εἶπετον, εἰ ἐν νῶ ἔχετον ἐπιδεικνύναι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ πῶς σφῶν βεβούλευται. Ἐπ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐπιδείζοντε καὶ διδάζοντε,
- B** ἂν τις ἐθέλῃ μαρθάνειν. Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐγγυῶμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὐτοσί, πρὸς δ' ἡμῖν Κτήσιππος τε ὁδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου. οἱ δὲ ἐτύγχανον ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιϋστάμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρῳ καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. ὥς *δ' ἐτύγχανεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνενευκῶς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἐν μέσῳ ὄντος ἡμῶν
- C** τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας. βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσέστη ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ. οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἳ τε τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐρασταὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου τε καὶ Διονυσοδώρου ἐταῖροι. τούτους δὴ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, ὅτι πάντες ἔτοιμοι εἶεν μαρθάνειν. ὁ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα προθύμως
- D** καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτῷ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.

Cap. IV. Εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πάντῳ μὲν οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα ἐπιδείζατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα

ἐν μέσῳ . . . Socrates had Clinias on his right, and Euthydemus was on the right of Clinias; Dionysodorus, the other Sophist, being on Socrates' left.

τούτους δὴ. "Now it was these whom I pointed to when I said that all were ready to learn."

καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα ἐπιδ. Socrates puts himself in the lowest place.

δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐπιδείξαι, τόδε δέ μοι εἶπετον·
 πότερον πεπεισμένον ἤδη, ὡς χρὴ παρ' ὑμῶν μαρθάνειν,
 δύναισθ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνον E
 τὸν μήπω πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ οἶσθαι ὅλως τὸ πρᾶγμα,
 τὴν ἀρετὴν, μαθητὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ σφῶ εἶναι αὐτῆς διδα-
 σκάλῳ; φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης
 ἔργον πεῖσαι, ὡς καὶ διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ οὗτοι ὑμεῖς
 ἐστέ, παρ' ὧν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθοι, ἢ ἄλλης;
 Ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυ-
 σόδωρος. Ὑμεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν
 ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ' ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ
 ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν; Οἰόμεθά γε δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τῶν 275
 μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων τὴν ἐπιδείξιν ἡμῖν, ἔφη, εἰσαῦθις
 ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ ἐπιδείξασθον· τουτονὶ τὸν
 νεανίσκον πείσατον, ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι, καὶ χαριεῖσθον ἐμοί τε καὶ τουτοισὶ πᾶσι.
 συμβέβηκε γάρ τι τοιοῦτον τῷ μεираκίῳ τούτῳ· ἐγώ τε
 καὶ οἷδε πάντες τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὡς βέλτιστον
 αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ
 Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτανεψιὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος B
 Ἀλκιβιάδου· ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ Κλεινίας. ἔστι δὲ νέος·

“Favour the company, and add a demonstration on my account.” He calls himself the dunce of Euthydemus’ class.

φέρει καὶ τὸν . . . τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα is the object of πείσαι; and the words τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον are to be taken together: “Is it the business of the same art to persuade?” &c.

Οἰόμ. γε δῆ, “That is exactly what we think.” δῆ sometimes has reference to a thing laid down as a fact, or to a preceding

point which it recalls to the notice of the person addressed. v. s. iii. fin. τούτους δῆ ἐγὼ δεῖκνυς ἔλεγον: “It was these persons, whom I mentioned, that I was pointing out, when I said,” and so frequently.

τοῦ παλαιοῦ. To call the famous Alcibiades ὁ παλαιός would intimate that this dialogue was written considerably after his death, which took place 404 B. C. æt. 44.

φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ, μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν διανοίαν καὶ διαφθαρῇ. σφὼ οὖν ἤκετον εἰς κάλλιστον. ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν, λάβετον πῆραν τοῦ μεираκίου καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναντίον ἡμῶν. Εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοῦ σχεδὸν τι αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἅμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ
 C θαρράλως, Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐὰν μόνον ἐθέλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε καὶ εἴθισται· θαμὰ γὰρ αὐτῷ οἶδε προσιόντες πολλὰ ἐρωτῶσί τε καὶ διαλέγονται, ὥστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρῇ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Cap. V. Τὰ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγησαίμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον, δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην ὥστ' ἔγωγε,
 D καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. ἤρξατο δ' οὖν ἐνθένδε ποθεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς ἐγῶμαι· ὦ Κλεινία, πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Καὶ τὸ μεираκίον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρω-

διαφθαρῇ. Notice the change of subject, a not unusual feature in Greek writing, for which the reader should always be prepared. Cf. Hom. Il. 1, 218. ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ.

εἰς κάλλιστον. χρόνον, sc. διαλέχθητον. Socrates, it should be observed, uses this word advisedly. The lesson is to be as usual, by question and answer, not a lecture.

τοῦτό γε καὶ εἶθ. That this is acc. cogn. is shewn by the full expression, ἔθη ἅττα, . . . ἃ ἐθίσθησαν περὶ θεοῦς. Legg. 681. B.

οὐ γὰρ, &c. Socrates here enters upon a mock-heroic strain, designed at the same time really to inspire Crito with temporary interest and admiration for these teachers of virtue; so that the lesson of their confusion may be the better appreciated in the rest of the dialogue.

ἐνθένδε ποθεν, "somewhere at this point," "some time after this:" v.s. ch. i., "from some spot or other," ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν.

Μνημοσ. For this divinity cf. Theæt. 191. D. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης.

μεγάλου, h.e. χαλεποῦ, Heindorf.

τήματος, ἡρυθρίασέ τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἔβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ. καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, Θάρρρει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ἀνδρείως, ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται ἴσως γάρ τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μεγίστην ὠφέλειαν. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκύψας μοι σμικρὸν πρὸς τὸ οὖς, πάννυ μειδιάσας τῷ προσώπῳ, Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, σοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, προλέγω, ὅτι ὁπότερ' ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ μεираκιον, ἐξελεγχθήσεται. Καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν ἀποκρινάμενος, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μεираκίῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ εἶεν οἱ μανθάνοντες. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Καλεῖς δέ τινας, ἔφη, διδασκάλους, ἦ οὐ; Ὡμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν τῶν μανθανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι διδάσκαλοι εἰσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς διδάσκαλοι δῆπου ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων, ἡμεῖς δὲ μαθηταί; Συνέφη. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα ἐμανθάνετε, οὐπὼ ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα, ἃ ἐμανθάνετε; Οὐκ ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἠπίστασθε; Οὐ

πάννυ μειδ. τῷ π., as might be said, "smiling all over his face." μειδιάω is naturally expressive of a slight smile, and requires πάννυ to picture the self-complacent grin of Dionysodorus.

Καλεῖς δε. The first pair of ἔλεγχοι or catches in which Clinias is caught turns upon the two meanings of the word σοφός. Euthydemus first uses it in the sense of those who are learned; and since Clinias has answered that σοφοὶ μανθάνουσι, he is evidently incorrect, if we give σοφοὶ the above meaning.

ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . "Is the fact any other, then, than this, viz. that you did not know?" This

is the full construction of ἄλλο τι οὖν ἦ: the ἦ is colloquially omitted, cf. Euthyph. ch. xii. D. ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑποθεῖν . . . ; where τὸ ὅσιον is nom. to φιλεῖται. We may transl. "Surely . . ."

οὐπὼ ἠπίστασθε. Here lies the fallacy or catch. A learner, of course, cannot be σοφός in regard of that which he is learning, if σοφός means "learned." Clinias meant "clever" or "quick-witted" by σοφός, if he thought at all before answering, which is improbable. Euthydemus sees which sense is implied, and works out the other meaning, to effect the contradiction.

- B δῆτα, ἥ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; Πάνυ γε. Ὑμεῖς ἄρα μανθάνοντες ἂ οὐκ ἠπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε. Ἐπένευσε τὸ μειράκιον. Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα σοφοὶ μανθάνουσιν, ὧ Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ σοφοί, ὡς σὺ οἶε. Ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἐπόμενοι ἐκείνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσσοδώρου τε καὶ
- C Εὐθυδήμου. Καὶ πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον ἐκδεξάμενος ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Τί δέ, ὧ Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὅποτε ἀποστοματίζοι ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστής, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παίδων τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄρτι Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω.

- Car. VI. Ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε
- D καὶ ἐθορύβησαν οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιώπῳμεν. Γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἔν' ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνίει τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλ' ἠρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ

σοφοὶ μανθάνουσιν. σοφοὶ here is proleptic: "learn to be wise," i.e. they are not so already. As Stallb. says, the word is introduced here by Euthydemus, "magis etiam perturbaturus juvenem."

οἱ σοφοί . . . Dionysodorus takes up the boy with the other sense of σοφός, "clever," which agreed with Clinias' first statement, but not with the conclusion which has just been worked out by Euthydemus, according to the meaning "learned."

ἐκδεξάμενος, i.e. τὸν λόγον. So

Ficinus, which seems better than Stallb.'s τὸ μειράκιον ἐκδεξάμενος. Cf. vi. B.: τὸν λόγον ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος.

διπλᾶ ἔστ., "brought his questions back over the same ground," lit. "doubled them back." A metaphorical use of the primary meaning of διπλός, "folded over," or "double." L. and Sc. give an illustration, τὴν ἐπωμίδα πτυξας διπλὴν, Apoll. Car. in Mein. fr. 4, 440, which brings out fully the exact sense, but with a physical import.

ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη· Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἂ μὴ ἐπίστανται; Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρὸς με ψιθυρίσας, Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερον τοιοῦτον, Ε οἷον τὸ πρότερον. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἢ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα. Πάντ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφυστα. Τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, δοκεῖτέ μοι εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηταῖς. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλεινίας τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὥνπερ τὸ πρότερον. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς, 277 οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἅπαντα; ὦ μολόγει. Ὅταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματίζει ὅτι οὐν, οὐ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει; ὦ μολόγει. Οὐκοῦν ὥν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει εἴπερ πάντα ἐπίστασαι; Καὶ τοῦτο ὠμολόγει. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄρα σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις ἅττ' ἂν ἀποστοματίζει τις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μανθάνει; Οὐκ, ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, μανθάνεις, εἴπερ γε ἅπαντα τὰ

Πάντα, ἔφη . . . "All our questions of the kind are unanswerable." ἄφυστα, properly "unavoidable:" a metaphor drawn from the unerring flight of a missile.

Τοιγάρτοι. This particle implies that the statement it introduces follows from the last: "Yes, it seems that you have a good reputation therefrom."

Οὐκοῦν ὥν τι . . . The fallacy of Euthydemus' argument is that he uses the word "understand" first of the letters, and then of their combinations, viz. words and sentences without taking the

difference into account. He says: "If you know letters, and all your letters, you know everything expressed by letters," a manifestly false inference.

ἄρα σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις. This is thrown in to fix the confession, *μανθάνω*, "I am a learner," in Clinias' mouth. "Then you don't learn what is dictated to you, but the learner is one who does not know his letters." "Oh yes! I learn," says Clinias. "Then," returns the Sophist triumphantly, "You learn what you *do know*, and not what you don't," as you said.

- B γράμματα ἐπίστασαι. Ὁμολόγησεν. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη. Καὶ οὐπω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἶρητο τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὥσπερ σφαιῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον πάλιν ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μεираκίου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε Εὐθύδημος, ὦ Κλεινία. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτου οὗ ἂν τις μανθάνῃ; Ὁμολόγει ὁ Κλεινίας. Τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἥδη ἐστίν; Συνέφη.
- C Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μήπω ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν; Ὁμολόγει αὐτῷ. Πότερον οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὅτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἥδη ἢ οἱ ἂν μή; Οἱ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπιστάμενους, τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων; Κατένευσε. Τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων; Συνέφη. Οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη, μανθάνουσι, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.
- D Cap. VII. Ἔτι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλὼν ὥσπερ πάλαισμα ὦρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ ἐγὼ γνούς βαπτίζομενον τὸ μεираκίον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαύ-

σφόδρα τι. This word properly means "vehemently;" here some sense such as "exactly," "definitely:" the word καὶ has the temporal sense noticed above, ch. ii.

τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἐπ. As before, Dionysodorus twists the question round to the other and more proper sense of ἐπίσταμαι, which Clinias had intended, and Euthydemus had ignored—the sense, viz., of synthetic thought, not of mere perception of forms. "Learning," he says, "is surely the act of acquiring by thought

what we learn; and if we did not know before we learnt, we must acquire by the process of learning."

οἱ ἔχοντες ἥδη, nom.; οἱ λαμβάνοντες, predicate.

Οὐκοῦν ὦμ. "But did you not grant that it was just (καὶ) those who do not know who belong to that class, viz.: that which does not possess knowledge?" For καὶ v. infr. ch. xxix. and note on καὶ τῷ Κτησιππῷ.

Ἔτι δὲ, &c. ὥσπερ πάλαισμα goes with τρίτον, and νεανίσκον with καταβαλὼν.

σαι αὐτό, μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον·
 ὦ Κλεινία, μὴ θαύμαζε, εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι·
 ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, οἷον ποιεῖτον τῷ ξένῳ περὶ σέ.
 ποιεῖτον δὲ ταυτόν, ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάν-
 των, ὅταν τὴν θρόνῳσιν ποιῶσι περὶ τοῦτον, ὃν ἂν
 μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορηγία τίς ἐστι καὶ παιδιά,
 εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν τούτῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύ- E
 ετον περὶ σέ καὶ οἷον ὀρχεῖσθον παίζοντε, ὥς μετὰ τοῦτο
 τελοῦντε. νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν
 τῶν σοφιστικῶν. πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ
 ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθόν

ἡμῖν, *Dativus Incommodi*. For the converse see *Ar. Ran.* 1134. Ἐγὼ σιωπῶ τῷδε: "must I hold my tongue to please this fellow?"

Κορυβάντων. *Lobeck's* account of the Corybantic mysteries is worth transcription. He says: "The Eleusinian and Corybantic mysteries were as different as possible: the former were celebrated with public countenance, the latter as privately as possible. Over the one presided the magistrates and priests of Athens; over the other the low characters and dregs of the people." The priests of the mysteries used to place the neophyte on a throne, before which dancers passed round him, and afterwards as well. To judge from the context, there must have been a certain amount of buffoonery.

εἰ ἄρα καὶ . . . Understand "as you know" if you have been initiated." We might put the stop at *παιδιά*, and make *εἰ ἄρα*, &c., the *apodosis* to *καὶ νῦν τούτῳ*, &c.

τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν, cf. *Her.* 6, 100. *Αἰσχίνης* ὁ *Νόθωνος*, ἐὼν τῶν Ἐρετρίων τὰ πρῶτα. We may compare the expression *τὰ τελεῖ* and the use of the word *honor* in Latin. *Sed quum summus honor finito computet anno.* *Juv. Sat.* 1, 117. The explanation seems to be that there is an identification of the person with his office: the office and position being always the same, whilst the *personnel* may vary.

Πρόδικος, of *Ceos*. In the *Protagoras*, 314. C. he is coupled with the subject of that dialogue, and with *Hippias* of *Elis*, 314. C.; and again, in the beginning of the *Hipp. Ma.*, the same three are quoted as examples of literary and rhetorical teachers who also took part in public business, especially that of foreign negotiation. V. *Introd.* And for the ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων, v. *Cratyl.* 384. B.: τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἀκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου, &c.

278 σοι τὸ ξένω, ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδησθα, τὸ μανθάνειν, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιῷδε, ὅταν τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην περὶ πράγματός τινος ἔπειτα ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔχων ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῇ ἢ πραττόμενον ἢ λεγόμενον. μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ ξυνιέναι καλοῦσιν ἢ μανθάνειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ μανθάνειν. σὲ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς οὔτοι ἐνδείκνυνται, διαλέληθε, ταὐτὸ ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσι κείμενον, ἐπὶ τῷ τε εἰδότητι καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μή. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐρωτήματι, ἐν ᾧ ἡρώτων σε, πότερα μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἐπίστανται, ἢ ἢ μή. ταῦτα δὲ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδιὰ ἐστὶ· διὸ καὶ φημι ἐγὼ σοι τούτους προσπαίζειν. παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδέῃ πῇ ἔχει, προσπαίζειν δὲ οἷος τ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς

ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδησθα, &c. "Because you did not know the double meaning of 'to learn,' viz., &c." Notice καλοῦσι μὲν and καλοῦσι δὲ, the two balancing clauses which explain the equivocal in the word μανθάνειν; ἐπὶ τῷ τοιῷδε, "in the following case." αὐτοῦ to be joined with ἐπιστήμην. καλοῦσι δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, "and they give it exactly the same name." ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ belongs to ἐπισκοπῇ as dative Instrumenti. It is worth remembering what gall and wormwood all this explanation of Socrates must be to the Sophists: for notice what he is doing. He is laying bare all the machinery of their apparent cleverness, and pointing out that

it only consists after all in the confusion of two different meanings, which, by carelessness of general language, one word happens to bear.

παιδιὰ ἐστὶ. Similarly in the Meno. 80 fin. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις; . . . ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε οἶδε ζητοῖ· οἶδε γάρ. οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὃ τι ζητήσει. This is a similar fallacy to that which Socrates calls παιδιὰ in the text: which was that a man cannot learn what he knows, for he knows it already, playing upon the two senses of μανθάνειν.

ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκε-
 λίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ σκολύθρια τῶν μελ-
 λόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες χαίρουσι καὶ γελῶσιν, C
 ἐπειδὴν ἴδωσιν ὕπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
 σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιὰν γεγονέναι · τὰ δὲ μετὰ
 ταῦτα δηλόν, ὅτι τούτῳ γέ σοι αὐτῷ τὰ σπουδαῖα ἐνδεί-
 ξεσθον. καὶ ἐγὼ ὑφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν, ἵνα μοι ὁ ὑπέσχοντο
 ἀποδῶσιν. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν
 σοφίαν · νῦν δέ, μοι δοκεῖ, πρότερον δεῖν ᾤκησιν παῖσαι
 πρὸς σέ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσό- D
 δωρε, πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν καὶ ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει · τὸ δὲ δὴ
 μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε τὸ μεираκιον, ὅπως
 χρὴ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δ' ἐγὼ
 σφῶν ἐνδείξομαι, οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ οἷον αὐτοῦ
 ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκούσαι. ἐὰν οὖν δόξω ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ
 γελοίως αὐτὸ ποιεῖν, μή μου καταγελάτε · ὑπὸ προθυ-
 μίας γὰρ τοῦ ἀκούσαι τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας τολμήσω
 αὐτοσχεδιάσαι ἐναντίον ὑμῶν. ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ E
 ἀκούοντες αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν. Σὺ δέ μοι, ὦ
 παῖ Ἀξιόχου, ἀπόκριναι.

ὑποσκελίζων, Lat. supplantare, "to pull a man's feet from under him."

ὕπτιον: for the singular Stallb. compares Gorg. 478. C. ΣΩ. χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρυνόμενοι; ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἐμοί γε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ παλλάττεται, i.e. "for it relieves a man."

τούτῳ γε: "these, if any others." A subtly ironical tribute to the Sophists' wisdom.

ἴσως ἰκ. ἔχει. "I should think it is sufficient:" so τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Euthyphr. ch. iii.

ἰδιωτικῶς, "in an unprofessional manner." ἰδιωτης is a private citizen without trade or profession. There is of course a reference to the superior skill of the Sophists in such matters, who were men professing ἀρετὴν παραδοῦναι κάλλιστα, ch. ii. fin.

αὐτοσχεδιάζειν here bears its primary sense of sketching out or knocking up for light purposes, and this without preparation: in Euthyphr. 5, it means "inventing" or "romancing."

τολήμω . . . ἐναντίον ὑμῶν. Still deprecating his daring in

Cap. VIII. Ἄρα γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὢν νῦν δὴ ἐφοβούμην ἐν τῶν καταγελάστων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ οὐ βούλεται ἀνθρώπων εὖ
 279 πράττειν; Οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν εὖ πράττοιμεν; ἄρ' ἂν εἰ ἡμῖν πολλὰ κάγαθα εἴη; ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἔτι εὐηθέστερον; δῆλον γάρ που καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα

intimating to the masters of the art the lines on which he wishes them to work, Socrates makes this diversion or interlude in the performance of the Sophists, principally because he thinks the experiment has gone far enough on the corpus vile of Clinias. It is probable from Ctesippus' pugnacious attitude later on (ch. xii.) that a little more of this browbeating would have led to unpleasantness between the followers of the Sophists and the *ἔρασται* of Clinias. Socrates in the next place is anxious to set a real discussion on foot, or to shew up the Sophists' pretences in their true light; and he takes the field against them in his usual method, pretending that he is anxious to be instructed by those whom he is going to confound.

Ch. VIII. The main question in this diversion is: "Can wisdom be taught?" as in ch. iv. init. Socrates tries to raise the question with the two Sophists: "Can virtue be taught?" v. inf. ch. x. fin. *πότερον ἢ οὐ διδασκὸν ἡ σοφία*; Socrates starts with the

premise that all men desire to be successful and happy; and by argument he finds that this end is obtained through the right use of our faculties and means towards a right object. After this he proves *σοφία*, or skill in any pursuit, mental or physical, to be only a matter of *ἐπιστήμη* or acquired science, v. inf. ch. ix.; and if this *ἐπιστήμη* can be taught his point is proved. For Socrates' first premise that all men desire happiness, comp. Arist. Eth. 1, 7, 5. *τοιούτον δ' (sc. τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰρετόν ἀεὶ) ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ*. For the second, viz. that action, i.e. employment of our faculties, is the way to be happy, v. ibid. § 15. *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν*. Ἄρα γε. The γε intimates that the tone is apologetical; and this tone appears in the next words.

ἄρ' ἂν... εὖ πράττοιμεν, subaud. ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα, &c. "And what kind, then, of things existing are our good things?" ἀγαθὰ is predicate, and goes with *ὄντα τυγχάνει*; ποῖα with *τῶν ὄντων*.

ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐρεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι, ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν. ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι; B Συνεδόκει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαί τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δῆλὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα. Ὡς μολόγει. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τί ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ σῶφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον πρὸς Διός, ὃ Κλεινία, ἡγεῖ σύ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὡς ἀγαθὰ, ὁρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσιν, ἢ ἐὰν μή; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσῃ· σοὶ δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ; Ἀγαθὰ, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Ἐν τοῖς C ἀγαθοῖς. Ἐνθυμοῦ δὴ, μή τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδέν, ὁ Κλεινίας. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεῖς εἶπον, ὅτι Ναὶ μὰ Δία κινδυνεύομέν γε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν. Τί τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς. Τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὃ Κλεινία· ὃ πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάνυ φαῦλοι, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ

ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν, &c. The order is ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι οὐ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν οὐδὲ πάνυ τι σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς: "Or does not this even seem," &c. There is a redundancy of negatives.

ἐν τῇ ἑαυτ. Intell. γῆ, Stallb. χρόνον. This metaphor has been employed before in ch. v. fin., ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χρόνος ἀποσημήναντος.

σοφίαν. σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and σοφία are the four cardinal virtues of the Republic.

δικαιοσύνη includes the other three, which are the perfection of the three different components of the mind of man, the λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν.

ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου: "which is nevertheless (καὶ) worthy of remark." καὶ as often merely emphasizes the word it precedes. In the next lines καὶ οἱ πάνυ φ.: it means "even;" and v. infr. κἂν πᾶς γνοίῃ: "a very child would know this."

- D πάλιν μετανοήσας εἶπον, ὅτι Ὀλίγου καταγέλαστοι ἐγέ-
νόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου.
Τί δὴ, ἔφη, τοῦτο; "Οτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
θέμενοι νῦν δὴ αὖθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν. Τί οὖν
δὴ τοῦτο; Καταγέλαστον δὴπου, ὃ πάλαι πρόκειται,
τοῦτο πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δις ταῦτ' ἀλέγειν. Πῶς, ἔφη,
τοῦτο λέγεις; Ἡ σοφία δὴπου, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, εὐτυχία ἐστί·
τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πᾶς γνοίῃ. Καὶ ὃς ἐθαύμασεν· οὕτως ἔτι
νέος τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστί. Καγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν θαυμά-
ζοντα, Ἄρ' οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, ὅτι περὶ αὐλη-
μάτων εὐπραγίαν οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοί εἰσι; Συνέφη.
Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων γραφῆς τε καὶ
ἀναγνώσεως οἱ γραμματισταί; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; πρὸς
τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης κινδύνους μῶν οἶε εὐτυχεστέρους
τινὰς εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν κυβερνητῶν, ὥς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν;
Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον
τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ
στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετ' ἀμαθοῦς; Μετὰ σοφοῦ. Τί δέ; ἀσθε-
νῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ
ιατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; Μετὰ σοφοῦ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ'
ἐγὼ, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἶε πράττειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράγ-
των ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; Ξυνεχώρει.

εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. So-
crates introduces by the way a
fresh thought, which he sows in
the mind of Clinias—the thought,
viz., that the wise man is in a
manner the controller of fortune.
Zeno, the founder of the Stoic
philosophy, brought on this pre-
cept by recommending the virtue
of action; and the doctrine was
pushed to absurdity by his fol-
lowers, whom Horace ridicules:

Sat. 1, 3, 124:—"Si dives qui
sapiens est, Et sutor bonus et
solus formosus et est rex, Cur
optas quod habes?" where the
wise man is even a king, and jack
of all trades besides. V. inf.
ch. xx.

ὥς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν: "to speak
as for every instance," i.e. "to
speak in general terms." ἐπὶ
means "extending over;" ἐπὶ
πᾶν, therefore, "to the whole

Cap. IX. Ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ 280
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ
 τις σοφία, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν.
 ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη. Συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευ-
 τῶντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν. B
 σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυ-
 χίας. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυν-
 θανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν
 ἔχοι. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ
 παρεῖη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. Συνέφη. Ἄρ'
 οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ, εἰ μηδὲν
 ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; Εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν
 ἂν τι ὠφελοίη, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρώμεθα δ' αὐτοῖς μή; C
 οἷον σιτία εἰ ἡμῖν εἴη πολλά, ἐσθίομεν δὲ μή, ἢ ποτόν,
 πίνομεν δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελοίμεθ' ἂν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.
 Τί δέ; οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντα τὰ
 ἐπιτήδεια παρεσκευασμένα ἐκάστῳ εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον,

extent." Cf. *infra*, ch. xvii. οὐδεμία τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλεον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι.

ἡ σοφία ἄρα . . . There is really a slight play upon words in this induction. *Εὐτυχία* is not, in its ordinary sense, "well being," as dependent upon study and exertion, which is the sense Socrates has gradually worked round to here, but that kind of mere "good fortune" which made the poet exclaim *τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσι καὶ τρίμηνα παῖδια*: i.e. miraculous good fortune.

πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. "How the former conclusions might be turning out for us now." "How

the premises were affected by our discovery of the goods of this life." The particle *ἂν* with optative must imply some degree of futurity or potentiality, however small.

εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν: "if we only had it." *μόνον* with *εἴη*.

ὠφελοῖη. Notice collateral form of *ὠφελοῖ*, an Atticism. So *infr.* *ἀγανακτοῖην*, ch. xx. E. *ἀμφισβητοῖην*, ch. xxiii. init.

χρώμεθα δ'. Here the doctrine that there is virtue in action and employment enters: possession is useless by itself, although better than bad use. V. *infr.* *πλεον γάρ που, ἔαν τις χρῆται μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ ἔαν ἔξ*.

χοῶντο δ' αὐτοῖς μή, ἄρ' ἂν οὗτοι εὖ πράττοιεν διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν, ὅτι κεκτημένοι εἶεν πάντα ἃ δεῖ κεκτηῖσθαι τὸν δημιουργόν; οἷον τέκτων, εἰ πυρεσκευασμένος εἴη τά τε ὄργανα ἅπαντα καὶ ξύλα ἱκανά, τεκταίνοιτο δὲ μή, ἔσθ'

D ὅ τι ὠφελοῖτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Τί δέ; εἴ τις κεκτημένος εἴη πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ, χοῶτο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἄρ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῖ διὰ τὴν τούτων κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. Δεῖν ἄρα, ἔφην, ὥς ἔοικε, μὴ μόνον κεκτηῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ὥς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἥδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα ποιῆσαί τινα,

E τό τε κεκτηῖσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς; Ἐμοιγεδοκεῖ. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς χρῆται τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή; Ἐὰν ὀρθῶς. Καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. πλεον γάρ πον, οἶμαι, θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐὰν τις χρῆται ὀψωρὺν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἔῃ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν,
281 τὸ δὲ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω φαμέν; Ξυνεχώρει. Τί οὖν; ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσει τῇ περὶ τὰ ξύλα μὲν ἄλλο τί ἐστι τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς

ἄρ' ἂν. Notice the position of ἂν, brought to the beginning of the clause to intimate that it is hypothetical, belonging in construction to *πράττοιεν*.

Πότερον . . . This question brings in a further requisite for the definition of happiness, viz., the right use of good things. By putting the question as an alternative, Socrates involves Clinias in the necessity of accepting the dogma that is implied. There is a fallacy of the two questions.

πλεον γάρ πον, &c. πλεον here bears a bad sense, apparently in opposition to its ordinary use, which is rather "superior," "pre-eminent," than as here, "worse." But we have a kindred use of μέγα in the Homeric phrases μέγα ἔργον in the sense of a crime, Od. 3, 261, 275; μέγα εἰπεῖν, to brag, Od. 3, 227; and a similar phrase, ch. xxiii. fin., where v. note.

μὲν ἄλλο τι . . . τὸ with χρῆσθαι, ἀπεργ. is accusative of

χρησθαι ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ τεκτονική; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκευὴ ἐργασία τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπεργαζομένη. Συνέφη. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ὧν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πλούτου τε καὶ ὑγείας καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρησθαι ἐπιστήμη ἦν ἡγουμένη καὶ B κατορθοῦσα τὴν πράξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; Ἐπιστήμη, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν πάσῃ κτήσει τε καὶ πράξει. Ὡμολόγει. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὧ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄφελός τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἀνευ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; Ἄρα γε ὄνιναιτ' ἂν ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων; Ὡδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν C κακῶς πράττοι, ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἄθλιος ἦττον ἂν εἴη; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι πένης ὢν ἢ πλούσιος; Πένης, ἔφη. Πότερον δὲ ἀσθενὴς ἢ ἰσχυρός; Ἀσθενής. Πότερον δὲ ἔντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος; Ἀτιμος. Πότερον δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ὢν καὶ σώφρων

the subject, the person who works.

ἐπιστήμη. This word is important, marking the point where Socrates passes to the beginning of his conclusion. He has been aiming at this all the time—viz., that fortune is after all controllable by skill, and skill is a right use of material, and a right use of material is knowledge or science, ἐπιστήμη.

τὸ ὀρθῶς . . . "The right use of material was the scientific knowledge that produces (results)

from it." Understand χρῆσθαι with ὀρθῶς.

ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα . . . "Or would he not rather profit himself by few actions and few acquirements plus intelligence?"

πότερον οὖν . . . "Would a poor man or a rich man be more likely to perform fewer actions." The juxtaposition of μᾶλλον ἐλάττω is awkward: if we omit μᾶλλον in rendering, nothing is lost, and the meaning gains in clearness.

ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι ἢ δειλός; Δειλός. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀργός μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης; Συνεχώρει. Καὶ βραδὺς
 D μᾶλλον ἢ ταχύς; καὶ ἀμβλύ όρων καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἢ όξύ; Πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ξυνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις. Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτά γε καθ' αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικεν, ὥδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγούμενῳ κακῷ ὄντι· ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ
 E σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ· αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὥς σὺ λέγεις. Τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοις ἢ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν; Ὡμολόγει.

282 Cap. X. Ἐτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἐπειδὴ εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, ἐφάνημεν δὲ τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τε τοῖς

καὶ βραδὺς μᾶλλον . . . i. e. ἐλάττω, as before. "The slow would do less than the fast."

Ἐν κεφ. "On the whole, our account of these things was wrong: we called them good things per se, but they are only good per mentem. Intelligence then is the important factor of well-doing and well-being, the others, such as riches, wealth, courage, &c., are but the raw material."

For the construction of this sentence, with the accusativus pendens v. Soph. El. 1364.

τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγους πολλαὶ κυκλοῦνται νύκτες ἡμέραι τ' ἴσαι

αἱ ταῦτά σοι δείξουσιν, Ἠλέκτρα, σαφῆ.

περὶ τούτου refers to what follows, viz. ὅπως αὐτά γε, &c. ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς οὐ περὶ τούτου εἶται. "The account we gave of them was wrong (οὐκ εἶναι) in this respect (περὶ τούτου)."

τῶν ἐναντίων, their contraries: e.g. poverty, stupidity, sloth.

ὑπηρετεῖν. To supplement, back up, assist.

μείζω ἀγαθὰ, sc. τῶν ἐναντίων.

ὄν. Supply τυγχάνει from συμβαίνει.

ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι, &c. "Non tantum ex rerum usu, sed ex recto usu."—Stallb. To use them

πράγμασι καὶ ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ εὐτυ-
 χίαν ἐπιστήμη ἢ παρέχουσα, δεῖ δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐκ παν-
 τὸς τρόπου ἅπαντα ἄνδρα τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὅπως
 ὥς σοφώτατος ἔσται. ἢ οὐ; Naί, ἔφη. Καὶ παρὰ πατρός B
 γε δῆπου τοῦτο οἰόμενον δεῖν παραλαμβάνειν πολὺν
 μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων τῶν
 τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἐραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων
 καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἰκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδό-
 ναι, οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν, ὧ Κλεινία, οὐδὲ νεμεσητὸν ἔνεκα
 τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇ καὶ παντὶ
 ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτιοῦν ἐθέλοντα ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπη-
 ρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ
 σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὕτως; Πάννυ μὲν οὖν εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέ-
 γειν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὧ Κλεινία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ σοφία
 διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς C
 ἀνθρώποις. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι σκεπτέον καὶ οὐπω διω-
 μολογημένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὧ
 Σώκρατες, διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἡσθεῖς εἶπον·
 Ἥ καλῶς λέγεις, ὧ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας
 ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πό-
 τερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ σοφία. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ
 σοὶ καὶ διδακτὸν δοκεῖ καὶ μόνον τῶν ὄντων εὐδαίμονα
 καὶ εὐτυχῇ ποιεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄλλο τι ἢ φαίης ἂν D

rightly is as indispensable as it is to use them at all.

καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε . . . Heindorf expresses the order thus :—
 οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲ νεμεσητὸν . . .
 ὑπηρετεῖν . . . οἰόμενον δεῖν.
 “It is not wrong for a man to
 undergo any honourable exertion,
 if he thinks (οἰόμενον) that he
 ought to get this gift above all
 others,” Routh compares Sympos.

184. C. νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν,
 εἰάν τις ἐθέλῃ τινὰ θεραπεύειν,
 ἡγούμενος δι' ἐκείνον ἀμείνων
 ἔσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν μέρος
 ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἢ ἐθελοδοουλία
 οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία.

ἄλλοτι ἢ. v. s. ch. v.; notice
 the different tenses in the follow-
 ing words :—“You will say, and
 you *are* actually contemplating
 it.”

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῷ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα.

Cap. XI. Καγὼ ταῦτα ἄσμενος ἀκούσας, Τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, ἔφην, παραδείγμα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οἶων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι, τοιοῦτον, ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως καὶ μόλις διὰ μακρῶν λεγόμενον· σφῶν δὲ ὁπότερος βούλεται, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τέχνη πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βούλεσθον, Ε ὅθεν ἐγὼ ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς ἐπιδείξατον τῷ μειρακίῳ, πότερον πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην δεῖ αὐτὸν κτᾶσθαι, ἢ ἔστι τις μία, ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, καὶ τίς αὕτη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀρχόμενος, περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὃν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

283 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἶπον, ὦ Κρίτων· τῷ δὲ μετὰ

οἶων ἐπιθυμῶ . . . the words τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων belong to παραδείγμα, and οἶων should be taken with εἶναι. "My sketch of suggestive argument, as I wish it to be, is of this kind." We have had the προτρεπτικὸς λόγος above ch. vii. ad fin. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν, and below, in this passage, παρακελευστικὸς ὁ λόγος. "Suggestive" is perhaps the nearest equivalent in English; "inductive" would be the exact equivalent if its services were not retained too strictly by the language of logic. The word implies the true principle of all education, moral, intellectual, or physical, viz. not to state alone directions for action, but to accustom and direct the mind as

well to such habits of thought as may enable it of itself to recognize and pursue right objects of action.

ἰδιωτικόν, v. s. not. ad cap. vii. It is to be taken in contrast to τέχνη πράττων in the next sentence; and to illustrate the point, viz. of Socrates sketching out his plan, and asking the professional men to work upon it, we may think of an architect who, according to his professional knowledge, carries out the rough plan which his employer supplies.

ὅθεν ἐγὼ . . . these words follow τὸ ἐξῆς in construction; in ὅθεν the ablative case is attracted into the relative sentence. "Begin from that point where I left off."

ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδ. δεῖ βα-

τοῦτο ἔσομένῳ πάνυ σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐπεσκόπουν, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄψοιντο τοῦ λόγον καὶ ὁπόθεν ἄρξοιντο παρακελεύόμενοι τῷ νεανίσκῳ σοφίαν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ὁ οὖν πρεσβύτερος αὐτῶν, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, πρότερος ἤρχετο τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους τινὰς λόγους. ὕπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἡμῖν· θαυμαστὸν γάρ τινα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀνὴρ κατῆρχε λόγον, οὗ σοὶ ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς παρακελευστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν.

B

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι φατὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφὸν γενέσθαι, πότερον παίζετε ταῦτα λέγοντες ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιθυμεῖτε καὶ σπουδάζετε; Κἀγὼ διενόηθην, ὅτι ᾤθητήν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τὸ πρότερον παίζειν, ἡνίκα ἐκελεύομεν διαλεχθῆναι τῷ νεανίσκῳ αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσεπαι-

longs to λαβ., governing *ἐνδαιμονεῖν* only for purposes of constructive neatness. *ἐνδ.* might be translated "if he wishes to be happy," just as the participle sometimes requires the conjunction "although" (ch. i. note on *βουλόμενος*), sometimes "if," as here, v. ch. xxviii. *ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτὴν οἰκείαν γενομένην.*

Κἀγὼ διενόηθην . . . Socrates is good enough to say this for the Sophists, that he perceives they thought he was in jest, when he invited them to instruct Clinias, and therefore they treated the boy in such a paltry manner. Probably it did not make any difference to their arguments if their hearers were in jest or earnest; for their reasoning remains throughout the dialogue

alike unproductive and trifling; even alter Socrates' solemn assurance that they are in earnest about Clinias.

See Dionysodorus' conclusion at the end of this chapter that they wish to annihilate Clinias.

ᾤθητήν ἄρα. This particle is introduced to hint or express the narrator's opinion upon what he is relating: "they thought, of course;" or "they thought, as must have been the case." Comp. Euthyphr. xiii. ἴσως ἂν με ἐπισκωπῆτε, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ τὰ ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει; and Rep. 375. D. οὐκ ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα τοιαῦτα φύσεις, οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾤθημεν: where it is "after all, and we were unaware." So here "they were thinking *after all*," or "whilst we did not know that

- C ἀτην τε καὶ οὐκ ἐσπουδασάτην. ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεῖς
 ἔτι μᾶλλον εἶπον, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζοιμεν. Καὶ
 ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως
 μὴ ἕξαρονος ἔσει ἂ νῦν λέγεις. "Εσκεμμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ·
 οὐ γὰρ μή ποτ' ἕξαρονος γένωμαι. Τί οὖν; ἔφη· φατὲ
 βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Νῦν
 δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, Κλεινίας πότερον σοφός ἐστιν ἢ οὐ; Οὐκ οὖν
 φησί γέ πω· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἀλαζών. Ὑμεῖς δέ, ἔφη, βού-
 D λεσθε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφόν, ἀμαθῆ δὲ μὴ εἶναι; Ὡμολο-
 γοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν
 γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας
 ἐθορυβήθην. Ὁ δέ μουθορυβουμένου ὑπολαβὼν,
 "Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὅς νῦν ἐστί,
 μηκέτι εἶναι, βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι;
 καίτοι πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν φίλοι τε καὶ
 ἐρασταί, οἵτινες τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιήσαιεντο
 ἐξολωλέναι.

- E Cap. XII. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἡγανάκτησέ
 τε ὑπὲρ τῶν παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν· Ὡς ξένη Θούριε, εἰ μὴ
 ἀγροικότερον, ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν, Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν,

they were thinking." Very similar is the following—

ὦ τλήμον ἀρετῇ, λόγος ἄρ' ἦσθ'·

ἐγὼ δὲ σε

ὥς ἔργον ἤσκουν, σὺ δ' ἄρ' ἐδού-
 λευες τύχῃ.

πω, placed late to emphasize.

ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι. ὅς dixit pro
 οἶος. Stallb. The fallacy lies
 in the use of ὅς. Socrates does
 not wish Clinias to become *what*
 he is not, but *such as* he is not;
 wise instead of foolish; not an-
 nihilated instead of existent.

Κτήσιππος. He is described

in ch. ii. as καλός τε κάγαθος,
 τὴν φύσιν ὅσον μὲν, ὑβριστὴς δὲ
 διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. v. Introd.

Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, cf. Ar. Plut.
 526. ἐς κεφαλὴν σοι, and id. 650:
 where there is a play on the ex-
 pression. KA. ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν ἐς
 τὴν κεφαλὴν σοι πάντ' ἐρῶ. ΓΥ.
 μὴ δῆτ' ἔμοιγ' ἐς τὴν κεφαλὴν;
 and in Ach. 833. we find it fuller,
 πολυπραγμοσύνη νυν ἐς κεφαλὴν
 τρέποιτ' ἐμοί.

ἀγροικότερον: "rather rude."
 The comparative often bears the
 sense of "rather;" the real cor-

ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοιοῦτο
 πράγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ
 τόνδε βουλοίμην ἂν ἐξολωλέναι. Τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτή-
 σιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἧ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;
 Νῆ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ
 πράγμα, περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα; Λέγοντα, 284
 ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν
 ὄντων ἢ ἐκείνο, ὅπερ λέγει. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη ὁ Κτή-
 σιππος. Ἐν μὴν κάκεϊνό γ' ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ὃ λέγει,
 χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων
 τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν λέγων
 καὶ τὰ ὄντα τάληθῇ λέγει· ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, εἶπερ
 λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τάληθῇ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ ψεύδε-

relative in the comparison being the standard, or usual extent of the quality, but unexpressed, "ruder than usual" or "ruder than is fit." So we must render by "too" sometimes, the analysis of which expression will be similar. v. infr. ch. xv. ἴσως μὲν οὖν φορτικώτερόν τι ἐρισσομαι: "rather stupid;" and cf. Euthyph. init. Τί νεώτερον ὦ Σώκρατες . . . ; and so in Latin Virg. *Æn.* 7, 557. "errare licentius auras."

ὅ τι μαθὼν καταψεύδει. Heindorf compares Apol. Socr. 36. B. τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῆσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἔχον; and Stallb. explains the phrase "quod in mentem venerit ut hoc feceris," after the analogy of τί παθὼν. That it is a highly idiomatic expression is clear when we translate literally. Hermann wished to alter μαθὼν here and in all other passages into παθὼν. The above expla-

nation is a consistent one; and in this passage we must understand the verb implied in σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, thus, "May you be confounded for daring to tell such a lie as this!" Comp. the English expression, "What could you have been thinking about to do such a thing?" which is equivalent to "How could you do." Cf. infr. ch. xxv. init. ὃ τι μαθὼν σοφοῦς νίεις οὕτως ἔφυσεν.

οὐκ ἄλλο λέγει: the fallacy lies in λέγει. In λέγοντα the meaning is "utter;" but as the quibble goes on we see Euthydemus means "assert" or "speak of as existent" by λέγει. The man who tells a lie about a thing mentions that thing (λέγει), and also if he speaks the truth about it; but if we strain λέγει to mean "speak of as possible," it is evident that, although we can put any two notions together in words, it will not follow that

- ται. Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος,
 Β ὡ Εὐθύδημε, οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Τὰ
 δὲ μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἄλλο
 τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν; Οὐδαμοῦ.
 "Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως περὶ ταῦτα τὰ μὴ ὄντα πράξειεν ἂν τίς
 τι, ὥστ' ἐκεῖνά γε Κλεινία ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὅστισοῦν, τὰ
 μηδαμοῦ ὄντα; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.
 Τί οὖν; οἱ ῥήτορες ὅταν λέγωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, οὐδὲν
 πράττουσι; Πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ
 C πράττουσι, καὶ ποιοῦσι; Ναί. Τὸ λέγειν ἄρα πράττειν
 τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐστίν; Ὁμολόγησεν. Οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ
 ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεῖς. ποιοῖ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη τι, σὺ δὲ ὁμο-
 λόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ οἶόν τ' εἶναι μηδὲ ποιεῖν· ὥστε
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεῖς ψευδῇ λέγει, ἀλλ' εἶπερ

they are borne out by facts. τὸ πρᾶγμα, this lie, or mendacious circumstance, may exist in the mind by the juxtaposition of two notions, and may thus be expressed in words, though totally incompatible with things. So Routh, Verba igitur, quæ loquens facit, omnino existunt, et vere sunt, sed nisi res existant, et eundem ad modum, quo verba præ se ferunt, ea non sunt vera.

Ναὶ ἔφη . . . Ctesippus does not give in to this, but replies that Dionysodorus said something that really had no existence (οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει). And this is true. For he said that there was a desire on the part of Socrates and Clinias' friends to annihilate him. That is, he enunciated in words that which had nothing correlative to it in facts. But his wording of the reply (οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει) gives

Euthydemus just the handle he wants to bring home the quibble: he at once proceeds to prove that what has no existence cannot be spoken of, done, or considered in any way. Here he is wrong. We can λέγειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, we can speak in words of impossibilities and non-existences. But he is sufficiently clever at verbal fence to drive Ctesippus to allow it.

ἀλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ . . . "Surely, then, things non-existent do not exist anywhere."

καὶ ὅστισοῦν, "any person whatsoever," καὶ emphat.

πράττουσι μὲν οὖν. "nay but they do act." Cf. Æsch. Cho. 999 :

ἄγρευμα φηρὸς, ἢ νεκροῦ ποδέν-
 δντον

δροίτης κατασκῖνωμα; δίκτυον
 μὲν οὖν.

οἶόν τ'. Supply τινὰ as subject: τὸ μὴ ὄν is object.

λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τάληθῃ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει. Νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει. Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὦ Κτήσιππε; εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὥς ἔχει; Εἰσὶ μέντοι, ἔφη, οἱ καλοὶ D τε κάγαθοι καὶ οἱ τάληθῃ λέγοντες. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς· τὰγαθὰ οὐκ εὔ, ἔφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ κακῶς; Συνεχώρει. Τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς τε κάγαθους ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὥς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα; Ὁμολογῶ. Κακῶς ἄρα, ἔφη, λέγουσιν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὥς ἔχει λέγουσι. Naὶ μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γοῦν κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ὦν σύ, ἐάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσῃ εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὥς εὔ ἴσθ' ὅτι κακῶς E λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς. Ἥ καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς θερμῶς; Μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσί τε καὶ φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι. Σὺ

οἱ καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι . . . A
sarcasm directed against the little-minded and quibbling sophists, as below Ctesippus says: τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς διαλέγεσθαι.

ὥς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα. Dionysodorus has caught at Ctesippus' expression, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει. By this Ctesippus meant "in their actual relation or situation with regard to things." Dionysodorus applies this qualifying clause to the word λέγω, and uses it of the speaker; as below he says κακῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὥς ἔχει λέγουσιν, i.e. "In an evil way do good men speak of evil things," a construction quite foreign to

Ctesippus' intention when he used the phrase ὥς ἔχει. Ctesippus, by a play upon the expression κακῶς λέγειν, to abuse or condemn, gains a point upon the sophist when he replies that good men certainly condemn (κακῶς λέγουσιν) the bad.

ψυχροὺς. Notice the play with the word θερμοὺς, which is probably used by the sophist merely as a general example of a quality, although it may contain a hit at Ctesippus' irascible temper. If so, the reply of Ctesippus is a good repartee; and, whether Euthydemus intends anything or not, has reference to the frigid dialectic of the sophists.

λέγουσί τε καὶ φασί. The latter

μέν, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, λαιδορεῖ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λαιδορεῖ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε, ἀλλὰ νουθετῶ σ' ὥς ἐταῖρον, καὶ πειρῶμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀγροίκως
 285 λέγειν, ὅτι ἐγὼ τούτους βούλομαι ἐξολωλέναι, οὓς περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦμαι.

Cap. XIII. Ἐγὼ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἐδόκουν ἀγριωτέρως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχειν, προσέπαιζόν τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον, ὅτι ὦ Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἃ λέγουσιν, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολλύναι ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ' ἐκ πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χρηστούς τε καὶ ἔμφρονας ποιεῖν,
 B καὶ τοῦτο εἴτε αὐτῶ εὐρήκατον εἴτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐυαθέτην φθόρον τινὰ καὶ ὄλεθρον τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφῆναι,—εἰ τοῦτο ἐπίστασθον (δῆλον δέ, ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι τὴν νεωστὶ εὐρημένην ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πονηρῶν) συγχωρή-

verb is merely put in to emphasize the reply. λέγουσι has been employed all along the chain of the argument; it has assumed a stereotyped character along with the other expressions. So Ctesippus: "At any rate they speak of, nay! assert that, the insipid converse in an insipid manner."

ὀνόματι, better than Heindorf's conjecture ὀνόμασι, referring, no doubt, to the word employed at first by Euthydemus, ἀπολωλέναι, ch. xi. fin., to which Ctesippus took exception. Socrates, too, shows what he refers to by his

next remark, playing upon the sense of ἀπόλλυμι, to destroy physically, and the secondary sense of removing a defect from a person; and he draws out this notion by a reference to the old tale of Medea, who pretended to restore Pelias to youth by boiling him in a caldron. For ὀνόματι compare ch. xxx., οὕτωςι γὰρ πως καὶ εἴπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι.

συγχ. οὖν. "Why let us concede that to them." οὖν marks the apodosis, which requires some distinctive particle after such a long suspension.

σωμεν οὖν αὐτοῖν αὐτό· ἀπολεσάντων ἡμῖν τὸ μεράκιον καὶ φρόνιμον ποιησάντων, καὶ ἅπαντάς γε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι φοβεῖσθε, ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ ἐν C
 ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος· ὡς ἐγὼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμί, παρακινδυνεύειν ἔτοιμος καὶ παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσόδωρῳ τούτῳ ὥσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ· ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐφέτω, εἰ δ', ὃ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιείτω· μόνον χρηστὸν ἀποφηνάτω. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώ- κρατες, ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλωνται δέρειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι D
 ἢ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσῃ ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσίου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετὴν. καίτοι με οἶεται Διονυσόδωρος οὕτωσι χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλεπαίνω, ἀλλ' ἀντιλέγω πρὸς ταῦτα ἃ μοι δοκεῖ πρὸς με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ κάλει λοιδορεῖσθαι· ἕτερον γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι.

ἀπολ. ἡμῖν τὸ μερ. "Let them annihilate our youth." For ἡμῖν, the ethic dative as it is called, v. s. ch. vii. init.: τὸ μεράκιον . . . μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε. The Dativus Incommodi, to which it is there referred, is a species of ethic dative, and might, with advantage, be included together with it under some wider term, such as dative of reference, v. infr. τί σοι ἐννοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, ch. xvi.

ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ . . . Compare Eur. Cycl. 511. δράσω τάδ'· ἐν τῷ Καρὶ κινδυνεύσομεν, i.e. we will form the forlorn hope. Carian mercenaries were selected to bear the brunt of an engage- ment.

Κόλχῳ. Steph. asks the question "Κόλχων?" but there is apparently no authority of any kind for the change. We must suppose that, the form Κολχίς being reserved for the meaning "Colchian woman," Κολχός has become stereotyped in the masculine, and admits of no feminine terminations.

τελευτήσῃ, "turn out;" Lat. evaserit.

Μαρσίου, who contended with Apollo in music, and was flayed alive, as a punishment for his presumption. His blood was supposed to give rise to the river which bore his name. Xenophon, Anab. 1, 2, 8, speaks of αἱ πηγαὶ τοῦ ποτάμου Μαρσίου.

Cap. XIV. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὧς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, ὧ Κτήσιππε, ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους; Πάντως δῆπου, ἔφη, καὶ σφύδρα γε. ἢ σύ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, οὐκ οἶει εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν; Οὐκουν σύ γ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πώποτε ἀκούσας οὐδενὸς ἀντιλέγοντος ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ ἀκούωμεν νῦν, εἴ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι, ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησίππου Διονυσοδώρῳ. Ἡ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἄν τούτου λόγον; Πάννυ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς· εἰσὶν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; Πάννυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὥς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν; ὧς ἔστιν. Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὥς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος· ἡττόν τι ἀντιλέγομαι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ;

ὧς ὄντος, “as though it existed.”

οὐκοῦν σύ γ' ἄν . . . ἀποδείξαις. “You could not shew that you had ever heard.” The exact sense, according to grammar, is sacrificed to the desire of keeping the person before the hearer. In Latin it would have been cast in the accusative, “te unquam audiisse.” Jelf remarks, on this construction, that the participle completes the verbal notion; and hence we find it used frequently where the principal verb expresses some feeling of the subject which the participle explains or specializes, as πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ῥσθετ' ἡδικημένη, Eur. Med. 26; τιμώμενοι χαίρουσιν, Id. Hipp. 8; and Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 26, ἡδόμεαι τιμώμενος. So here the statement and the hearing are referred both to the same person, and are looked upon as two stages of the

same process, the giving off of information acquired. In the expression above, ch. x. fin., εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς, the two expressions refer to the same act; so that the grammatical connection is closer and more regular than the present one.

ἀλλ' ἀκούωμεν νῦν. Ctesippus grants Dionysodorus' statement for the purpose of giving point to his reply, that at any rate contradiction is found when men have to do with a Sophist.

ὑπόσχοις ἄν τούτου λόγον. Stallb. compares Gorg. 465. A. τούτων δὲ πέρι ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον. “Will you undertake to prove it?” In the next sentence λόγος is used in a slightly different sense, and means the true account of anything. The puzzle with which he at last confounds Ctesippus rests upon his former

Πότερον οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες; ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτ' ἀλέγοιμεν; Συνεχώρει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ B πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἔφη, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινός, ἄρα τότε ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς ἀντιλέγοι;

Cap. XV. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐσίγησεν· ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν λόγον, Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν C δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκῶς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ

position, that a man cannot say the non-existent; whilst in this place he qualifies his weak point, viz. the expression "say" (λεγει); substituting for it the term "λόγον διδόναι;" "give an account of." By so doing he really advances towards a true position that there can be no real contradiction in facts, only in words; but he does not attain to it, and the argument remains only a quibble.

ἢ οὕτω μὲν . . . The latter of two questions is generally the one intended to be adopted in Platonic dialogue. See Rep. i. ch. xiii. : πότερον δὲ ἀναμάτητοι εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάστας ἢ οἳοί τε καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν; et passim.

οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ . . . Cf. Xen. Cyr. i, 4, 8 : ὁ ἵππος . . . μικροῦ ἐξετραχίλισεν ἐκείνον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπέμεινεν ὁ Κύρος, &c. Ar.

Ran. 498 : φέρε δὴ ταχέως αὐτ'· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ πειστέον. The expression is elliptic. Cf. also Ar. Nub. 232 : οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἶδρον· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἢ γῆ βία ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἱκμάδα τῆς φροντίδος.

οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν. In Theætet. 170. C. Socrates protests against anyone holding this extreme opinion, "that error is impossible because we cannot state the non-existent," whether he be Protagorean or not : σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι τις ἂν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι, ὥς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθὴ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν. In Soph. 260. the question is more fully discussed, and the conclusion is : τὸν σοφιστὴν ἔξαρον γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μὴδ' εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαι τινα οὔτε λέγειν. The practical way of disproving such an assertion

Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι; τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ; ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν; Συνεχώρει.

- D Πότερον οὖν ψευδῇ λέγειν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι ἔστιν; Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν. Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι. ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων; Πάνν γε, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκ ἔφη. Λόγου ἕνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι

is by pointing to the existence of deceit, falsehood, and fraud. Protagoras' own text was πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος; that is, in other words, "all truth is sensation;" so that in this sense the possibility of error could not exist, each man being a law to himself.

οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι. By these Socrates cannot mean either the Eleatics or Heraclitus, for each school maintained the untrustworthiness of the senses; the Eleatics as giving an apparent fluctuation to that which is really fixed, and Heraclitus as giving an apparent stability to the really fluctuating: doctrines diametrically opposed to that of Protagoras in their conclusions. Socrates probably refers to the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, and their school, who

held that the universe was composed of aggregations of atoms having different kinds of effects upon a sentient object, and that these effects were produced by the quantity, not the quality, of the aggregations of atoms. The word ἔτι is not very emphatic, because such a theory could not have been held by the first Greek philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximander, &c., who were rather physicists than philosophers, and had not left physical inquiry for psychical analysis.

ἄλλο τι with οὐκ ἔστιν. v.s. not. ch. v.

τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. v. Crat. 429. C. ἄρα ὅτι ψευδῇ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; δύναται, the gist or value of the words,

ἀμαθῆς ἀνθρώπων; Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον. Ἡ καὶ Ε
 ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι, μηδενὸς
 ψευδομένον; Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. Οὐδ' ἄρα
 ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ νῦν δὴ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι·
 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὃν πῶς ἂν τις κελεύσαι; ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μαν-
 θάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως ἐννοῶ. ἴσως μὲν οὖν φορτι-
 κώτερόν τι ἐρήσομαι· ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκε. ὅρα δέ. εἰ
 γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστι μήτε ψευδῇ δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῇ 287
 εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι
 πράττη; πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ
 πράττει. οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτό ἐστιν
 ἥδη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἐρώτημα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρ-
 τάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοοῦ-
 μενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος
 διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε; ἦ οὐκ ἄρτι ἔφατε ἀρετὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν
 παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλοντι μανθάνειν;

Cap. XVI. Εἴτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος B

Ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον. The text of the inferior Sophists: "Disprove, or destroy, a position;" they did not attempt to construct; their attitude was entirely critical, or hardly worthy of the term critical, and better described as carping.

ἐξελέγξαι: expegegetical of τοῦτο.

οὐδ' ἄρα, &c. Literally this runs: "I did not even tell you just now," said Dionysodorus, "to show that I was wrong," i.e. for we allowed that no one can be wrong. Dionysodorus sees Socrates beginning to close in upon him, and takes refuge in repudiating his own words—giv-

ing them a construction which is manifestly an after-thought.

μανθάνω: "understand," or "take in." Cf. Rep. 596. A. εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, ἣ οὐ μανθάνεις; Μανθάνω. Notice the long and circumlocutory lead up to the final point, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε, a question which descends with irresistible force upon the Sophist. For μανθάνω in this dialogue, v. infr. ch. xxxi., ἥδη μανθάνω: "Now I understand."

Ch. XVI. With the opening words of this chapter there is a close and in fact a family resemblance in Rep. i. ch. xvi., where

ὑπολαβών, οὕτως εἴ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν, νῦν ἀναμνησκει, καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις οὐχ ἕξεις ὃ τι χρῆ; Καὶ γὰρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποὶ εἰσι πάνν· εἰκότως· παρὰ σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ παγχάλεπον χρῆσασθαι ἐστίν, ὃ λέγεις. τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρῶμαι ὃ τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; C ἢ δὴλον ὅτι, ὥς οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἶπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο ἐννοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρῆσθαι τοῖς λόγοις; Ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ πάνν χαλεπὸν χρῆσθαι· ἐπεὶ ἀποκρίναι. Πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; Οὐκ ἀπο-

a Sophist, Thrasymachus, having been roughly handled by Socrates in argument, takes refuge in abuse, and in his first moment of anger asks: Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τιτθὴ σοι ἐστίν; ὅτι κορυζῶντα περιοῖ. Κρόνος, the ordinary term for anything antiquated or out of fashion, v. Ar. Nub. 926, where the Unjust Argument applies the term to the Just. ΔΙΚ. ὥμοι μανίας τῆς σῆς, πόλεως θ' ἢ τις σε τρέφει λυμαινόμενον τοῖς μειρακίς. ΑΔ. οὐχὶ διδάξεις τοῦτον Κρόνος ὢν.

παρὰ σοφῶν. The irony of this epithet is rendered the more exquisite by its proximity to the absurd position of the Sophists, that ignorance and error do not exist, and also by the fact of Socrates just having raised a laugh at their expense. The word χαλεποὶ has reference to λόγοι, subaud. For an example of the converse, changing from λόγους to ταῦτα, v.s. not. ad cap. ix. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ.

χρήσασθαι. Socrates uses Dionysodorus' word (ὅτι χρῆ). We might translate: "And you cannot make anything of what I say now." Socr. "Your words are so hard; this last word, "make anything of," for instance."

ὃ τί ποτε λέγεις. ὃ τί pro τι. v.s. ch. i. not. on ὁπότερον.

τί σοι. σοὶ to be taken with ῥῆμα: "What does this word of yours mean?" Notice the verb ἐννοεῖ, for upon this loose expression of Socrates Dionysodorus builds his next structure of quibbling argument.

Ἀλλ' ὃ, sc. ἐστίν ὃ. Socrates is probably forming his next reply to the Sophist's puzzle, while he thus plays with the word.

ἐπεὶ ἀποκρίναι. This conclusive use of ἐπεὶ with the imperative is common. See Soph. El. 352. ἐπεὶ διδάξον, ἢ μάθ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ. We have also just above ἐπεὶ εἶπέ, where the conclusive sense of the conjunction is clearer,

κρίνει; ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ δίκαιον; Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη. Κατὰ
 τίνα λόγον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε, ὅτι
 σὺ νῦν πάνσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ
 οἶσθ' ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν D
 ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρίνει, ἅτε γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ; Λαλεῖς,
 ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄγαθέ, πείθου
 καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι.
 Πειστέον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὥς ἔοικε· σὺ
 γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα
 νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα; Τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα.
 Οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥῆμα ψυχὴν ἔχον; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. E
 Τί οὖν ἄρτι ἦρου, ὃ τί μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα; Τί ἄλλο γε,

bringing the doubt expressed in the former sentences to an issue with the question: "Tell me what you mean," as though the thought were: "Tell me, since I am compelled to 'demand.'" The explanation of the latter ἐπεὶ will be found to agree with that of the other on the whole. We may say that the impatience of Dionysodorus is brought to a point at which he passes to the direct imperative, and this point is marked by ἐπεὶ. See *infr.* ch. xxxii., where Socrates, about to give an explanation of a statement, begins his inductive argument with this word ἐπεὶ.

καὶ ὅτε μή. A hit at Dionysodorus' discomfiture by Socrates' own question: *τίνας ἤκετε διδάσκαλοι*, and implying that Dionysodorus had no answer to that searching question.

λαλεῖς, "You are talking nonsense." Cf. the proverb, *λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν*. In the expression οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν

ἀποκρ. Stallb. points out that ἂν cannot be taken with the verb, but has its place in any subordinate part of the sentence where the notion of indefiniteness is found.

πότερον οὖν . . . "When anything knows, is it one of those things which have a soul, or do things devoid of soul know?" This is the literal rendering of the Greek, which is cast in this form to bring out, by means of a participle (*ἔχοντα*), in agreement with the subject, the connected view of the thinking process. The participle (*v. not. cap. xiv.*) completes the verbal notion; when the whole notion belongs to one subject, the participle is used in the case of the subject. Therefore, here, in order to show that the possession of a soul is the cause and the means of thinking, we find *ἔχοντα* in direct agreement with *νοοῦντα*.

τί ἄλλο γε. Socrates readily allows that he made use of an

ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν; ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα; πότερά φης ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὐδ' ἔχεις ὅ τι χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δ' ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ' οὕτως
 288 ὀρθῶς λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν. καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς ἃ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ ἔοικεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταύτῳ μένειν, καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας που τέχνης ἐξευρῆσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως θυμαστῆς οὔσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν λόγων. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαν-
 B μάσιά γε λέγεται, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθ'

expression open to question, as though he were discussing a serious subject with a serious antagonist; but recollecting how Dionysodorus has cut the ground from under his own feet by denying the possibility of error, he replies on second thoughts that he did not make a mistake.

οὐδ' ἔχεις ὅ τι χρῆ. Socrates reiterates his rallying of the Sophist over this unlucky expression, showing that he will be in the same plight as he asserted Socrates to be.

οὐ πρὸς ἃ πέρυσιν. v.s. this chapter init. καὶ εἰ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον.

ὁ λόγος ἐν ταύτῳ μένειν. Cf. Euthyphr. xix. ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν ἵκει, and id. xiii. περιέρχεται γὰρ πῶς ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα.

τὸ παλαιόν. Heindorf. i.e. τὸ πάλαι; but if we understand such a word as ῥηθὲν or ῥῆμα with the adjective, and construe "as the proverb goes," we shall not find

the expression unsupported; thus infr. ch. xix. fin. ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται. And again Gorg. 447. A. Ἄλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἤκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν, and similarly in Symp. 217. E., εἰ μὴ πρῶτον μὲν, τὸ λεγόμενον, οἶνος ἄνευ τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων ἀληθὲς ἦν. And in this dialogue again, ch. xx. τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς, and ch. xxiv. τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ ξυνάπτεις;

Καὶ ταῦτα. Cf. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 819. καὶ τὰδ' οὔτις ἄλλος ἦν ἢ ἡ γῶ π' ἐμαντῶ τάσδ' ἄρας ὁ προστιθείς. In this example Campbell calls τὰδε an accusativus pendens; in the text ταῦτα is almost adverbial. Cf. also Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 15: Μένωνα δὲ οὐκ ἐζήτει, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' Ἀραιοῦ ὢν τοῦ Μένωνος ξένον, and in this dialogue, infr. ch. xxv. καὶ ταῦτα γε πολὺ.

Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι, v.s. not. ch. i.

ὀπόθεν καὶ ὕπῃ χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι· ὥς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν. Καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεῖς, μὴ λοιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπράυνον τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νῦν δὴ ἂ πρὸς Κλεινίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταῦτά ταῦτα λέγω, ὅτι οὐ γιγνώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν, ὅτι θαυμασία ἐστίν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντες, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντες ἡμᾶς. ἡμεῖς οὖν C τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῇτον ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτὼ σπουδάζετον· οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξωνται σπουδάζειν. ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώμεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ

ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου, ἀπέκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους. The tone is disparaging, and implies that the Sophists were obliged to move from place to place. Stallb. compares Phædr. 273 C. ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δῆπου ὦν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅποθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος.

παραληρεῖν. The force of παρά in compounds is equivalent to the English particle mis- in mistake, misrepresent, &c. παράσημος αἶψα. Æsch. Ag. 780. "wrongly stamped with praise." v. inf. ch. xxvi. fin. παρακηκόει; παραπαίειν, "to strike wrongly," and afterwards intransitively "to go out of one's mind." This sense comes from the idea of doing anything "beside" the right one, i.e. not coinciding with it, and so wrong. Cf. the expression "beside oneself."

γένηται. To give greater reality to the scene is the object of this use of the primary conjunctive,

equiv. to pres. subj. in Latin; it may be paralleled by a reference to Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 17. εἰσῆλθαι αὐτοὺς ὅπως ἂν καὶ ἔχοντες τι οἴκαδε ἀφίκωνται, where the principal verb is historic, whilst in id. 2. 4. 4. we find the exact converse of the present construction, ἴσως δὲ που ἢ ἀποσκάπτει τι ἢ ἀποτευχίζει, ὥς ἄπορος εἴη ἢ ὁδός.

Πρωτέα . . . σοφιστὴν. Cf. Euthyphr. 15. D. οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. Jowett renders σοφ. by "wizard."

αὐτοῖν. Winckelmann connects with φαν., Stallb. with τι, better; unless we attribute to the genitive its full and original sense of derivation from.

δοκῶ. The same sense belongs to the personal as to the impersonal use of this verb, visum est. Æsch. Ag. 16. ὅταν δ' αἰδέειν ἡ μινύρεσθαι δοκῶ. Stallb.

αὐτὸς πάλιν ὑφηγήσασθαι, οἷω προσεύχομαι αὐτῷ
 D φανῆναί μοι. ὅθεν γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς
 τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἑάν
 πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντέ με καὶ οἰκτεῖραντε συντε-
 ταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτῷ σπουδάσῃτον.

Cap. XVII. Σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν
 με, πόθεν τότ' ἀπελίπομεν. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἐγῶμαι, ἐνθένδε
 ποθέν. φιλοσοφητέον ὠμολογήσαμεν τελευτῶντες. ἥ
 γάρ; Ναί, ἥ δ' ὅς. Ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστή-
 μης. οὐχ οὕτως; ἔφην. Ναί, ἔφη. Τίνα ποτ' οὖν ἂν
 E κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς κτησαίμεθα; ἄρ' οὐ τοῦτο
 μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην, ἣτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει; Πάνυ γ',
 ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ ἐπισταίμεθα γιγ-
 νώσκειν περιϊόντες, ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίον πλεῖστον
 κατορώρυκται; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον, ἦν δ'

ὅθεν γὰρ, v.s. ch. xi. note.

ἐντεταμένον. The metaphor contained in this use of the word is the same that we find in the English words "tense," "attention."

πόθεν, as before in ch. xi. the point where the argument was broken off is looked at as a point *from which* the new departure is to be taken, not *to which* the old one came.

Ἡ δέ γε φιλ. This was the conclusion of ch. x. viz. that the acquisition of wisdom was a science, and Clinias had stated his belief, governed by the analogical argument about the sciences, that this was *διδακτόν*, to be acquired by study. Now the question is, What science? And its definition, as elicited in the present chapter, is "the

science not only of acquiring material, but of employing it rightly." Then the further question arises, "What material does this science seek?" Is it such a science as that of lyre-making? No, for the lyre-maker does not necessarily play upon the lyre. Is it a higher science, such as that of the general, war? No, for the general is only the officer of the state, and if he takes cities he hands them over to the home government, and does not settle their fate himself. And then the discussion, getting a little tedious for the reader, is broken off with a question from Crito, the original interlocutor. And a short conversation by the way ensues, happily and naturally inserted, with that art of which Plato is master.

ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ' εἰ
 ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν
 χρυσίον γένοιτο· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ τὰς πέτρας χρυσᾶς ἐπισ-
 ταίμεθα ποιεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀξία ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἴη. εἰ γὰρ 289
 μὴ κεχρῆσθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ χρυσίῳ, οὐδὲν ὄφελος
 αὐτὸ ἐφάνη ὄν. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ἔφην ἐγώ. Πάνυ γ',
 ἔφη, μέμνημαι. Οὐδέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης
 ὄφελος γίγνεται οὐδέν, οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς οὔτε ἰατρικῆς
 οὔτε ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, ἥτις ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρῆσθαι
 δὲ μὴ ᾧ ἂν ποιήσῃ. οὐχ οὕτω; Συνέφη. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις B
 ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίσ-
 τασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος
 οὐδέν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς πρόσθεν ὠμολογημένοις τεκμαίρεσ-
 θαι. Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα. Τοιαύτης τινὸς ἄρα
 ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ᾧ καλὲ παῖ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ᾗ συμ-
 πέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι
 τούτῳ, ὃ ἂν ποιῇ. Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ, ὡς

ἐξηλεγξ. "We discovered this by argument," giving the force of ἐξ.

οὐδὲν πλέον. sc. ἡμῖν εἴη. "It would be of no further advantage to us."

ἥτις . . . ἐπιστ. "which teaches men to know how to make anything."

ᾧ. Notice attraction in case to χρῆσθαι; for which v. intr. οἱ τοῖς ἰδίῳις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, and in this ch. fin. ἥτις ᾧ ἂν κτήσεται ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσάμενη, αὕτη καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι.

πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ . . . "It is by no means the case that, supposing us to be good at making lyres,

we should be therefore masters of such a science as we speak of." Heindorf reads δεῖν instead of δεινούς, which gives the following sense: "It does not follow that we must be good lyre-makers and masters of the art which they (lyres) imply," i.e. "It does not follow that because we are lyre-makers we must be masters of the art of lyre playing." The sense of this reading is more coherent in the passage, but δεῖν following immediately upon δεῖ is awkward. Winckelmann's reason for rejecting Heindorf's reading is that if we take ἐπιστήμη in the special sense of the art of lyre playing, we use it differently from its sense in

- ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς λυροποιούς δεινούς εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τινὸς
 C ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ
 ποιούσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη, διήρηται δὲ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ περί. ἡ γὰρ λυροποιϊκὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολὺ
 διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν. οὐχ οὕτω; Συνέφη. Οὐδὲ μὴν
 αὐλοποιϊκῆς γε δῆλον ὅτι δεόμεθα. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἑτέρα
 τοιαύτη. Συνεδόκει. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη ἐγώ, εἰ
 τὴν λογοποιϊκὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν, ἄρά ἐστιν αὕτη, ἣν
 ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη,
 D ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών. Τίτι τεκμηρίῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 χρῆ; Ὁρῶ, ἔφη, τινὰς λογοποιούς, οἱ τοῖς ἰδίοις λό-
 γοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ
 οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυ-
 νατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκεῖνοι εἰργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν
 αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς
 ἡ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρῆσθαι. Ἰκανόν μοι
 δοκεῖς, ἔφη ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν
 ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἣν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαίμων
 εἴη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾧμην ἐνταῦθά που φανήσεσθαι τὴν ἐπισ-
 E τήμην, ἣν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. καὶ γὰρ μοι οἷ τε ἄνδρες
 αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι,

the rest of the passage; to which argument no doubt weight must be attached.

διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. "There is a difference between them in respect of the same thing."

μὴν. This particle, though usually introducing a new point, is sometimes distinctly adversative. Æsch. Ag. 1178. καὶ μὴν ὁ χρησμός οὐκέτ' ἐκ καλυμμάτων ἔσται δεδορκώς, and Arist. Nub. 53. οὐ μὴν ἐρῶ γ' ὡς ἀργὸς ἦν.

ἦν ἔδει κεκτημ. v.s. ch. xi. ἦν

δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, and note.

ὁρῶ, ἔφη . . . This remark is too evidently tinged with Socrates' irony to be put in the mouth of a blushing boy such as Clinias; the hit at "those who manufacture words but cannot use them" is too finished for any but a master in verbal fence.

καὶ ἐνταῦθα, "in the sphere of word-making too."

καὶ μέντοι, "and after all."

ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσ-
 πεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· ἔστι
 γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπωδῶν τέχνης μόριον σμικρῷ τε ἐκείνης 290
 ὑποδεστέρα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπωδῶν ἔχέων τε καὶ
 φαλαγγίων καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ
 νόσων κήλησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγ-
 χάνει οὔσα. ἡ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ; Οὐκ,
 ἀλλ' οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὥς σὺ λέγεις. Ποῖ οὖν,
 ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίαν τέχνην; Ἐγὼ
 μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι
 εὐρηκέναι. Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Ἡ στρατηγική μοι Β
 δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἣν ἂν τις
 κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἴη. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πῶς;
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Θηρευτική τις ἦδε γέ ἐστι τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.
 Τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ. Οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς
 αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι.

πάντος μᾶλλον, "certainly,"
 "without doubt." The word
 πάντος has no reference to the
 different cases that have been
 enumerated, but forms with *μ.* a
 single expression, devoid of its
 originally comparative force.

ἦδε γέ. The particle marks an
 apologetic tone, as of one who is
 a young speaker, and volunteer-
 ing his own theory.

οὐδεμία . . . Routh's explana-
 tion of this curious expression is
 to supply a word like "part;"
 thus, "No part of the hunting
 art is concerned with more than,"
 &c. But it is difficult to supply
 such a word, when we have no
 instances of a similar use of the
 feminine numeral. If οὐδεμία is

to stand, it would be better to
 make οὐδεμία depend for its gen-
 der on ἡ θηρευτική, and translate
 "Hunting in no respect is con-
 cerned with more than," &c.
 For such a partitive use of the
 genitive we may compare an ex-
 pression *infr.* *ch.* *xxix.* τοῦτο μὲν
 οὖν τοῦ πράγματος, "Your busi-
 ness in this respect," literally
 "this (phase or aspect) of your
 business." To translate literally,
 "Nothing of hunting is con-
 cerned," &c., and the word οὐδε-
 μία comes κατὰ ξύνεσιν, or by a
 sort of attraction, into the gender
 of that whole notion, of which it
 expresses a part.

ἐπὶ πλέον, *v.s.* note *ch.* *viii.*
fin. "to a greater extent."

- ἐπειδὰν δὲ χειρώσωνται τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν θηρεύωνται, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κυνηγέται καὶ οἱ ἀλιεῖς τοῖς ὀψοποιοῖς παραδιδόασιν, οἱ δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί — θηρευτικοὶ γάρ
- C εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν — ἅτε οὖν χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον, παραδιδόασι δῆπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὐρήμασιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοί εἰσιν. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία· τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἱ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐπειδὰν ἡ πόλιν τινὰ
- D θηρεύσωνται ἢ στρατόπεδον, παραδιδόασι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσιν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις, ἃ ἐθήρευσαν· ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, οἱ ὀρτυγοθῆραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόασιν. εἰ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δεόμεθα

οἱ δ' αὖ. The particle αὖ introduces a new instance, sometimes one to the contrary. Cf. the use of the word "again" in colloquial and provincial English, meaning "on the other hand." See Arist. Nub. 50. ὄζων τρυγός, τρασιᾶς, ἐρίων περιουσίας, ἢ δ' αὖ μύρου, κρόκου, καταλωττισμάτων. For the first sense v. inf. ch. xxii. ad med. passim, and in ch. xxiv. ad med. we get the combination πάλιν αὖ.

δήπου qualifies the verb to the extent that it may carry a *general* statement.

τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς. The discoverers would correspond to the working astronomers and experts placed at observatories in the present time, most of whose time is taken up with

acquiring facts, who have no leisure whilst in active research for theorizing on their discoveries; whilst the διαλεκτικοί would answer to those acknowledged chiefs of science who communicate the results of scientific research to the public at meetings of associations, by review articles, and special scientific treatises. But the parallel will not bear insisting upon, because at this period of inquiry the physicists and dialecticians pure (i.e. metaphysicians) and rhetors (i.e. *littérateurs* or lecturers) did not occupy such distinct departments as they do now, and real results were retarded by this confusion.

τοῖς πολιτ. ἀνδ.: "diplomats." Stallb.

ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἥτις ὧ ἂν κτήσεται ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη, αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην δὲ τινα, ἔφη, ζητητέον ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.

Cap. XVIII. ΚΡ. Τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ε
ἐκεῖνο τὸ μειράκιον τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγγετο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶει, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτ' εἶπεν, οὔτ' Εὐθυδήμου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτ' ἀνθρώπου δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;

ΚΡ. Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;

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ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε εὔ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος οὔτε Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν ταῦτα. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε

ἥτις ὧ ἂν κτ. ὧ ἂν κτ. are to be taken together and with ἐπιστησ. χρῆσθ., whilst ἥτις is to be joined with ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσ., "that art which, either by working upon material acquired or acquiring that material, will know how to use whatever it possesses." For αὐτὴ the Bodl. has αὕτη, which is preferable.

οὐ μέντοι. Cf. the French *mais non*, in a direct negation.

μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος . . . For μὴ in a directly interrogative sentence v. Xen. M.S. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι;

ποῖος Κτ.σιππος; lit. what kind of a Ctesippus? i.e. "what kind of a Ctesippus could have said such a thing?" Surprise and contempt are alike expressed by this formula of interrogation. Cf. Arist. Ach. 61. οἱ πρέσβεις

οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως. ΔΙ. ποίου βασιλέως; Transl. "Ctesippus, forsooth!" Jowett paraphrases "Ctesippus! nonsense!" We must agree with Crito, as was remarked before, note on ch. xvii., that these last remarks are above the calibre of Clinias' dialectic powers, as shown in his first encounter with the two Sophists at the beginning of the dialogue. That Socrates in his reply means more than his words actually convey we may be pretty certain. Stallb.'s theory is that, when he asks Crito if he really does not believe these are Clinias' answers, he is speaking sarcastically, as much as to say, "Is it so very wonderful that a boy could answer like this?"—a remark only disparaging Crito's judgment. This is not Socrates'

Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο; ὅτι γὰρ ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα.

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τίνα ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ εὔρετε ἐκείνην ἢ οὐχ εὔρετε, ἥς ἕνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;

Β ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὦ μακάριε, εὔρομεν; ἀλλ' ἤμεν πάννυ γελοῖοι, ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορυδοὺς διώκοντα· αἰὲν ὥόμεθα ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι, αἰ δ' αἰὲν ὑπεξέφυγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἂν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτήν, εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσά τε καὶ ἀπεργαζομένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες

manner. By such a remark he would damp Crito's interest in the story, the very last thing he wishes to do. It seems more likely that Socrates has been led on a little beyond the bounds of probability in his anxiety to do justice to the argument. Finding then that he is going beyond his hearer's faith, he adopts his usual tone of mild interrogation, "Don't you really think he said this?" with the view of keeping up a continuous chain of question and answer,—Socrates' first object in all his dialogue,—and of stimulating his hearer to ask questions and express an opinion of his own.

τῶν κρειττόνων. Heindorf, Routh, and Schæfer all agree that this means the gods; if so, Socrates' remark is a humorous piece of exaggeration. In Crito's reply Stallb. sees a reference to

Socrates himself. Otherwise we must take τῶν κρ. as referring to certain other skilled dialecticians, and then κρ. in the reply must refer to their vast (πολύ γε) superiority to such tiroes as Clinias.

πόθεν, ὦ μακ. εὔρ. A similar interrogation to ποῖος Κτήσιππος; Heindorf parallels the indic. by a reference to Rep. I. 330 A. ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; ΚΕ. ποῦ ἐπεκτησάμην, ὦ Σώκρατες; Transl. "Where could we have found it?" or "Where do you think we could have found it?"

λήψεσθαι, graphic or realistic future, v.s. note on γένηται, ch. xvi. ad fin.

κορυδ. διωκ. For the simile compare a metaphorical expression in Euthyphr. iv. πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

περικάμψαντες, v.s. note on ch. xvi., and the expression there

πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες C
καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι, ὅσουπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.

KP. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ
ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.

KP. Τί οὖν δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων, ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοί
εἰσιν, ὡς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει
ἡμῖν αὕτη εἶναι, ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὁρθῶς D

compared from Euthyphr. περι-
έρχεται . . . ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα. After
πάλιν ἀνεφάνημεν should be
taken, and then ὥσπερ . . . ὄντες.
τοῦ ἴσου, "the equal amount,"
and so "the same thing."

ἡ βασιλική. In Rep. ix. Plato
works out his triple division of
the soul as "writ large" in the
affairs of men. With the ἐπι-
θυμητικόν, or lustful part of man's
nature, he compares the τυραν-
νίς; with the θυμοεῖδες, or spi-
rited, the δημοκρατία; and with
the λογιστικόν, the part where
reason reigns, the βασιλεία. See
lib. cit. 580 B. and C. μισθωσώ-
μεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ αὐτὸς
ἀνείπω, ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν
ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον εὐδαι-
μονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι
τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασι-
λεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κίκιστόν
τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον,
τοῦτον δὲ αὐτὸν τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς
ἂν τυραννικότατος ὦν ἑαυτοῦ τε
ὃ τι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς
πόλεως;

Again in Rep. bk. v. 473, we
come to the great τρικυμία, that
there is no hope for a wise and

peaceful world until kings are
philosophers and philosophers
kings. Ἐὰν μὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ οἱ
φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λε-
γόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφή-
σωσιν γυνσίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ
τοῦτο ἐς ταῦτόν ξυμπέσῃ, δυνάμεις
τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, . . .
οὐκ ἔστι κακὺν παῦλα, ὦ φίλε
Γλαῦκον, ταῖς πόλεσι. Com-
paring the passages in these two
books of the Republic with that
before us, we shall see that
Plato's argument tends in the
same direction here. But here,
instead of working out the men-
tal side of an analogical argu-
ment, as he does in Rep. ix.,
where he discovers that a certain
part of our mind is the best and
should enjoy the greatest devel-
opment, here he carries out to
the end a political theory, viz.
that βασιλεία is the best form of
government, as though it were
possible thereby to provide an
ethical rule of life for every unit
of the state as a political unit.
He is treating a moral question
politically; and he naturally

πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου
 λαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως,
 πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα
 ποιεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σαρ. XIX. ΣΩ. Σὺ κρινεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ
 ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. αὐθις γὰρ
 δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν ὧδέ πως· Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα
 ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τι ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον; ἢ οὐδέν;
 Ε Πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ
 σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ
 σὲ ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ, ὣν ἄρχει,
 τί ἔργον παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν φαίης;

ΚΡ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἡ γεωργία, πάντων

finds very soon ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος
 γίγνεται, and that they must
 begin all over again. There can
 be no doubt that Plato knew this
 perfectly well; and that this
 apparent failure of Socrates to
 discover the true rule of life is
 but a blind, to quiet the appre-
 hensions of the Sophists, and per-
 suade them that he was no such
 great dialectician after all. It
 is also quite in character with
 his practice to follow implicitly
 the rule which he lays down
 elsewhere, ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ἄγῃ
 ταύτην ἰτέον, to whatever conclu-
 sion it bring the inquirers; usu-
 ally he directs the inquiry into a
 fertilizing channel, but in this
 dialogue he plays the part of

the ignorant, would-be learner
 throughout; v. note, ch. iv. init.
 and ch. xv. fin. ἀλλὰ παχέως
 πως ἐννοῶ.

κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἱαμ. v.
 Sept. contr. Theb. init. Κάδμου
 πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια
 ὅστις φυλάσσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ
 πόλεως οἶακα νωμῶν.

πάντων ἄρχουσα . . . "Con-
 trolling all things, and making
 all things bear a useful part."
 ἄρχειν follows ἐδοκεῖ as εἶναι and
 καθῆσθαι.

ἔργον, result.

ὑμετέρα τέχνη. That the fa-
 thers of the rising generation in
 Athens at this period were
 farmers we know from Aristop-
 hanes' Clouds, where see the

ἄρχουσα, ὦν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφήν ἂν φαίης τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;

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KP. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ βασιλικὴ πάντων ἄρχουσα, ὦν ἄρχει, τί ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάνυ γ' εὐπορεῖς.

KP. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων. ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι.

KP. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι;

KP. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις B
ἐγώ τε καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

KP. Ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίη ἂν τις πολιτικῆς εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους τοὺς πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασίαστους—πάντα ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ σοφοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλεν αὕτη εἶναι ἡ ὠφελοῦσά τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦσα.

devoted attachment of Strepsiades to the soil, as in vv. 43. *ἄγροικος ἡδιστος βίος*, and 70. Also in the *Acharnians* throughout, e.g. v. 33. *τὸν δ' ἐμὸν δῆμον ποθῶν*, &c., the speaker being cooped up in the town.

Μὰ τὸν Δία. *μὰ* used generally where a negative notion is intended; *νῆ* is affirmative. For *μὰ* negative v. *infr.* ch. xx. *init.*; also v. *Ar. Pax.* 438, 9. TP....

μὴ λαβεῖν ποτ' ἀσπίδα. XO. *μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ διάζειν τὸν βίον*. In *id.* v. 416 we find *ναὶ μὰ Δία*; but *μὰ* affirmative is generally preceded by *νῆ*, whereas it stands by itself, when negative, nearly always.

πολιτικῆς, a good example of the partitive genitive, "belong to politics." And so *ἐπιστήμης* below.

C KR. "Ἐστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὁμολογήθη, ὥς σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς;

KR. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθοὺς; καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικὴν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας, αὕτη ἡ παραδιδούσά ἐστιν;

KR. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

D ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἥ τί χρησόμεθα; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μήτε κακῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν, τίς ποτε ἔστιν αὕτη, ἥ τί χρησόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἥ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;

KR. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Οἷ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; ἡ ἔτι λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκείνοι ἄλλους; ὅ τι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν φαίνονται, ἐπειδὴ περ τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡτιμάσαμεν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ ἔλεγον, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν ἐνδεῖ

ἀλλ' ἄρα . . . "But does it make all men good, in every respect, too?" In τί γὰρ κωλύει Crito's attitude is neutral. Thus, "I dare say it does, for why should it not?" i.e. "I have no objections to suggest; I will leave it to you to make any you can." With Crito's answer the βασιλικὴ τέχνη is finally dropped as not satisfying the conditions of the science which is required.

τί χρησόμεθα. The word τί corresponds to the special arts of Socrates' previous remark, to the improvement and illumination of which this ἐπιστήμη is to be directed. And so below, ὅ τι δέ π. τε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν, "but as to the particular pursuits in which they are to be good . . ."

ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος: "the old story over again." v. Pind. Nem. 7. 155. ταῦτά δὲ τρεῖς τετράκι τ'

ἢ ἐτὶ πλείονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι, τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἢ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσῃ;

ΚΡ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀφίκεσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφίειν, 293
δεόμενος τοῖν ξένοις, ὥσπερ Διοσκούρων ἐπικαλούμενος, σῶσαι ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μεράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδᾶσαντας ἐπιδεῖξαι, τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥς τυγχόντες ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν.

ἀμπολεῖν ἀπορία τελέθει, τέκνοισιν ἅτε μαψυλάκας, Διὸς Κόρινθος, on which the Scholiast says: μαψυλάκας, ὁ μάτην φλυαρηθείς. Διὸς δὲ Κόρινθος παροιμία ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων. ἡ δὲ παροιμία ἐντεῦθεν ἔρπει. Ἀλήτης περὶ τῆς ἐν Κόρινθῳ βασιλείας προσῆλθε τῷ μαντείῳ τῷ ἐν Δωδώνῃ, ὁ ἐστὶ τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ ἔχρησεν αὐτῷ τότε κρατήσῃν, ὅτε τίς δῶ βῶλον γῆς ἐπιθέσθαι δὲ ἡμέρας πολυστεφάνῳ· ἔλθων οὖν ἐν Κόρινθῳ ἦται τινὰ ἀγροῖκον ἄρτον ὁ Ἀλήτης, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν βῶλον ἔδωκεν. ἐτελείτο δὲ καὶ θυσία τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐν Κόρινθῳ, δι' ἣν τῆς πόλεως ἐν μνήμασιν οὐσης ἐπέρχεται ὁ Ἀλήτης, καὶ εἶρε Κρέοντος θυγάτερας περὶ συνθήκας γενομένας, ἔφησέ τε εἰν κρατήσῃ, ἔξῃεν τὴν νεωτέραυτῶν πρὸς γάμον. καὶ πείθεται ἡ κορὴ καὶ προδίδωσι τὴν πόλιν τὰς πόλας ἀνοίξασα, καὶ κρατεῖ ὁ Ἀλήτης, καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὴν Διὸς Κόρινθον ἐπεὶ διὰ τῆς μαντείας τοῦ Διὸς ἡ ἀρχὴ εἰς αὐτὸν ἦλθεν. Pausanias 2. Κορινθ. 1. 1. mentions the fact that Corinth took

its name from Corinthus, but throws doubts upon his genealogy, which he gives in 2. 3. 10. For τὸ λεγόμενον. v.s. not. ad cap. xvi.

ποιήσῃ. Notice that the verb has passed into the optative, as if the probability of such a discovery were receding. Hitherto the categorical future has been used.

ὥσπερ Διοσκ. Cf. Hor. Car. 1. 3. Sic te diva potens Cypri, sic fratres Helenæ, lucida sidera. Eur. Hel. 1497 seqq. παῖδες Τυνδάριδαι . . . ναύταις εὐαεῖς ἀνέμων πέμποντες Διὸθεν πνοάς.

τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου. For this expression v. Rep. 472 A. τὸ μέγιστον καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγει, where it is applied to the proposition of Socrates which, he expects, is to cause the greatest offence, viz. that "to ensure a perfect state kings must be philosophers and philosophers kings."

καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον δι. v.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; ἠθέλησέ τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ ἥρξατό γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πάνυ μεγαλοφρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὥδε·

- B Cap. XX. Πότερον δὴ σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα; ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἐπιδείξον τοίνυν με νῆ Δί', ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ ῥᾶον ἢ μαυθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα. Φέρε δὴ μοι ἀποκρίναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὅ τι ἐπίστασαι; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε. Ἀρκεῖ, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖς οἷόν τε, τὶ τῶν ὄντων C τοῦτο, ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἔφης ἐπίστασθαί τι; Ἐγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἶπερ ἐπίστασαι; Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει

Euthyphr. fin. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

Ch. XX. The Sophists now have their innings; and, refreshed by their silence during Socrates' inquiry, they come pompously and confidently into the dialectical arena, with a flourish—"Shall I teach it you, or show you that you already possess it?" From this point to ch. xxii. fin. the Sophist Euthydemus is occupied in defending and proving true (to his own satisfaction) that "knowledge" is equivalent to "universal knowledge;" that there can be no intermediate stage. He suffers so severely from Socrates in the word-battle that he completely loses his temper; but his skill in quibbling remains with him to the last, and

gives him, apparently, the victory, such as it is.

τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα. In ch. i. fin. he is by no means afraid of attacking a new subject, although advanced in years, and even tries to get other old men to join him.

καὶ πολλά, σμ. γε. Betrayed out of his assumption of complete ignorance into the bold assertion καὶ πολλά, Socrates hastens to qualify it by the saving clause σμικρά γε. His knowledge may be extensive, but it is superficial. For γε apologetic, qualificatory, v.s. ch. xvii. note on ἡδέ γε, and immediately below in this passage τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

τὶ τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο. The demonstrative is merely employed to emphasize the indefinite, "any particular individual."

τούτου γε αὐτοῦ. Socrates is

πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη
 ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ
 ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. Ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ. Ἦττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ
 ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι. καὶ οὕτω τυγχάνεις ὧν αὐτὸς D
 οὔτος, ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταῦτά ἅμα.
 Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ
 παταγεῖς. πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἐκείνην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν
 ἐζητοῦμεν; ὥς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε
 καὶ μὴ· εἴπερ ἔν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντ' ἐπίσταμαι· οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν εἶην. ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἅμα· ἐπεὶ δὲ
 πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, καὶ ἐκείνην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχω· ἄρα

careful to limit the statement which Euthydemus puts in his mouth, perceiving that the expression *ἐπιστήμων*, "understanding," will be used in a universal sense, unless he is careful to preserve its special application; and so immediately below, *ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε*.

Μὰ Δί', v.s. note ch. xix.

ἦττον οὖν . . . οὐκ ἐπ. εἶ; "But are you any the less ignorant?" i.e. the term "ignorant" must be applicable to you, whether you are ignorant only in special points or entirely ignorant. This argument is a violent wresting of language, and a misuse of the general application, or, in logical language, of the "extension" of a noun. Extension means to what number or extent of individuals any term applies. The word ignorant has a limited extension in its sense of "not well educated," and does not in that sense, therefore, apply to Socrates. In its sense of "not

knowing," its extension is over all the human race, every member of which is "not knowing" in some points. The fallacy, therefore, lies in confusing the double extension of the word ignorant, which double extension is simply due to the word possessing two meanings.

αὐτὸς οὔτος refers to the predicate *ἐπιστήμων*, "that very kind of person."

τὸ λεγ. v.s. note ch. xvi.

καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς. lect. vulg. *καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις, καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄγεις*. Abresch. and Dind. restore this reading from a fragment of Aristophanes, 171 Meineke.

ὥς δὴ . . . Socrates here plays his adversary's game for him with great effect. If he knows one thing he knows all things; but, ergo, he knows this science for which they have been continually searching. And he has his reason for playing it thus.

Ε οὕτω λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σοφόν; Αὐτὸς σαυτὸν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ πέπονθας τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὀτιοῦν ἂν πάσχων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσοδώρου τοῦδε, φίλης κεφαλῆς, οὐκ ἂν πάνν ἀγανακτοίην. εἰπέ μοι, σφῶ οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθον τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθον; Ἦκιστά γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγώ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὄς. Πάντ' 294 ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπίστασθον, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ ὀτιοῦν; Πάντ', ἔφη. καὶ σύ γε πρὸς, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἐπίστασαι, πάντα ἐπίστασαι. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ

αὐτὸς σαυτὸν γε δὴ. Euthydemus has done what he promised to do: he has shown Socrates that he knows the science for which he has been seeking, by means of the lame argument we have spoken of above. But why did Socrates thus accept the situation? Because, like a good chess-player (and this game of question and answer is not unlike a game of chess), he saw where Euthydemus' confession would place him, viz. under the necessity of asserting that he knew all things. This train of argument strictly followed out presses Euthydemus so hard that, hitherto unruffled, he has to give in and lose his temper, as Dionysodorus had already done with Socrates (ch. xvi. in.) and with Ctesippus (ch. xii. fin.).

πέπονθας, πάσχω means to receive an impression, physical or mental; hence to experience anything. In English we should say "Is it the case with you?"

Thus Adeimantus in Rep. viii. describes how in his walks he has difficulty in avoiding the animals of the fields, when Socrates has been speaking of the same thing in the δημοκρατία, and he says αὐτὸς γάρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θάμα αὐτὸ πάσχω. "It is just my case." Also v. inf. ch. xxiv. ταῦτά ταῦτα πέπονθεν.

ἐπ. καὶ ὀτιοῦν, "If you know the merest trifle." καὶ here, as below, ch. xxix. ἐν δὲ τῷς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, has merely an emphasizing or intensifying force. Cf. also ch. xxx. οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι, "For so he *actually* said in words," i.e. whatever his meaning might have been.

ὥς- θαυμαστὸν . . . ἀγαθόν is the subject and θαυμ. and μέγα are the attributes. "What a great and wondrous blessing this is which you say has been brought to light!"

ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. μὼν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντ' ἐπίστανται, ἢ οὐδέν; Οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπίστανται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἅμα ἐπιστήμονές τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες. Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πάντες, ἢ δ' ὅς, πάντα ἐπίστανται, εἴπερ καὶ ἔν. Ὡς πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε· δηλοῖ B γάρ μοι ἐστον ἤδη, ὅτι σπουδάζετον, καὶ μόλις ὑμᾶς προῦκαλεσάμην σπουδάξιν· αὐτῷ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον; οἷον τεκτονικὴν καὶ σκυτικὴν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ νευρορράφεϊν δυνατὴ ἐστον; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία καττύειν, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας, ὅπόσοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἄμμον; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς· εἴτ' οὐκ ἂν οἶει ὁμολογῆσαι ἡμᾶς;

Cap. XXI. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ὑπολαβὼν· Πρὸς Διός, ἔφη, Διονυσόδωρε, τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ὥς εἶσομαι, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον. Τί ἐπιδείξω; ἔφη. Οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὅπόσους ὁδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅπόσους σύ; Οὐκ ἔξαρκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα; Μηδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῖν μόνον εἶπατον καὶ ἐπιδείξατον, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον. καὶ ἐὰν εἴπητον, ὅπόσους ἑκάτερος ἔχει

οὐ γὰρ δήπου . . . rejecting as an utter absurdity what is really the case, viz. that men are partly wise, partly ignorant.

ἀλλὰ τί; sc. "What next?" "What follows?"

καὶ μόλις . . . "And I have with difficulty provoked you to be in earnest." προῦκ. σπουδ.: "Caused you by challenging or provoking, to be in earnest."

πάνυ γ', v.s. note on the debased form of Stoicism, which encouraged this tenet; here it is

only a passing phase of the Sophists' argument, ch. viii. fin.

εἴτ' οὐκ ἂν . . . "Why, do you think that we were not going to agree to that?" ἂν with ὁμολ. Εἴτα is a demonstrative conjunction, as the suffix -τα indicates; it points to the clause which it introduces as contrasted with the preceding clause, not merely consequent to it.

ἔτι, "still," i.e. "as well as making your assertion, add to it just this proof."

ὑμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνόντες ἡμῶν ἀριθμησάντων, ἤδη
 πεισόμεθα ὑμῖν καὶ τᾶλλα. Ἐγούμενῳ οὖν σκώπτεσ-
 D θαι οὐκ ἠθέλητην, ἀλλ' ὠμολογησάτην πάντα χρήματα
 ἐπίστασθαι, καθ' ἑν ἕκαστον ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ Κτησίππου.
 ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος πάννυ ἀπαρακαλύπτως οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐκ
 ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ τὰ αἰσχιστα, εἰ ἐπισταίστην. τῷ
 δὲ ἀνδρείοτατα ὁμόσε ἦτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, ὁμολο-
 γοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν
 ὁμόσε ὠθούμενοι. ὥστ' ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ὑπ'
 ἀπιστίας ἠναγκάσθην τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι τὸν Εὐθύδημον,
 E εἰ καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐπίσταιτο ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Ὁ δέ,
 Πάννυ, ἔφη. Οὐ δῆπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε
 κυβιστᾶν καὶ ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι τηλικούτος ὢν· οὕτω
 πόρρῳ σοφίας ἦκει. Οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὃ τι οὐ. Πότερον δέ,
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ καὶ αἰεί; Καὶ
 αἰεί, ἔφη. Καὶ ὅτε παιδία ἦσθην καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι
 ἠπίστασθε; Πάντα, ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω. Καὶ ἡμῖν

πεισόμεθα ὑμ. καὶ τᾶλλ. "We shall believe in you about every-thing else." *πείθεσθαι*, to be persuaded, hence convinced.

ὁμόσε, Lat. *cominus*. ὁμόσειέναι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Thuc. 2, 62.

ὀρχεῖσθαι. A piece of genuine Socratic humour, Dionysodorus being advanced in years: v. inf. τηλικούτος ὢν. The sword-dances mentioned below were probably an imitation of the dances of Greek Highlanders, Thessalians, Ætolians, &c.; just as in Scotland we have sword-dances. In Xen. Anab. 6, we have an elaborate description of the rustic and military dances of the Magnesians; and of a Mysian dance, where the performer holds two

javelins in his hand, and mimics a battle.

οὕτω πόρρῳ σοφ. ἦκει. "So far has he progressed on the road of wisdom." A similar phrase occurs in Euthyphr. ch. iv. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρῳ πον ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαννόντος. A curious parallel to this construction is to be found in the Midlands, where a man says, "He is a long way *of* eighty," when he wishes to express that someone is nearly eighty. The genitive would be best described in grammatical language as *partitive*.

εὐθὺς γενόμενοι, "From your earliest moments." Cf. Xen. Anab. 1, ix. 4: ὥστε εὐθὺς παῖδες

μὲν ἄπιστον ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι. Ὁ δ' Εὐθύδημος, 295
 Ἄπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; Πλήν γ' ὅ τι, * ἦν * δ'
 ἐγὼ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. Ἀλλ' ἦν, ἔφη, ἐθελή-
 σης μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ
 θαυμαστὰ ὁμολογοῦντα. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδιστα
 ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ γάρ τοι λέληθα ἐμαντὸν σοφὸς
 ὢν, σὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὥς πάντα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ ἀεὶ,
 τί μεῖζον ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὖροιμι ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ;

Cap. XXII. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη. Ὡς ἀποκρινου- B
 μένου ἐρώτα. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστήμων
 του εἶ ἢ οὐ; Ἐγωγε. Πότερον οὖν ᾧ ἐπιστήμων εἶ,
 τούτῳ καὶ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ; Ὡς ἐπιστήμων. οἶμαι
 γάρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγειν. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις; Οὐκ
 αἰσχύνει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾷς;
 Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γὰρ ποιήσω,
 ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὅ τι ἐρωτᾷς, κελεύεις
 με ὁμῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπανερέσθαι; Ὑπολαμ-
 βάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι, ἔφη, ὃ λέγω; Ἐγωγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. C

ὄντες μανθάνουσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ
 ἄρχεσθαι.

σὺ δὲ τοῦτο . . . σὺ has been re-
 stored for οὐ, improving con-
 siderably the point of the passage
 —“If I myself knew it not, and
 you, on the other hand, demon-
 strate it to me.” For ἔρμαιον, v.
 not. ad cap. iii. init.

Ch. XXII. The argument is
 begun here to prove that Socrates
 knows everything, and has al-
 ways known it; but is broken
 off because Socrates is unwilling
 to answer unless he and his
 interlocutor fully understand
 each other. This is of course
 repugnant to Euthydemus' sys-
 tem, as Socrates says below,

βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι; but So-
 crates defers in the end to Euthy-
 demus as being the more learned.

οἶμαι γάρ. Socrates desires to
 understand the question more
 exactly; the word ᾧ being inde-
 finite, and possibly referring to
 any of the stages in the mental
 process, which is a complicated
 one. Euthydemus, on the other
 hand, would rather not particu-
 larize; he is only endeavouring
 to get the words ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι,
 or their substance, out of So-
 crates' mouth; and will lose his
 point if each reply is rigidly
 limited to a precise significance.

ὑπολαμβάνεις γάρ . . . “Yes,
 for you have some idea of what

Πρὸς τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀποκρίνου, ὃ ὑπολαμβάνεις. Τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλη ἐρωτᾷς διανοοῦμενος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλλη ὑπολάβω, ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἔξαρκεῖ σοι, ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι; "Εμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοί γε, ὥς ἐγὼμαι. Οὐ τοίνυν μὰ Δία ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πρότερον, πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι. Οὐκ ἀποκρινεῖ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνης, ὅτι
D ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος. Καγὼ

I am talking about." This reply is further carried out in Euthydemus' next reply. These senses of ὑπολαμβάνω, viz. "gaining an idea of," and its kindred sense of "supposing," are metaphors from the physical sense of the verb "to catch hold of *partially*" (cf. ὑπόχλωρος, "subfuscus," &c.). And the sense of grasping, so as to keep hold, is the salient feature in this secondary meaning; cf. ξυνίημι, "comprehendo." But in ch. xxi. init. we have the sense "interrupt," where we do not insist upon the notion of "holding" but merely of "catching at," and so "arresting." It is interesting to see in this way how a single verbal notion is capable of generating two others perfectly distinct.

ἔξαρκεῖ σοι. Socrates puts in its most illogical light the possible results of his complying with Euthydemus' system. And in Euthydemus' answer there is a confession of the results of such a system, "That it will satisfy the questioner, but not the answerer, who is desirous of learning." In other words, this system of answering merely plays into

the hands of one party, leaving the other unenlightened.

οὐ . . . πρότερον, πρὶν ἂν πύθ. Socrates very properly refuses to abide by such an unfair arrangement, viz. that the questioned is not to be told the full import of the question.

οὐκ ἀποκρινεῖ. Notice that Euthydemus is repeating Socrates' words, οὐ τ. ἀποκρινοῦμαι. The words πρὸς ἃ ἂν, &c., imply the fact that "Socrates does put some definite construction on all (ἀεὶ) Euthydemus' questions;" the inference being that he might give coherent answers to them all, instead of refusing to answer at all.

ἔχων φλυαρεῖς. So Ar. Nub. 509: τί κυπτάσεις ἔχων περὶ τὴν θύραν. Plato, Gorg. 490 E.: ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; Jelf explains this phrase with ἔχων, in the sense of "conducting oneself," by which he seems to mean "being in a certain way." If we take the word thus we may recall Aristotle's word for a habit born of a practice, viz. ἔξις, from the same verb, which supports the view taken above.

ἀρχαιότερος. v.s. οὕτως Κρόνος

ἐγνων αὐτὸν, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαῖνοι διαστέλλονται τὰ λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας. ἀνεμνήσθην οὖν τοῦ Κόννου, ὅτι μοι κάκεϊνος χαλεπαίνει ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπέικω, ἔπειτά μου ἤττον ἐπιμελεῖται ὡς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν διενενοήμην καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον φοιτᾶν, ὥήθην δεῖν ὑπέικειν, μή με σκαιὸν ἡγησάμενος φοιτητὴν μὴ προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, Εὐθύδημε, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως πού κάλλιον ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαί τῳ ἢ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ; Ἐγωγε, ἔφη, τῇ 296 γε ψυχῇ. Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτούμενοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαί τῳ. Πλέον αὖ, ἔφη ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμην ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκέ μοι· ἀποκρινοῦμαι γὰρ ἤδη ἀπλῶς, ὅτι ἐπίσταμαί τῳ αἰὲν ἢ ἐπίσταμαι. Πότερον, ἢ δ' ὅς, τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' αἰεί, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἑτέρῳ; Ἀεί, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτῳ. Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσει παραφθεγγόμενος;

εἰ, ch. xvi. init. and note. For the word ἀρχαῖος Stallb. compares Ar. Nub. 823. ὅτι παιδάριον εἰ, καὶ φρονεῖς ἀρχαῖκά.

διαστέλλονται, "distinguishing" or "differentiating."

χαλεπαίνει. From the tense we gather that Socrates is still Connus' pupil. v.s. ch. i. ad fin.

διενενοήμην. It is better not to attach much importance to this statement. Socrates could hardly expect to profit by a regular attendance at these Sophists' lectures, and his remark

seems directed rather to keep Crito's attention than to be meant seriously.

ἰδιώτου, v.s. nott. capp. vii. ix. τέχνη must be rendered by a general term, such as "skill," "practice," because, properly speaking, an ἰδιώτης was defined as one without a τέχνη, in the special sense.

προσαποκρ. Notice the force of the preposition.

ἔστι μὲν ὅτε, join, "sometimes."

οὐκ αὖ παύσ. παρ. αὖ to be joined with παραφθ.

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- B 'Αλλ' ὅπως μή τι ἡμᾶς σφήλη τὸ αἰ τοῦτο. Οὐκ οὖν ἡμᾶς γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου· ἢ αἰ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι; Αἰεὶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ διττὴ ἀφελεῖν τὸ ὅταν. Οὐκοῦν αἰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· αἰ δ' ἐπιστάμενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δ' ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ πάντα; Τούτῳ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, ἃ γ' ἐπίσταμαι. Τοῦτ' ἐκέينو, ἔφη· ἥκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα. 'Αλλ' ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἃ γ' ἐπίσταμαι.
- C 'Αλλὰ μηδὲ ἓν, ἔφη, ἀφέλῃς· οὐδὲν γάρ σου δέομαι. ἀλλὰ μοι ἀπόκριναι· δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταιο; Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Καὶ

ἀλλ' ὅπως μή . . . This remark belongs to Socrates, who objects to say "I always understand," unless he is allowed to qualify the statement with "when I understand." The fallacy, or quibble rather, consists in making the word αἰ apply to ἐπίσταμαι, and ἐπίσταμαι alone, instead of allowing it to belong to τούτῳ alone. Socrates means "I understand by means of this invariably," not "I always understand."

οὐκοῦν ἡμᾶς γε . . . v.s. ἐμοί γε, ἢ δ' ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοίγε, where, as here, γε is sarcastic.

οὐκοῦν αἰ μὲν. This sentence is carefully cast so as to make Socrates reply "I understand all things with this," although it is asked apparently to discover whether the thinking faculty is diverse when applied to diverse objects of thought, or not. Socrates saves himself from the snare by again inserting that qualifying clause, "Those things, at least, which I know."

τοῦτ' ἐκέينو. So οὗτος ἐκέινος ὃν σὺ ζητεῖς. Her. 1. 32.

ἀλλὰ μηδὲ . . . Euthydemus, piqued by Socrates' obstinate defence of his position, is obliged to try another device, in which he is successful. This wretched juggle of words is obscure from its very paltriness. Euthydemus says, "You could not understand everything, if you did not understand everything;" and Socrates, taking the words as they stand, replies "Of course not." But Euthydemus means, in the *double entente*, this further sense, "You could not understand everything, *unless* you understood everything (*as you must do*)." δύναιο refers to Socrates' capacity for acquiring universal knowledge, and if that capacity be granted, the clause "unless you understood everything" implies that Socrates does understand everything. This is one way of coming to the conclusion, and seems to be that intended by Euthydemus. He then breaks

ὃς εἶπε· Προστίθει τοίνυν ἤδη ὃ τι βούλει· ἅπαντα γάρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. "Εοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ περ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ ἂ ἐπίσταμαι, πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ὠμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ, ὃ ἐπίστασαι, εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἴτε ὅπως βούλει· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὠμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. δῆλον D οὖν, ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὢν ἠπίστω, καὶ ὅτ' ἐγίγνου, καὶ ὅτ' ἐφύον· καὶ πρὶν αὐτὸς γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω ἅπαντα, εἴπερ ἀεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστήσῃ καὶ ἅπαντα, ἂν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι.

Cap. XXIII. Ἀλλὰ βουλευθείης, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ' οὐ σοι πάνυ πιστεύω ἱκανῶ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ σοι συμβουληθείῃ ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὐτοσὶ Διονυσόδωρος· οὕτω τάχ' ἂν. εἶπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,—τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν, οὕτως εἰς σοφίαν E τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι,

out into an exultant encouragement to Socrates to make any additions or qualifications he pleases, since he has made this one admission.

ἐπειδὴ περ . . . "Because my qualification of 'what I do know' is of no use, but (according to you) I know all things."

καὶ ἀεὶ. Euthydemus pushes to extremity all that Socrates has admitted; and now makes out his knowledge to be eternal as well as universal.

εἴτε ὅταν . . . "Whether you add 'when I do understand,' or however you choose to put it."

αὐτὸς ἐπιστήσῃ. Heindorf finds αὐτὸς molestum, immo prorsus

absurdum; and for it αὐθις, εὐθὺς, &c., have been conjectured. But is there not a contrast between the self who is made to understand whether he will or not, and the Sophist who makes him? "You, yourself, shall confess 'I understand,' if I choose," just as ὅταν ἐπίστη above means "your qualification 'when I understand.'"

οὐ σοι πάνυ πιστ. Socrates, feeling that the game is nearly played out, begins slightly to lift the veil of deference which has hitherto covered his addresses to the brother Sophists. So he adds, in retraction, οὕτω τάχ' ἂν.

οὕτω τάχ' ἂν. sc. ἱκανὸς ἂν εἶη.

- ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς φατέ· τὰ δὲ τοιάδε πῶς φῶ ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὥς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοί εἰσι; φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι; Ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη, Τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. "Οτι οὐκ ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί.
- 297 Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλαί. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλ' ὥς ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἔμαθον; Οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐγώ. Διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὐτοσὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ἡρυθρίασεν. Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὀρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντα εἰδώς; Ἀδελφὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγώ

τὰ δὲ τοιάδε. Socrates meets the Sophist on his own ground; he wishes to know how, if he understands everything, he understands an impossibility or contradiction. Dionysodorus, evidently the inferior dialectician of the two, is beguiled into denying that Socrates can understand an impossibility, which destroys the conclusion which Euthydemus has taken so much pains to bring about. v.s. ch. xii. ad fin. where Ctesippus gets the better of Dionysodorus by rallying him, and causes him to lose his temper.

ἐπίστασαι μέντοι. "Yes, but you do understand." This reply is again an equivoque, meaning secondarily, "you know," on the confession wrung from Socrates that he knew all things. Socrates, not to be put off with general expressions, replies, "What do I know?" when Euthydemus, his

prevarication being met, garbles Socrates' original question, giving the converse sense, which is true.

διαφθείρεις . . . τὸν λογ. The machinery of the entertainment which the Sophists are providing for the audience is here laid bare; and a disagreement between the actors renders the scene undignified and ludicrous, even if the poverty of the discussion had not before disgusted their hearers.

ἡρυθρίασεν, an unusual circumstance in a Sophist of this stamp. v. Rep. i. xxii. init. ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα . . . καὶ τότε εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὐπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα.

ὁ πάντα εἰδώς, v.s. xx. fin. αὐτῷ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον; πάνν γ' ἔφη.

ἀδελφὸς γάρ . . . Dionysodorus wishes to get out of his uncomfortable situation, having just

εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος; Κἀγὼ εἶπον, "Εασον, ὦ ἄγαθέ, ἕως ἂν Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ, ὥς ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, ὅτι ἄδικοί εἰσι, καὶ μὴ μοι φθονήσης τοῦ μαθήματος. Φεύγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Εἰκότως γ', εἶπον ἐγώ· ἥττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε C
 φεύγειν. πολὺ γάρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἑρακλέους, ὅς οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνιείσῃ εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμηθείη τοῦ λόγου, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ σοφιστῇ, ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένῳ, νεωστὶ, μοι δοκεῖν, καταπεπλευκότι· ὅς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς D
 ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως Πατροκλῆς εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν.

made a *faux pas*, and tries to create a diversion and catch Socrates tripping, at one blow. Socrates tries to hold Euthydemus to the point, but the pertinacity of Dionysodorus, who has a character to retrieve, obliges him (but not till the next chapter) to receive Dionysodorus' argument.

Ἑρακλέους. This biting comparison of the Sophists to a hydra and a crab—the latter possibly a hit at Dionysodorus' halting argument—is suggested by the proverb, quoted by Stallb., πρὸς δύο οὐδ' Ἑρακλῆς.

σοφιστρίᾳ, "witch," or "wise-acre."

μίαν κεφ. accusat. respectus.

In the word λόγου Socrates passes back to the situation of affairs he is illustrating by this simile, just so far as to give the Sophists another hit.

ἐκ θαλ. . . . νεωστὶ, of course referring to the Sophist's late arrival from Chios, ch. i.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀριστερὰ. Schleiermacher recognizes a reference here to Dionysodorus—ὁ εἰ παρ' ἐμὲ κατῆμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφός τούτου Διονυσόδωρος. Ch. i. init. For the expression ἐκ τοῦ, Stallb. compares ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλείστον.

Πατροκλῆς. Heindorf notices that this person is never again mentioned by Plato: Jowett follows Hemsterhuys in the con-

Cap. XXIV. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὁπότε σοι ταῦτα ὑμνῆται· πότερον ὁ Ἰόλεως τοῦ Ἡρακλέους μᾶλλον ἢν ἀδελφιδοῦς ἢ σός; Κράτιστον τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῆς ἐρωτῶν, (σχεδόν τι ἐγὼ τοῦτ' εὖ οἶδα), φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα μὴ διδάξῃ με ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκείνο τὸ σοφόν. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη. Ἀποκρινοῦμαι δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἦν ὁ Ἰόλεως ἀδελφιδοῦς, Εἰ ἐμός δ', ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. οὐ γὰρ Πατροκλῆς ἦν αὐτῷ πατήρ, ὁ ἐμός ἀδελφός, ἀλλὰ παραπλήσιον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἴφικλῆς, ὁ Ἡρακλέους ἀδελφός. Πατροκλῆς δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, σός; Πάνυ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμομήτριός γε, οὐ μέντοι ὁμοπάτριος. Ἀδελφός ἄρα ἐστί σοι καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός. Οὐχ ὁμοπάτριός γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην· ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ Χαιρέδημος ἦν πατήρ, ἐμός δὲ Σωφρονίσκος. Πατὴρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ

jecture that he was the same as Patrocles the statuery, whom Pliny (Nat. Hist. 37, 8.) mentions as flourishing OL. 95. Aristophanes mentions a Πατροκλείδης τις—Birds, 790, and also in Plutus, 84, as one, ὃς οὐκ ἐλούσατ' ἐξ ὅτουπερ ἐγένετο, which Winckelmann conjectures to be the same person.

πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποι. v.s. ch. ix. πλέον γὰρ πον, οἶμαι, θάτερόν ἐστιν, εἰάν τις χρηται ὀτφοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ εἰάν ἐᾷ. The expression πλέον Stallb. notices is euphemistic. Cf. the Latin euphemism plures, i.e. mortui.

σχεδόν τι . . . οἶδα: "I am nearly certain of this."

ἵνα μὴ με διδάξῃ. Socrates finds that the Sophists are in too great a dilemma to allow him

to pursue the argument about knowing everything, so he meets Dionysodorus' new question with a parting shot at Euthydemus' inability to show that the good are wicked.

παραπλήσιον μὲν τοῦν. Heindorf at one time wished to read παραπλήσιος; but afterwards kept the present reading on the analogy of such expressions as ἀνὴρ ὄνομα Γωβρύας.

πατὴρ δὲ ἦν . . . The Sophist is proving that if a man is a father we cannot say he is not a father—of any other person; just as at the beginning of the dialogue, it was said that Clinias' friends wished to destroy him when "they wished him *not* to be—unlearned."

Χαιρέδημος; Πάνυ γ', ἔφην· ὁ μὲν γε ἐμός, ὁ δὲ ἐκείνου. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἕτερος ἦν Χαιρέδημος τοῦ 298 πατρός; Τοῦμοῦ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ. Ἄρ' οὖν πατήρ ἦν ἕτερος ὢν πατρός; ἡ σὺ εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ λίθῳ; Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτός· οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκῶ. Οὐκοῦν ἕτερος εἶ, ἔφη, τοῦ λίθου; ἕτερος μέντοι. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὢν λίθου οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν πατρός οὐκ ἂν πατήρ εἴη. Ἐοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ πατήρ B εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλιν αὖ ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἕτερος ὢν πατρός οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν, ὥστε σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἶ. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐκδεξάμενος, Ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, αὖ πατήρ οὐ ταῦτά ταῦτα πέπονθεν; ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦμοῦ πατρός; Πολλοῦ γ', ἔφη, δεῖ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος. Ἀλλά, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὁ αὐτός; Ὁ αὐτὸς μέντοι. Οὐκ

ἕτερος . . . τοῦ πατρός. The Sophist means "different from the thing father." Socrates of course means "different from my father," i.e. a different person, though agreeing in their relationship, in their paternity.

ἡ σὺ εἰ ὁ αὐτός . . . i.e. if the same person could be and not be the same thing, anyone can be anything, stock or stone. There is also the second meaning of λίθος, blockhead, intended. v. Ar. Nub. 1202. ὄντες λίθοι, ἀριθμὸς, πρόβατ' ἄλλως, ἀμφορῆς νενησμένοι. There may possibly be a reference to Sophroniscus' profession (he was a sculptor), and then we might translate "or are you only a chip of

a block?" Heindorf compares Sympos. 198 C. ἐφοβούμην γὰρ μὴ μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφάλην δεινὸν λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειεν. This ἀφωνία, Stallb. considers, is intended by Socrates in his reply.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδ. "Chaeremus, too, then, cannot be a father, if he is other than a father."

πάλιν αὖ. v.s. not. ad cap. xvii. οἱ δ' αὖ.

ταῦτά ταῦτα πέπονθεν. For this sense of πάσχω. v.s. not. ch. xx. πέπονθας.

ὁ αὐτὸς μέντοι. μέντοι here must be explained by an ellipse,

- C ἂν συμβουλοίμην. ἀλλὰ πότερον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐμὸς μόνος ἐστὶ πατήρ ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔφη· ἢ οἶει τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; "Ωμην δῆτα, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· χρυσὸν ὄντα μὴ χρυσὸν εἶναι; ἢ ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ ἄνθρωπον; Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις; δεινὸν γὰρ λέγεις πρᾶγμα, εἰ ὁ σὸς πατήρ πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ. Ἄλλ' ἐστίν, ἔφη. Πότερον ἀνθρώπων; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων
- D ζώων; Πάντων, ἔφη. Ἥ καὶ μήτηρ ἢ μήτηρ; Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε. Καὶ τῶν ἐχίνων ἄρα, ἔφη, ἡ σὴ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τῶν θαλαττίων. Καὶ ἡ σὴ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἀδελφὸς εἶ τῶν κωβιῶν καὶ κυναρίων καὶ χοιριδίων. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ἔφη. Καὶ πρὸς ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων. Καὶ γὰρ σοί, ἔφη. Αὐτίκα δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἂν μοι ἀποκρίνη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ἐστὶ σοι κύων; Καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. "Ἔστιν οὖν αὐτῷ κυνίδια;

"But how can you think otherwise?" or "But of course they are the same."

οὐκ ἂν συμβουλοίμην. "I should not agree or consent to" such an arrangement, i.e. "I should be sorry to have it so."

τὸ λεγόμενον. v.s. note ad cap. xvi.

οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις; Two renderings are possible for this proverb: (i.) "Are you not conjuring?" (ii.) "Are you not fitting like to like?" If the latter rendering be taken, we may understand a reference to the doctrine of the union of op-

posites, a doctrine expressed in the text τὸ ἀντίξουν ξυμφέρειν, which Heracleitus preached. Socrates then would mean that it is a sorry result if this dreadful identity of parentage is to be proved as universal. "If Euthydemus' father is father of us all, what is to become of the world?" The Scholiast gives a hint of this meaning, λίν. λίν. συνάπτειν, ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ... δρώντων ἢ τὰ ὅμοια εἰς φιλίαν ξυναπτόντων.

καὶ κύων: "A dog as well," i.e. as well as your human father.

καὶ μάλα πονηρός. "Ay, and

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν Ε
αὐτῶν ὁ κύων; Ἐγώ γε τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα
τὴν κύνα. Τί οὖν; οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ κύων; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὢν σός ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ γίγνεται
ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός; Καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ
ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ
Κτήσιππος, Καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριναι·
τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον;

Cap. XXV. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς
θεούς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτοῦ 299
πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις; Πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιότερον
τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι, ὅ τι μαθὼν σοφοὺς νίεις
οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλ' ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιπ-
πος, πόλλ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας ταύτης
ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατήρ ὁ ὑμέτερός τε καὶ τῶν κυνιδίων.
'Αλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οὐτ'
ἐκεῖνος οὐτε σύ. Οὐδὲ σύ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός;
Οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ὦ

a bad one he is." Ctesippus has just called Euthydemus a puppy; he continues to keep up the joke by this side-allusion.

οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ κ. "The dog is proved to be 'his,' and it is proved to be 'a father.'" Ergo, it is "his father," but that is "his father-of-puppies," i.e. "a father-of-puppies which belongs to him." The fallacy lies in the assumption of a further connection besides mere possession in the expression "his father."

ὅ τι μαθὼν . . . v.s. ch. xii. init. and note. The English expression, "What could you have been thinking about to . . . &c." compared there, will intimate

exactly the force of ὅ τι μαθὼν in the present passage.

καὶ τῶν κυνιδίων. Heindorf rightly removed the article ὁ from before τῶν κ. If allowed to remain, it would distinguish the πατήρ of Euthydemus from the πατήρ of the κυνίδια, which distinction Ctesippus wishes to ignore.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖται . . . There is truth in this by-argument of Euthydemus; the truth of the proverb, "A man may have too much of a good thing;" thus in the instance taken, of medicine, viz. the virtue of homœopathy consists in the smallness of the dose.

- B Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἀγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενοῦντι φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὅταν δέηται· ἢ εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἦ, ὅπλα ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἰέναι ἢ ἄνοπλον. Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. καίτοι οἶμαί τί σε τῶν καλῶν ἐρεῖν. Σὺ ἄριστα εἶσει, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέη, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὥς πλείστον δεῖ πίνειν, καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, ἔάν τις αὐτὸ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἐλλεβόρου ἅμαξαν; Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος εἶπε, Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐὰν ᾗ γε ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδριάς
- C ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὥς πλείστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατά τε καὶ ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδὴ περ ἀγαθὸν ἐστι; Μάλα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· σὺ δ' οὐκ οἶε, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ἐν δόρυ; Ἐγωγε. Ἡ καὶ τὸν Γηρυόνην ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸν Βριάρεων οὕτω σὺ ὀπλίσαις; ἐγὼ δὲ ὦμην σε δεινότερον εἶναι, ἅτε ὀπλομάχην ὄντα, καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἐταῖρον. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσίγησεν· ὁ δὲ Διο-

καίτοι . . . "and yet," i.e. "In spite of my making this admission, yet I am sure that its being logically correct will not prevent you from confuting me."

ἀγαθὸν εἶναι . . . φάρμακον πιν. is the subject, ἀγ. the predicate.

ἄλλο τι. Surely, v.s. ch. v. note.

ἐκεῖ, "in that case."

αὐτὸ, sc. φάρμακον.

ἐλλεβ. ἅμαξ. Similar expressions are *πίθος μέλιτος*, *δέπας οἶνου*, and in *Od.* 9. 196 *αἶγεον ἀσκόν ἔχον μέλανος οἴνοιο*.

σὺ δ' οὐκ οἶε . . . Spoken sarcastically; Ctesippus sees whither the argument is taking him, and

begins to rally Euthydemus, as usual, with a little sophism of his own.

μίαν, sc. ἀσπίδα.

δεινότερον. This word has here what we might term its Athenian sense; naming the quality upon the possession of which Athens prided herself, *δεινότης*: "more clever" or "a better man, at your profession." v. inf. ch. xxx. ad med. *τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν*. also xxxi. *δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινούς λόγους ξυντιθέναι*.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσ. This is the silence of contempt, we must imagine; Euthydemus not

νυσόδωρος πρὸς τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα τῷ Κτη- D
 σίππῳ ἤρετο, Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρυσίον, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀγαθὸν
 δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν; Πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ, ἔφη ὁ
 Κτήσιππος. Τί οὖν; ἀγαθὰ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι χρήματα αἰεὶ
 τ' ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
 τὸ χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι; Ὁμολόγηκα μὲν
 οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ
 καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος, εἰ E
 ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρί, τάλαντον
 δ' ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατήρα δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῷφ-
 θαλμῷ; Φασί γε οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος,
 τούτους εὐδαιμονεστάτους εἶναι Σκυθῶν καὶ ἀρίστους
 ἄνδρας, οἳ χρυσίον τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσι πολὺ τοῖς
 ἑαυτῶν, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες τὸν κύνα τὸν πατέρα,
 καὶ ὁ θαυμασιώτερόν γε ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ πίνουσιν ἐκ τῶν
 ἑαυτῶν κρανίων κεχρυσωμένων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντὸς κα-
 βορῶσι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν κορυφὴν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες.
 Πότερον δὲ ὀρώσιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καὶ Σκύθαι τε 300

being likely to give in to such a quibble, and always loving to have the last word.

τῷ Κτησίππῳ, dat. of the agent, v.s. ch. xxiv. init. ὅποτέ σοι ταῦτα ὑμνῆται; like the dative in use with the Latin gerundive. It is not truly an agent, but another case of what we call the dative of reference; for an illustration of which v. infr. ch. xxix. ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξεύρηται, where ὑμῖν is evidently referential in regard to ἔχει, but may be constructed as the agent with ἐξεύρηται.

καὶ ταῦτα, v.s. ch. xvi. note on καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἐναυμαστῆς.

πανταχοῦ. Notice below the use made of this premise, ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

φασί γε οὖν, &c. Ctesippus is tired of attempting to refute these sophisms, and meets Dionysodorus' absurdities with still greater absurdities.

τούτους εὐδ. εἶναι Σκυθ. Schleiermacher, "that the most fortunate and most admirable men are among the Scythians . . ." Valckenar remarks that either there is a confusion of Her. 4. 26. with some other passage, or that Plato is following some author of whom we are ignorant; because the Scythians are said to

καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα; Τὰ δυνατὰ δῆπου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ, ἔφη; Κἀγώ. Ὅραες οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἱμάτια; Ναί. Δυνατὰ οὖν ὁρᾶν ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Ὑπερφνωῶς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς, Μηδέν. σὺ δ' ἴσως οὐκ οἶει αὐτὰ ὁρᾶν· οὕτως ἡδὺς εἶ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκοιμῆσθαι, καὶ * εἰ * οἶόν τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

B Cap. XXVI. Ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγῶντα λέγειν; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; Ἐτι ἦττον, ἔφη. Ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις; Οὐκουν, εἰ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν

use only their enemies' skulls for goblets, whilst it is the Issedones whom Herodotus (l.c.) mentions as keeping their parents' skulls, ὅτε ἄγαλμα, and nothing is said of their own skulls. But the only confusion is between the Issedones and the Scythians; because, as Ctesippus hints (ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν. δὴ ἔλεγε), he means by "their own skulls," the skulls which are their own, which belong to them, viz., their parents' skulls, which naturally belong to the children when their parents die. So that κράνια τὰ ἑαυτῶν is a parallel (ὥσπερ ἔλεγε) to πατήρ σός, ch. xxiv. fin. where it means "a father, who is your property," and so infr. πίνουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν κρανίων," "they drink out of their very own skulls," i.e. out of skulls which are their very own property, the skulls of their parents.

τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν, "things which

have the quality of vision," J., an ambiguous expression, which may be translated "which can be seen," or "can see." This latter sense is immediately called upon, δυνατὰ οὖν ὁρᾶν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; μηδέν. σὺ δ' ἴσως . . . Ctesippus has completely mastered the Sophists' method, and, gifted with natural quickness and liveliness, he meets them on their own ground, and has decidedly the best of it.

ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς . . . The word σιγῶντα is here played upon in its masc. acc. singular, and neuter plural, senses. In the former sentence it is of course the subject of λέγειν, here the object.

οὐκουν εἰ γε . . . παρέρχ. Again Ctesippus, by a quick though superficial retort, gets the better of the Sophist on his own ground; he enters thoroughly into the spirit of the arguments, and does

τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγεται, ἐάν τις ἄψηται· ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἀλλ' ἔτι μοι τὸ ἕτερον ἐπιδείξατον, ὅπως αὖ ἔστι λέγοντα σιγᾶν. Καί μοι ἐδόκει C ὑπεραγωνιᾶν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ παιδικά. "Όταν σιγᾶς, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾶς; "Εγωγε, ἦ δ' ὄς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾶς, εἶπερ τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τὰ λέγοντα. Τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, οὐ σιγᾶ πάντα; Οὐ δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα; Τά γε δήπου λέγοντα. Ἄλλ', ἦ δ' ὄς, οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγᾶ ἢ λέγει; Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφοτέρα, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυ- D σόδωρος· εὖ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις ὁ τι χρῆ. Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάννυ ἀνακαγχάσας, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρικε τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἥττηται. Καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάννυ ἥσθη καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὥστε ὁ Κτήσιππος

not go too deep to expose their shallow fallacies.

καὶ μοι ἐδοκεῖ. Heindorf compares Charm. 162 B., where it is said that Critias "δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων."

εἶπερ τῶν ἀπάντων... "that is, if speaking things belong to 'all things';" τὰ λέγοντα, as before, in the case of σιγῶντα, is used first as subject to σιγᾶν, and afterwards as its object. σιγᾶν λέγοντα, "to keep silence about speaking things."

τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτησ. The trap laid by Ctesippus here, into which the inferior Sophist falls,

is grounded upon the position of the Sophists that a thing cannot be—and not be—the same thing. This appeared in ch. xxiii., where Euthydemus says to Dionysodorus, διαφθείρεις τὸν λόγον, καὶ φανήσεται οὐτοσὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. And again in ch. xxiv. —if anyone is a father we cannot say he is not father of anyone else: he must be always and everywhere a father. Dionysodorus, by his reply, makes out (as is true) that some things are mute and others vocal; but thereby convicts several arguments of his own and his brother's of resulting in falsehood.

ἐγένετο πλείον ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. ὁ δέ μοι, πανούργος ὢν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, παρ' αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρακηκόμεν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.

E Cap. XXVII. Κάγω εἶπον, Τί γε λάῃς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὕτω πράγμασι καὶ καλοῖς; Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πώποτε εἶδες, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Ἔγωγε, ἔφην, καὶ πολλὰ γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε. Ἄρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἔφη, ἢ ταῦτα, 301 τῷ καλῷ; Κάγω ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπ' ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγούμεν δίκαια πεπονθέναι, ὅτι ἔγρυξα, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα ἔφην αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστι μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν

ἐγένετο πλείον ἢ δεκ. Heindorf compares Arist. Or. Sac. I, 494. ἤδη μὲν τις καὶ ἄλλος χρηστοῦ τινός αὐτῷ ξυμβάντος καὶ βουλόμενος ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶπεν, ὡς ἄρα εἶη πλείων ἢ διπλάσιος γεγονώς.

παρακηκόμεν, "had heard wrongly," i.e. "had perverted his information," or "used his information wrongly;" v.s. ch. xvi. note on παραληρεῖν. Stallb. compares Ar. Ran. 750.: καὶ παρακούων δεσποτῶν ἄττ' ἂν λαλῶσιν.

τί γε λάῃς . . . ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις . . . Socrates to the last keeps up the joke, that he is listening to words of real wisdom; thereby luring the Sophists into a false notion of their security from his criticism.

τοῦ καλοῦ. Whether τὸ καλὸν here is intended as the *ἰδέα* τοῦ καλοῦ by the Sophists, is uncertain; but Socrates by his answer shows that he understands the expression in that way. Probably Socrates (or Plato) evolved the doctrine of the *ἰδέα* out of a pre-existing conception of quality

as distinct, or rather abstracted from, objects. The doctrine of the *ἰδέα* in a few words was as follows:—There is unity in the universe; all things mundane have their divine or transcendental types, from which all similar individuals emanate. And not only do these types exist of abstract qualities, but also of concrete objects, of physical as well as intellectual existences. The things then which we see are not the realities, only the shadows or manifestations, τὰ φαινόμενα; and such copies of them as we see in reflections, shadows, &c., are one degree further from the realities. This doctrine was no romance to Plato and his school: they believed in it devoutly, coming very near in that belief to the tenet of Christianity, "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." The full setting forth of the doctrine will be found in Rep. bk. vi.

ἐν παντὶ ἐγεν. Stallb. com-

κάλλος τι. Ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγεννηταί σοι βούρ, βούρς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; Εὐφήμει τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη; Ἄρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; ἤδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν B τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἅπαντες ἀνθρωποι ὁ μὴ ἔστι; Τί λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλὸν ἔστι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρὸν; Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῇ. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τό γε ἕτερον ταῦτόν, ἀλλ' ἐγῶγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ὥμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ὥς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν C

pares Symp. 194. A. εὖ καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖτο καὶ ἐν πάντι εὐῆς. "In extremity" is the force of the expression, and *τρόπῳ* might be supplied for the ellipse.

πάρεστι μέντοι. This was the rest of the doctrine, viz. that from these archetypes was communicated to their mundane expressions more or less of the original and the reality. Dionysodorus merely plays upon the word *πάρεστι*, which Socrates uses as meaning "is communicated," and the Sophist as "stands by," or "is near."

εὐφημεῖ τοῦτό γε. *εὐφημέω* means to use auspicious language or be silent; and is itself an example of what is called euphemism, i.e. the use of a word or expression, of a good or neutral meaning, to express something distasteful or unfortunate; the name *Εὐμενίδες* is a good example of euphemism; *εὐώνυμος*, the

left, is another. For the present meaning of *εὐφημέω* cf. Ar. Nub. 263, where the Socrates of the play, expecting interruption from Strepsiades, begins his invocation to the clouds with the words *εὐφημεῖν χορὴ τὸν πρεσβύτην, καὶ τῆς εὐχῆς ὑπακούειν.* The sense here is equivalent to *μή γένοιτο.* v. inf. xxviii. where the same reply is made to Dionysodorus when he says to Socrates *ᾧ μῖτε θεοὶ πατρώοι εἰσι μήτε ἱερά μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.*

ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον . . . &c. "How can one thing being by another make that other diverse?" Dionysodorus lays himself open here by asking how it is possible for *ἕτερον* to be *ἕτερον*, meaning "How can one thing be diverse from itself?" Socrates, *τὴν σοφίαν μιμούμενος*, asks how is it possible for *ἕτερον* to be anything else but *ἕτερον*?

ἐστιν. ἀλλ', ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὼν παρήκας, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, οἷς ἕκαστα προσήκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ τι προσήκει ἐκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν; πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα; Ἔγωγε· ὅτι χαλκία. Τί δὲ κεραμεύειν; Κεραμέα. Τί δὲ σφάττειν τε καὶ ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ μικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαντα ἐψεῖν καὶ ὀπτᾶν; Μάγειρον, D ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν ἔάν τις, ἔφη, τὰ προσήκοντα πράττη, ὀρθῶς πράξει; Μάλιστα. Προσήκει δέ γε, ὡς φῆς, τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρειν; ὡμολόγησας ταῦτα ἦ οὐ; Ὁμολόγησα, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε. Δῆλον τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἂν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον καὶ κατακόψας ἐψήσῃ καὶ ὀπτήσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει· καὶ ἐὰν τὸν χαλκία τις αὐτὸν χαλκεύῃ καὶ τὸν κεραμέα κεραμεύῃ, καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.

E Cap. XXVIII. Ὡ πόσειδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη κολο-

τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὼν παρ. "You made this slip on purpose," i.e. "Your former skill makes me think that this error was intentional."

καὶ ὑμεῖς. These words are slightly pleonastic, but inserted to recall the beginning of the sentence after the digression ὥσπερ, &c. Dionysodorus, no way abashed by his failure, is ready at once to try another fall.

οἶσθα οὖν . . . Dionysodorus here uses the fallacy of the accusative which may be subject or object, as in the expressions above, *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, *λέγοντα σιγᾶν*, &c. It was not unknown to the oracles, a result being pro-

vided for either way, in answers of this sort. So "Aio te . . . Romanos vincere posse," where the result could not fail to justify the oracular answer.

τίνα . . . προσήκει, "whose business is it?"

τί δέ . . . i.e. "What next?" "Whose business to make pots?" So in Latin quid is used in asking a series of questions. See Juv. Sat. 3. 86. Quid? quod adulandi gens prudentissima laudat sermonem indocti, faciem deformis amici? and infra ibid. 147.

αὐτὸν. For this αὐ has been written, and would be preferable, if there were authority for it.

φῶνα ἐπιτίθης τῇ σοφίᾳ. ἄρά μοί ποτε αὕτη παρα-
γενήσεται, ὥστε μοι οἰκεία γενέσθαι; Ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐ-
τήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οἰκείαν γενομένην; Ἐὰν σύ γε
βούλῃ, ἔφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι. Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ σαυ-
τοῦ οἶε γιγνώσκειν; Εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ
γὰρ δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι, τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον τόνδε.
Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἡγείσῃ εἶναι, ὣν ἂν ἄρξης καὶ ἐξῇ
σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ; οἶον βούς καὶ πρό- 302
βατον, ἄρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ
ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν; ἂ
δ' ἂν μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ, οὐ σά; Κἀγώ, ἤδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ
αὐτῶν καλόν τι ἀνακύψοι τὸ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ ἅμα
βουλόμενος ὅ τι τάχιστ' ἀκοῦσαι, Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην,
οὕτως ἔχει· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστὶ μόνα ἐμά. Τί δέ; Ζῶα,
ἔφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς, ἃ ἂν ψυχὴν ἔχῃ; Ναί, ἔφην.

κολοφῶνα ἐπιτ. Strabo's expla-
nation about the Colophonian
cavalry putting the finishing
stroke to a battle cannot be en-
tertained; it is better to connect
the word with κορυφή, κἀρα, colu-
men, columna, &c., and make it
equivalent to θριγκός: v. Rep.
534. E. δοκεῖ ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς
μαθήμασιν ἢ διαλεκτικῇ
ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι—i.e. a cornice,
coping-stone, the head stone of
the corner. To this explanation
the verb ἐπιτίθης lends itself.

ἐπιγνοίης ἂν . . . οἰκείαν γεν.
This question is really a condi-
tional sentence with protasis and
apodosis, οἰκείαν γεν. being equi-
valent to εἰ οἰκεία γένοιτο. Cf.
Xen. Anab. 6. 4. 19: ὁ δ' οὐκ ἂν
ἔφη ἐξαγαγεῖν, μὴ γιγνομένων τῶν
ιερῶν, i.e. if the sacrifices were
not favourable.

ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ . . . Heindorf com-
pares Hom. Il. ix. 96: Ἐν σοι
μὲν λέξω, σέο δ' ἄρξομαι οὐνεκα
πολλῶν Λαῶν ἔσσι ἀναξ.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη . . . The device
here is to get Socrates to agree
to a certain definition, and to a
special clause with regard to live
property; and then to include
under a man's personalty the
gods, the altars, and the religion
of the country to which he be-
longs.

καὶ ἐξ σοι αὐτοῖς χρ. Stallb.
points out that the proper con-
struction here should be καὶ οἷς
ἐξ σοι χρῆσθαι. It is a fre-
quent tendency of this colloquial
writing to avoid continuous sub-
joined clauses, and pass into the
more natural, but less correct,
demonstrative.

ἤδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν . . . αὐτῶν

- B Ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν ζώων ταῦτα μόνα εἶναι σά, περὶ ἃ ἄν σοι ἐξουσία ἦ πάντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον; Ὁμολογῶ. Καὶ ὅς, εἰρωνικῶς πάννυ ἐπισχὼν ὥς τι μέγα σκοπούμενος, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι σοι Ζεὺς πατὴρ; Καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτέυσας ἤξιεν τὸν λόγον ἥπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφηνον τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμεν ἤδη, ὥσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημμένος. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε. Ταλαίπωρος
- C ἄρα τις σύ γε ἄνθρωπος εἶ καὶ οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃ μήτε θεοὶ πατρώοι εἰσι μήτε ἱερὰ μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε. ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ πατρώα καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα περ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις τῶν τοιούτων. Εἶτα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἔφην, Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστι Ζεὺς ὁ πατὴρ; Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία Ἰώνων οὐδενί, οὐδ'

refers to the Sophists; τὸ τῶν ἐρωτ. is the nom., and καλὸν τι the predicate: some word like τέλος must be supplied with τὸ τῶν ἐρ. The sarcastic vein in which this whole dialogue is cast seems to increase in intensity as it draws to an end; we may imagine how bitter Plato was against those teachers of distorted and useless argument, for whose sins Socrates was called to account, who were indirectly the cause of his being put to death.

εἰρωνικῶς; εἰρωνεία (quite distinct from irony) is the practice of pretending not to know what one really does know; it was freely employed by Socrates, as a means of reducing overweening opponents to silence, by drawing them on to make statements

more extensive than they could defend. Here Dionysodorus protracts the argument unnecessarily, asking further questions, as though he did not quite understand Socrates' definition of "σά;" but really to drive Socrates into admitting that Zeus and the gods come under the head of "σά." The verb ἐπισχὼν will thus be seen to imply the Sophist's hesitation or protraction of the argument. Winckelmann compares Crat. 383. E.: εἰρωνεύεται τε πρὸς ἐμὲ, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς εἰδὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ.

ἀπορόν τινα στρ. ἔφευγ. For this cognate accusative, cf. Rep. 5. 405. C.: ἱκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι.

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . This

ὅσοι ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως ἀπωκισμένοι εἰσὶν οὗθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἴωνος γένεσιν. D
 Ζεὺς δ' ἡμῖν πατρῷος μὲν οὐ καλεῖται, ἔρκειος δὲ καὶ φράτριος, καὶ Ἀθηναίη φρατρία. Ἀλλ' ἄρκεϊ γε, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ἔστι γὰρ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ. Πάννυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὔτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἴεν; ἔφη. Πρόγονοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δεσπόται. Ἀλλ' οὖν σοί γε, ἔφη. ἦ οὐ σοὺς ὠμολόγη-
 κας αὐτοὺς εἶναι; Ὁμολόγηκα, ἔφην· τί γὰρ πάθω; Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ Ζῶα εἰσιν οὔτοι οἱ θεοί; ὠμολόγηκας E
 γάρ, ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, Ζῶα εἶναι. ἦ οὔτοι οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι ψυχὴν; Ἐχουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ζῶα εἰσι; Ζῶα, ἔφην. Τῶν δὲ γε ζώων, ἔφη, ὠμολόγηκας

statement is inconsistent with Arist. Nub. 1468. ΣΤ. Ναὶ, ναὶ, καταιδέσθητι πατρῶν Δία. ΦΕ. ἰδοὺ γε, Δία πατρῶν· ὡς ἀρχαῖος εἶ. Stallb. reconciles the apparent discrepancy by supposing that Socrates is guilty here of a sophistic quibble; and that he means πατρῷος in the sense "patron-deity;" not the deity who presided over the acts of duty to parents and relations. In this sense it would then be true that there was no Ζεὺς πατρῷος of Athens.

τοῦ Ἴωνος. Ion was Apollo's son by Creusa.

ἐρκεῖος δὲ καὶ φράτριος. This word ἐρκεῖος has been connected with the Latin word heretum, arcere, whence the equivalent of Ζεὺς ἐρκεῖος in Latin has been conjectured to be Hercules, god of the enclosure or courtyard, ἔρκος. The φρατρίαι were equivalent to the Latin gentes, i.e.

small clans existing within the πόλις or populus, and composed of a number of families joined in a kind of union through the possession of common religious rites and common deities.

οὐκοῦν καὶ οὔτοι σοὶ θεοὶ . . . The emphatic word here is σοί. "These, then, are *your* gods." This is shown by Dionysodorus' next answer, ἀλλ' οὖν σοί γε, i.e. "Whatever they are, ancestors or masters, they are yours."

τί γὰρ πάθω; v.s. note on πέπονθας, ch. xx. "What is coming to me?" The helplessness of which Socrates is pretending that he is the subject is brought out by the use of πάσχειν.

τῶν δὲ γε ζώων . . . "But those animals you described as yours, which you said you could sell or give away." The former fallacy, κυὼν ἐστὶ σὸς πατὴρ (ch. xxiv.) is here again employed to show that Socrates has property; he

- ταῦτ' εἶναι σά, ὅσα ἂν σοι ἐξῇ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ θῦσαι ἂν θεῷ ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ. Ὁμολόγηκα, ἔφην· οὐκ ἔστι γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσσις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε. Ἴθι δὴ μοι εὐθύς, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰπέ· ἐπειδὴ σὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν
- 303 Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς, ἄρα ἕξοστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλ' ὃ τι ἂν βούλῃ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις; Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἐκείμην ἄφωνος· ὁ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι ἰὼν ὡς βοηθήσων, Πυππᾶξ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πύππαξ ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ πύππαξ Ἡρακλῆς; Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Πόσειδον, ἔφη, δεινῶν λόγων. ἀφίσταμαι· ἀμάχω τῷ ἄνδρῃ.
- B Cap. XXIX. Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν παρόντων ὑπέρεπῆνεσε τὸν λόγον. καὶ τῷ ἄνδρῃ, καὶ γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε καὶ χαίροντε ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ'

also has gods which are his, and the property is his; ergo, the gods are his property.

ἀνάδυσσις, properly "diving or ducking up from beneath." Heindorf compares Theæt. 145.

C. μὴ ἀναδῦναι τὰ ὁμολογημένα. For the physical sense, v. Hom. Il. i. 359. Καρπαλίμως δ' ἀνέδνυ πολίῃς ἁλός, where Thetis rises from the sea to comfort Achilles.

ἐκείμην. The same metaphor involved here as in the expression καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, viz., a wrestling or boxing contest, ch. xvi. med.

πυππᾶξ. An exclamation of astonishment which Dionysodorus pretends to understand as an epithet of Heracles, at which

Ctesippus is finally disgusted, and relinquishes the combat. Notice the two exclamatory genitives, λόγου, λόγων. Jowett, "Bravo, Hercules, or is Hercules a bravo?"

παρατάθησαν, παρατείνω, to stretch along, has a variety of special senses, for two of which v. Ar. Nub. ἢ δέ γ' Εὐβοί, ὡς ὀρᾶς, ἡδὲ παράτεταται μακρὰ πύρρῳ πάννυ; ΣΤ. οἶδ'· ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους. The latter, "has got a good stretching," approximates to the present meaning of the word; here, however, it rather means "split their sides with laughing," as the English idiom goes.

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐφ' ἐκ. Hein-

ἐκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυ-
δήμου ἑρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν
τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ' ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθη-
σαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε ὡμολο-
γεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφούς, C
καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν
ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτῷ ἐτραπόμην, καὶ
εἶπον· ὦ μακάριοι σφὼ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, οἱ
τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξείρ-
γασθον. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ
ἔχουσιν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι οὐδὲν D
ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν μόνον. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ
οἶδα, ὅτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάννυ μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι
ἀγαπῶεν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὕτως
ἀγνοοῦσιν αὐτούς, ὥστ' εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν

dorf wished to remove the ἐφ', as unnecessary; but ἐφ' ἐκάστοις is added epexegetically, and in order to relieve the otherwise long-drawn expression τοῖς ἔμ-
προσθεν ἐκ. πᾶσι.

ὀλίγου, sc. ἰδεῖν.

κίονες, cf. *Juv. Sat. i. 13.*
Assiduo ruptæ lectore columnæ;
and *Vir. Geor. 3. 328. rumpent*
arbusta cicadæ.

Routh compares *Rep. vi. 492*
B. where a young man is sup-
posed to be addressing an au-
dience, who are described as ἐκ-
βοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ'
αὐτοῖς αἱ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος. .
διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχουσι.

μακάριοι . . . θαυμ. φύσεως.

With this genitive may be com-

pared those genitives which fol-
low the verbs φθονεῶ, εὐδαι-
μονίζω, ὀλβίζω, and give the rea-
son for which a person is called
happy, unhappy, enviable, &c.
For an example like the present
with adjective, v. *Phæd. 58. E.*
εὐδαίμων γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο καὶ
τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων.

τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ. The force of
δὴ here is emphatic and culmi-
native, like the Latin "denique,"
when closing a series of propo-
sitions. "You care nothing for
many, and in fact for those even
of great reputation," v. *infr. E.*
τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, quod denique
maximi est.

ἀγνοοῦσιν. For this word,
which according to Stallb. is cor-

μᾶλλον ἐξελέγχοντες τοιούτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ τόδε αὖ ἕτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾶον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅτι ὅταν φῇτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα μήτε λευκὸν μηδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἐτέρων ἕτερον, E ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι ξυρράπτετε τὰ στόματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ φατέ· ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δόξατε ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρείται. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξεύρηται, ὥστε πάνυ * ἐν * ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὄντινούν ἂν μαθεῖν ἀνθρώπων. ἔγνω ἔγωγε καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχων, ὡς ταχὺ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ

rupt, and cannot mean "despise," the sense required, Winckelmann suggests, οὕτω νοοῦσιν, "ita sentiunt de his sermonibus;" ἀτιμάζουσιν is Stallb.'s own conjecture.

αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν. It is to be observed how the satiric vein increases as Socrates proceeds in this address to the brothers. As it is the last, so it is the fiercest of all his criticisms of their method and its illustrations.

ἐξελέγχοντες. "If they were to confute," v.s. note on ἐπιγνοίης ἂν, ch. xxviii. init.

δημοτικόν. This word means that which belongs to the δῆμος, and so either "popular," "public," "patriotic," "public-spirited," &c. In the Clouds of Aristophanes the δημότης Strepsiades understands the use of geometry to be for the measuring out of the whole earth into holdings for colonists, and cries out,

ἀστεῖον λέγεις· τὸ γὰρ σόφισμα δημοτικόν καὶ χρήσιμον. l. 205.

ξυρράπτετε. Heindorf compares Sen. Ep. 47. "At illi (servi), quibus non tantum coram dominis, sed cum ipsis erat sermo, quorum os non consuebatur, parati erant pro domino porrigere cervicem." For the assertion ὅταν φῇτε μήτε καλόν, &c., we must suppose Socrates to be referring to ch. xxiii., where Euthydemus is anxious to uphold the position that "he knows the good to be bad;" although the less sophistical Dionysodorus denies it.

αὐτῷ. This nominative is brought to the end of the sentence for the sake of the increased emphasis gained by its juxtaposition to τὰ ὑμέτερα.

ὑμῖν. For this dat. v.s. ch. xxv. note, τῷ Κτησίππῳ.

καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ. "When I was noticing Ctesippus, for in-

παραχρῆμα μιμῆσθαι οἷός τ' ἦν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ 304
 πράγματος σφῶν πρὸς μὲν τὸ ταχὺ παραδιδόναι καλόν,
 ἐναντίον δ' ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ'
 ἂν γ' ἐμοὶ πείθῃσθε, εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ πολλῶν ἐναντίον
 λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ ἐκμαθόντες ὑμῖν μὴ εἰδῶσι χάριν,
 ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ μόνῳ διαλέ-
 γεσθον· εἰ δὲ μή, εἴπερ ἄλλου του ἐναντίον, ἐκείνου
 μόνου, ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῶ ἀργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐὰν
 σωφρονῇτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλευσέτε, μηδέποτε B
 μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑμῖν τε καὶ
 αὐτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον· τὸ δὲ
 ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλ'
 ἄγετε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπως κάμῃ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παρα-
 δέξεσθον.

stance." καὶ here merely directs attention to the particular instance, which the speaker alleges to illustrate his statement; for another example of which v.s. ch. vi. fin. οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μὴ ἔχόντων, and note.

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος, "this part of the matter," i.e. "the matter in this respect." We may compare, if the reading be correct, ch. xvii. med. οὐδεμία τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλεον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι. "No part of hunting is concerned with anything more than the capture," &c., i.e. "Hunting is in no respect concerned with more than," &c. The genitive would then be partitive, and would be due merely to the desire to treat of a subject in one of its particular aspects.

εἰδῶσι χάριν. This construction is really a cognate one; the sense of knowing passes into that

of feeling, and χάριν is the feeling of gratitude. We meet the expression in Hom. Il. 4. 235, and Xen. Anab. 7. 4. 9.

μάλιστα μὲν... εἰ δὲ μή. Stallb. well compares Dem. de Cor. p. 260 (Reisk) ὥστε μάλιστα μὲν μὴ θεῖναι τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, εἰ δὲ μὴ καταβαλόντα ἑᾶν ἐν ὑπωμοσίᾳ. "At best... but failing that," or "in the first and best place... and otherwise."

ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῶ ἀργ. From this we may gather that the rule was not to pay for general instruction given in public places such as the Gymnasia.

ἀλλ' ἢ. ἢ here is pleonastic; there is a confusion of two meanings, "Talk with no man, but with yourselves," and "Talk with no other than yourselves." For another instance of pleonasm, v. infr. ch. xxx. ἐξείργειν... μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν.

Πίνδαρος, Ol. 1. i. ἄριστον μὲν

Cap. XXX. Ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἔτι
 βραχέα διαλεχθέντες ἀπῆμεν. σκόπει οὖν, ὅπως συμ-
 C φοιτήσεις παρὰ τῷ ἄνδρῃ, ὡς ἐκείνῳ φατὸν οἶω τ' εἶναι
 διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντ' ἀργύριον διδόναι, καὶ οὔτε φύσιν
 οὔθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν—ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει
 ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι φατον διακωλύειν
 οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὄντινον εὐπετώς τὴν σφετέ-
 ραν σοφίαν.

KP. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ
 ἡδέως ἂν τι μανθάνοιμι, κινδυνεύω μέντοι κἀγὼ εἰς
 εἶναι τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων, ὧν δὴ
 D καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἡδιον ἂν ἐξελεγχόμενων ὑπὸ τῶν
 τοιούτων λόγων ἢ ἐξελεγχόντων. Ἀτὰρ γελοῖον μέν
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ νουθετεῖν σε, ὅμως δέ, ἃ γ' ἤκουον,
 ἐθέλω σοι ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τῶν ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἀπιόντων οἷσθ'

ἡδωρ, ὃ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ,
 &c.

ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων . . . Socrates
 has finished his dramatic deline-
 ation of the two Sophists, and
 leaves them to Crito's own good
 sense, with an admonition to go
 and see for himself. Perhaps
 Crito may not have been very
 intimate with Socrates, or he
 could have hardly failed (as he
 does fail) to perceive the satirical
 import of Socrates' discourse. It
 is probably with the view of un-
 deceiving Crito that Socrates
 advises him to go and see for
 himself.

συμφ. sc. ἐμοί. v.s. ch. i. καὶ
 σὺ τί που συμφοίτα.

ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ . . . The only inti-
 mation we have had of Crito's
 business hitherto is found in ch.
 xix. ἡ ὑμέτερα τέχνη ἡ γεωργία :

but in ch. xxxii. we get an ink-
 ling of his being alive to the
 value of money; when speaking
 of children he says, ὅπως ὡς
 πλουσιώτατοι, sc. εἰεν.

ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρημ. οὐδὲ . . .
 φατον is "negant," "they" is
 subject to διακωλύειν and οὐδέν
 is adverbial, "anyone" being
 understood as object to διακω-
 λύνειν.

φιλήκοος. sc. εἰμί.

τῶν ἡδιον ἂν ἐξελ. v.s. xxix.
 ad med.

ἃ γ' ἤκουον, i.e. "merely the
 actual remarks, without any
 criticism or inference of my
 own." Crito's friendship for So-
 crates strikes us, when he ap-
 pears thus anxious to caution
 him that his conduct appears in
 an equivocal light to others.

οἷσθ' ὅτι, interrogative.

ὅτι προσελθὼν τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ οἷός τ' ἦ προσστάς κατακούειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκούσαι. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. E
 Ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους. Καγὼ εἶπον, Τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι; Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἦ οἷά περ αἰεὶ ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων; οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι. Καὶ ἐγώ, Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμα ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία. Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε; οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον. ἀλλὰ 305
 καὶ εἰ νῦν παρεγένου, πάννυ ἄν σε οἶμαι αἰσχυνθῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἐταίρου· οὕτως ἦν ἄτοπος, ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις, οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει ὅ τι ἂν λέγωσι, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται. καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ

τῶν . . . ἀπ. Connect this genitive with τίς.

τῶν περὶ τοὺς λογ. . . Although a citizen could always plead his own cause, the custom grew up of reading speeches which had been composed by others. Antiphon and Æschines are said by Diogenes Laertius to have been writers of such speeches for others. Stallb.

Ἵνα ἤκουσας. Jelf describes this use of a final conjunction with historic indicative as directed to express an end proposed and wished for, but not attained or not to be attained. He compares Soph. O. T. 1387: οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην τὸ μὴ 'ποκλῆσαι τοῦμόν

ἄθλιον δέμας ἔν' ἡ τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν. ib. 1393. τί μ' οὐ λαβὼν ἐκτεινας εὐθὺς, ὥς ἔδειξα μήποτε ἑμεινὸν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔνθεν ἦν γεγώς;

ἐφαίνοντο, sc. λέγειν.

οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι. These words are Crito's own, to apologize for the harsh terms ληρούντων and ἀναξία σπουδὴν. τοῖς ὄν. "in the actual words." Stallb. compares Gorg. 450. E. οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες.

ποῖον . . . χαρίεν. v. s. ch. xviii. ποῖος Κτήσιππος, and note. ἐθέλων . . . παρέχειν . . . οὐδὲν ὅ τι . . . πάντος. It will help us to understand the repul-

ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κρατίστοις εἰσὶ τῶν νῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ πράγματι διατρίβοντες πάνν φαῦλοί εἰσι καὶ καταγέλαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐδόκει
 B οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν οὐθ' οὗτος οὐτ' εἴ τις ἄλλος ψέγει· τὸ μέντοι ἐθέλειν διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτους ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι.

Cap. XXXI. ΣΩ. ὦ Κρίτων, θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ οὐπω οἶδα ὅ τι μέλλω ἐρεῖν. ποτέρων ἦν ὁ προσελθὼν σοι καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι δεινῶν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις, ἢ τῶν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων, οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται;

C ΚΡ. Ἦκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἐπαΐειν αὐτόν

sion which such pliability inspired in the mind of an Athenian if we compare Rep. iii. 395. seqq. There the question is discussed how far "imitation," i.e. poetry, painting, music, sculpture, &c., are to be admitted into the ideal state; and all imitations or representations of subjects ludicrous or trivial are strongly discountenanced. Thus (397. A.) οὐκοῦν ὁ μὴ τριοῦτος αὐ, ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγῆσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ἐαυτοῦ οἴσεται εἶναι; and again (398. A.) εἰπομεν δ' ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἡμῖν οὔτε θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι. So here it is Socrates' willingness to be "all things to all men" that disgusts Crito's friend. For the words alluded to v. s. ch.

xiii. παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτόν . . . ὅ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιεῖτο.

τὸ μέντοι . . . Here Crito is not keeping his word, viz., that he would adhere to a mere report of the conversation, but, like a true Athenian, he gives his assent to his friend's objection that Socrates was "performing in public." A little thought will show us that it is the motive which makes such a proceeding questionable or not. If it be self-glorification, as was the case with the Sophists (see ch. v. fin. vi. init. ἴν' ἐτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζομεν αὐτόν), the objection is well-founded; otherwise it is fastidious to disparage a man because he has the courage to support his opinions against all comers.

πότερον τῶν ἀγ. . . . We

φασι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.

ΣΩ. "Ἦδη μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νῦν δὴ ἐμελλον λέγειν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσι μὲν, ὧ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἷονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάννυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἔὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσι μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἷσσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ

see here a distinction drawn between those who wrote speeches for others and those who delivered speeches. As we can understand that many people would be unable to compose an effective harangue in support of their evidence, and were therefore obliged to resort to professional speech-writers, so it is more than probable that many were unable to deliver these compositions themselves, and had to engage a *ρήτωρ* to deliver them. In the one case they were merely employing one whom we should term a solicitor or a consulting barrister; in the other a barrister practising in the courts, who receives his brief from the solicitor. In the concluding part of the sentence Stallb. wishes to strike out *οἱ ῥήτορες*, because "litigantes intelligendi sunt, qui causam suam dicturi orationibus utuntur ab aliis compositis qui profecto non possunt *οἱ ῥήτορες* appellari." But on the above

hypothesis, viz., that the term was extended, with the extension of litigation, to mere deliverers of speeches, the difficulty disappears.

δεινὸν . . . καὶ δεινοὺς. v. s. note, ch. xxv. δεινότερον.

μανθάνω. v. s. note p. 37.

Πρόδικος. v. s. ch. vii. and note.

πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι . . . "And they believe that with very many they enjoy this reputation, besides actually being so."

ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν . . . οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ . . . &c., is subject, εὐδοκιμεῖν is exegetical of σφίσιν ἐμπ. εἶναι:—ita ut nulli præter eos qui philosophiam tractant sibi obvi sint quominus apud omnes clare audiant. In the preceding clause, Stallb. illustrates the separation of πάννυ from πολλοῖς by a reference to Euthyphr. 14. B. ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὧ Εὐθύφρων, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον.

εἰς δόξαν, "towards reputa-

τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνν· εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνν
 Ε ἔξ εἰκότος λόγου· μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλ' ὅ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν
 306 μαῖλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον αὐτοὺς πείσαι, ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὅσα μεταξὺ τινοῖν δυοῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέροιον τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυεῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταυτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἐκάτερον ἢ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων, ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συνεθέντα μὴ πρὸς

tion," i.e. "on the way to," or "requisite for."

εἶναι μὲν, &c. i.e. while they believe that they are the really wise, they know that such men as Euthydemus may seize opportunities of disparaging their wisdom, and they consider them as their enemies accordingly.

φιλοσοφίας, purely a partitive genitive: "they say to themselves, we have a moderate knowledge of philosophy."

μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρων. Later on we get the phrase μετέχουσι μέρος ἀμφοτέρων, leaving no doubt about the present construction.

τὴν σοφίαν. All knowledge of politics, at least acquired with-

out experiment, cannot be of any practical value. Socrates is therefore satirizing those who, like the coward, "fight and run away:" ἐκτὸς κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων.

οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλ'. v.s. note, ch. xiv.

τῶν ἀνδρῶν. Those men of whom Crito's friend is one, not the Sophists, who have been finally dismissed from the discussion.

οὐ γάρ, &c. "For it is not easy to persuade them that, both in the case of men and all other things, all things that lie between any two and partake of the nature of both, are better than the

τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστί, ταῦτα μόνα βελτίω B
 ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν.
 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
 πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκάτερα, οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων
 μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν· ἀμ-
 φοτέρων γάρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι· εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν,
 τῶν μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφοτέρα,
 οὕτως ἂν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂν
 οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογῆσαι οὔτε κακὸν αὐτῷ ἀμφοτέρῳ C
 εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι
 οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους εἰσὶ

one and worse than the other, when this couple is composed of a bad and a good. But when of two goods with different ends (μὴ πρὸς ταὐτὸν) such a thing is worse than each of the two in respect of that end wherein each of the two (out of which the single thing is composed) is good or useful. But when a single thing, having two bad things for its components which have not the same end, is the mean, it is the only case where such a thing is better than each of those, in both of which it participates." Such is the literal rendering of this passage, the difficulty of which lies in the possible confusion of ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη with the couple or pair; whereas it is really to be referred to the single thing composed of two things, and is really equivalent to ὧν μετέχει. Accordingly, in the corresponding clause we find ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν, where note the use of μετέχουσιν after ταῦτα, because above we

have been speaking of ἀνθρωποι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. Following upon *ξυνετέθη* applied to the single thing, we have in the next sentence ὅσα . . . *ξυντεθέντα*, which leaves *ξυνετέθη* in no doubt as to its subject. In plain English the whole passage is as follows:—"Where we have a participator in two subjects, he, not being a specialist, is inferior to the specialists in those two (their own) subjects. This when a proficiency in the subject is a good thing. Where it is a bad thing the participator, for precisely the same reason, viz., because less proficient, is superior to the specialists from the depravity of the subject itself." The awkwardness of the passage lies in the forced antithesis between the subject composed of two good things and two evil things, which really are not comparable; the first instance being taken from the intellectual, the second from the ethical sphere.

εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφοτέρα. A mani-

πρὸς ἐκάτερον, πρὸς ὃ ἢ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίῳ λόγῳ ἐστόν, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἡγεῖσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοί ἐισι· πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγα-
 D πᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὅτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πράγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιών διαπονεῖται.

Cap. XXXII. ΚΡ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν υἱέων, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρὸς σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμί, τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρὸς ἐστι, Κριτόβουλος δ' ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται τινος, ὅστις αὐτὸν ὀνήσει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ ξυγγένωμαι, οὕτω διατίθεμαι, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ
 E μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἔνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου, ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρος, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελεῖν. ὅταν δὲ εἰς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ
 307 εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνν ἁλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθ' εἰρησθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μεираκίον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

festly absurd hypothesis for Crito's friend to uphold, for these were his subjects.

πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγ. ἀγαπάω means to be content or satisfied; but generally is used neuter. Stallb., however, compares Rep. iii. 399. C. ἀλλὰ σωφρονῶς τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα.

ὥς πλουσιώτατοι. v. s. ch. xxx. note, ὃ δὲ καὶ σοί.

ἁλλόκοτος. "Other than is usual," "monstrous." In like manner ἄλλος is used to mean "extraordinary," or "unusual." See Od. 4. 348. Ἄλλα παρέξ εἶποιμι; and in ix. 261. ἄλλην ὁδὸν, ἄλλα κέλευθα ἤλθομεν.

οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως. This may mean (i.) I do not know how I am to put my son to study philosophy, or (ii.) I do not know how to bring myself to embark my son on the study of philosophy. The

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν ἐκάστη τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὀράς;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτὸς τε φεύξει πάντα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ νείῃ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ οὐν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ὅ γε οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀλλ' ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοὶ εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μὲν σοι φαίνεται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπώτρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς νείεις· ἐὰν δὲ φαίνεται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.

first implies the pooriness of the teachers as the bar to learning philosophy well; the second detaches the father from the results as shown in the teachers (and therefore professors) themselves. The first is rendered slightly preferable by Socrates' reply

that the good teachers are few and far between.

ἐπεὶ. v. s. note, ch. xvi. ἐπεὶ ἀπόκριναι.

πρὸς ἕκαστον, as above, πρὸς ταῦτόν, ch. xxx. q. v.

τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, as the saying is. v. supr. ch. xvi. τὸ παλαιον.

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
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
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